BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI--A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

Statement of the Problem: The purpose of this study is to carefully and critically examine the methodologies and preconceptions[1] of Bronislaw Malinowski. Because Malinowski was very influential in the field of anthropology[2] and the social sciences in general, his methodologies and preconceptions are not peculiar to him alone. As a matter of fact a whole "school"--the so-called "functional school"--was built up around Malinowski. Moreover, the tradition which Malinowski typifies is symptomatic of fundamental developments which were/are taking place in all fields of inquiry. That is, the basic problems which confronted Malinowski and with which he struggled are similar to those facing economists, philosophers, psychologists, historians, political scientists, sociologists--all cultural investigators. For example, the problem of evaluation is universal. Thus, this thesis will have a wider orientation than that indicated by the title.

The author is particularly interested in discovering the

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[1] I am using "preconceptions" in the Veblenian sense; that is, to denote a priori, prejudiced beliefs--beliefs held in the face of scientific evidence to the contrary.

[2] The field of anthropology is extremely broad; the term "anthropology" has many meanings. In this thesis, I shall use "anthropology" to mean "cultural anthropology"; that is, the study of all the patterns of social life which have and are being developed through man's adjustment to his environment.

fundamental methodologies and preconceptions of Malinowski, in critically analyzing them and testing their validity, in comparing them with those of other influential and representative anthropologists and outstanding social scientists. In addition, the methodologies and preconceptions of those men with whom I shall compare Malinowski's way-of-thinking will not escape my critical analysis and evaluation.

This problem may be compared to that which faces the archaeologist in his attempt to establish spatial and chronological relationships between different foci. That is, the archaeologist attempts to compare the material culture of one focus with that of others, whereas I shall be interested in comparing the methodologies and preconceptions of Malinowski with those of his fellow anthropologists and social scientists.

Importance of the Problem: The importance of this thesis will lie in whether or not it succeeds in fulfilling the following three aims:

(1) To place Malinowski in proper perspective. That is, to show his relationship to other ways-of-thinking in his own field and in other fields of inquiry and to the general climate of opinion.

(2) To develop critical awareness on the part of the student of current techniques and theories in his own field of investigation.

(3) And most important of all, to focus attention on the major points of agreement and disagreement in the field of cultural anthropology. That is, to uncover the fundamental problems which now face the anthropologists. For example, some very influential anthropolo-

gists hold that there is an innate normative-descriptive dualism and that anthropology should concern itself with "pure description";[3] on the other hand, some equally well-known anthropologists hold that fact and theory are innately distinct, but are equally important and that it is legitimate to be concerned with theoretical issues.[4] It is obvious that the latter is only a modification of the first position. Very few anthropologists[5] hold the viewpoint common to some social and physical scientists[6] that the normative-descriptive dualism is a false, artificial and non-existent dualism in reality. This latter viewpoint,

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[3]Radin, Method and Theory of Ethnology, 1933, particularly pp. 115-117 but actually the whole book, is based upon this position; Herskovits, Dahomey, 1938, pp. viii-ix; Strong, "Anthropological Theory and Archaeological Fact," Essays in Anthropology, 1936, pp. 364-365; Drucker, American Anthropologist, Vol. 40, p. 520; Murdock, Studies in the Science of Society, 1937, p. xix; and Boas' "monographic" work expresses either a "pure" fact-theoretical dualism or makes normative statements about the desirability of pursuing purely factual investigation. In Culture and Ethnology, 1929, p. 21, Lowie makes a "pure" fact statement but later in The History of Ethnological Theory he notes that: "The clarification of concepts . . . directly gauges scientific process" (p. 281).

[4]Malinowski, Sorcerers of Dobu, 1932, pp. xxiv-xxv; Radcliffe-Brown, "The Present Position of Anthropological Studies," JRAI, Vol. LXX, 1931, pp. 150 and 157; Lowie, The History of Ethnological Theory, 1937, p. 281; Ashley Montagu, "Physical Anthropology and Anatomy," AJPA, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1941, p. 263; Goldenweiser, History, Psychology and Culture, 1933, the entire book; Lesser, Linton, Kroeber, Mead, Firth, Thurnwald, and the entire German school emphasize the role of theory in anthropology.

[5]Kluckhohn, "Theory in Anthropological Studies," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1939, pp. 328-344; Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, 1937, p. 8; Wallis, Culture and Progress, 1930, p. 46; and Richards, "Field Work Methods in Social Anthropology," in The Study of Society, 1939, p. 274.

[6]Peirce, Dewey, G. H. Mead, Angell, Childs, Veblen, Lundberg, Lynd, Bridgman, Franz, Lashley, C. E. Ayres, and G. V. Gentry, etc.

on the basis of vital evidence furnished by modern pragmatic experimental psychology, sets forth the position that the distinction between a "fact" and a "meaning," or a "theory," is a functional, logical distinction rather than an innate, given dualism.[7]

Here is an issue on which there is widespread disagreement not only in anthropology, but in economics, philosophy, physics, psychology, etc. Because of the scope of the controversy, it is clear that this is a significant and pressing problem. Kluckhohn has already placed this issue, which he considers to be of fundamental importance, before the anthropologists in a challenging article in Philosophy of Science.

> It is probably true that the greater number of contemporary American anthropologists feel that "theory" is a very dangerous kind of business which the careful anthropologist must be on his guard against. . . . It is . . . symptomatic that not until 1933 did a book by an American anthropologist include the word "theory" in its title (Radin). Only a single book published subsequently is explicitly given over to anthropological theory (Lowie). . . . My impression that American anthropologists (in spite of some evidence of a reawakening of theoretical interest during the past five years) are still devoting an overwhelming proportion of their energies to the accumulation of facts seems confirmed by the following empirical test samples. I examined all articles which have appeared in the American Anthropologist, the American Journal of Physical Anthropology, and American Antiquity . . . since January 1st, 1935. In the first-named journal I found . . . only seven articles out of 152 were devoted to theory in the sense of discussion of the canons of reasoning in anthropological procedures. In the American Journal of Physical Anthropology but one article in ninety-eight was concerned with theory. . . . In American Antiquity

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[7] Dewey, J., Logic--The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt and Company), 1938, Chpt. 9.

> four articles out of sixty-eight. . . . I must simply record my honest impression (and those anthropologists whom I have specifically questioned on this point agree that it was theirs also) that the very word "theory" has a pejoratif connotation for most American anthropologists. To suggest that something is "theoretical" is to suggest that it is slightly indecent. "Theory" indeed tends to be roughly equated with "speculation." [8]

This is only one of the points around which controversy revolves in anthropology and the social sciences. We shall examine in detail in the body of this thesis some of these more basic problems.

Statement of Procedure: The organization of this thesis is as follows: Chapter II will consider the "Biography of Bronislaw Malinowski"--his training, field work, teaching, and bibliography. Special attention is paid to the significant formative influences upon his way-of-thinking. Chapter III is a discussion and a partial evaluation of "Theories and Methodologies Basic to Malinowski's Viewpoints," and Chapter IV will include some "Methodological Comparisons." In Chapter V, his fundamental "Preconceptions" will be examined and evaluated. The "Conclusion," Chapter VI, will include a critical analysis of Malinowski's positive and negative contributions to the "Study of Man," and a brief discussion of the future of anthropology.

Although there is criticism and evaluation throughout the thesis, the body of the latter will be found in Chapter V, "Preconceptions." This procedure was followed because it became evident that Malinowski's

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[8] Kluckhohn, C., "The Place of Theory in Anthropological Studies," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1939, pp. 328-333.

preconceptions were "organically" related. For example, his concept of "mores relativism" impregnated all of his work. A criticism of any one of his beliefs must, in part, be in terms of his acceptance of relativism. Thus, a criticism of "mores relativism" is a criticism of most of his other viewpoints.

CHAPTER II

BIOGRAPHY OF BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI

Training: Bronislaw Kasper Malinowski was born in Cracow, Poland, in 1884 of an aristocratic, "cultured," and scholarly family. His father was a Slavic philologist and a university professor. This environment prepared Malinowski for an academic career.[1]

His first academic training was at the University of Cracow, where in 1908 he obtained a Ph.D. degree in physics and mathematics. Ill-health kept him, however, from pursuing as his life work research in these fields.

Malinowski's interest in anthropology, or the study of human cultures, was first awakened "as he left the University to recuperate, [and] struck accidentally a copy of Frazer's Golden Bough."[2] He subsequently attended the University of Leipzig for two years, falling under the influence of Wilhelm Wundt, "who turned his interests toward folk psychology and thence to cultural anthropology."[3] Malinowski's

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[1]Murdock, G. P., "Bronislaw Malinowski," obituary in American Anthropologist, Vol. 45, No. 3, Part I, 1943, pp. 441-451.

[2]Richards, A. I., "Bronislaw Kaspar Malinowski," obituary in Man, Vol. XLIII, January-February, 1943, pp. 1-4.

[3]A brief discussion at this point of Wilhelm Wundt's theories and contributions might possibly clarify some of Malinowski's subsequent viewpoints. Wundt is best known in psychology as the father of "physiological psychology, a new and experimental psychology that should apply the methods of science to the problems of the mind" (Boring). Because "Wundt was probably the most complete expression in

prime interest in the psychology of a people, the "Weltanschauung," can probably be traced initially to his contacts with Wundt. In addition, it was Wundt's influence that set Malinowski on the Gestalt path, for as Boring says: "The inheritance of Wundt can be found in Gestalt psychology." In the early part of the twentieth century, Malinowski was more deeply impressed by Gestaltism than any other competing school of psychology. In Sex and Repression in Savage Society, Malinowski expresses his indebtedness to such Gestalt psychologists as C. Lloyd Morgan and Köhler. It was through Gestalt psychology that Malinowski became interested in such synchronous movements as the

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his time of the scientific forces that were remaking psychology" (Murphy), he "approached the problem of primitive mentality with a far broader and deeper equipment in scientific method than did Spencer, Tylor, or Frazer" (Goldenweiser). Wundt, foreshadowing the social-psychological behaviorism of G. H. Mead, Dewey, Hull, and others, "realized that the psychological foundations of civilization cannot be sought in the isolated individual, but that the group always actively co-operates in the production of attitudes and ideas" (Goldenweiser). His psychology, however, is broadly classified by Boring as associationistic sensationism. Wundt attacked the "rationalism" of Tylor and others; that is, he attacked the concept that the whole universe is rational and that man's mind is also rational, being a mere reflection of the rational environment. Wundt escaped the errors of philosophical "individualism," realizing that "with reference to the individual, the group (the 'others') was the carrier of habit, of tradition. It set the pattern and held the individual to it. And patterns, historically transmitted, are culture. Culture, then Wundt taught, was a group product, a creation of the folk. As a culture-maker the individual was part of the folk, and only for purposes of analysis could he be separated from it, and then only with difficulty" (Goldenweiser). Wundt, unlike many of the contemporary American and English writers, was never a unilinear social evolutionist, always insisting upon the complexity of evolution. Furthermore, he did a great deal to purge the study of man of mysticism, insisting upon the "folk-psychological nature of language, art, mythology, religion" (Goldenweiser). Wundt's specific contribution to anthropology was, of course, Elements of Folk Psychology, published in 1916.

behavioristic trend in America. We know that later on he was more profoundly influenced by the behaviorist and pragmatic developments. Certainly, during the last years of his life, Malinowski was leaning more and more toward a pragmatic psychology.

While at Leipzig, according to Richards, Malinowski was also influenced by Carl Bücher.[4]

In 1910, Malinowski traveled to London, being attracted by the "preëminence of English anthropology." Here he became a student at the London School of Economics, as well as engaging in research at the British Museum. In London, Malinowski was one of many, as Richards brings out, who was stimulated and encouraged by C. G. Seligman.[5] He

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[4]Carl Bücher, celebrated economic historian, was a Professor of Political Economy at the University of Leipzig when Malinowski was studying there. Bücher was one of the first, if not the first, to emphasize the importance of "comparative economics" (Firth); that is, he was one of the first students of society to question some of the current economic theory and preconceptions on the basis of data derived from a comparative analysis of "primitive" societies. He early saw the kinship of economics and field anthropology. With comparative data obtained from 19th-century ethnographies, he attacked the concept of "economic man," illustrating that not all peoples have the degree of regulation, planning, accumulation, and transmission of economic goods as was characteristic of European societies. Furthermore, he saw, as only a few do, the technological (as well as magical) history of money--"money as the favorite exchange commodity furnished a medium that brought together men from tribe to tribe in regular peaceful trade and prepared the way for a differentiation of tribes in the matter of production." Bücher, while discarding many of the prevailing preconceptions of the economics of his age, retained--ironically enough--the basic mythology of classical economics. That is, he maintained, along with Adam Smith and others, that Capital (money funds) is the creative factor in industrial society. His most important work from an anthropological viewpoint is Industrial Evolution. Malinowski's interest in "primitive" economics was stimulated by Bücher.

[5]It is interesting to note that Seligman's primary interest was also the relationship between anthropology and psychology.

also worked under Westermarck, Frazer, Rivers, and Haddon. In 1916, Malinowski received a D.Sc. in anthropology from the University of London. This completed his formal education, although in 1936 he received an honorary D.Sc. from Harvard University.

Field Work: In 1914, despite the fact that he was already lecturing in the London School of Economics (since 1913), Malinowski left for the South Pacific with the Robert Mond expedition. This expedition lasted four years, during which time Malinowski did field work in New Guinea and northwestern Melanesia.

Malinowski's first actual contact with native peoples was with the Motu of Papua; here he spent only a few weeks. Following this, Malinowski lived for six months with the natives of Mailu in New Guinea. This provided the basis for his first ethnographic publication,[6] although he had previously published a theoretical treatise on the family among the aborigines of Australia.[7] Then for two years, during 1915-1916, 1917-1918, Malinowski did extensive and systematic field work in the Trobriand Islands. During these two years, as Frazer so aptly states in the Preface of Argonauts of the Western Pacific: "Dr. Malinowski lived as a native . . . watching them daily at work and at play, conversing with them in their own tongue, and deriving all his information from the surest sources--personal

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[6] The Natives of Mailu: Preliminary Results of the Robert Mond Research Work in British New Guinea (Transactions of the Royal Society of South Australia, Vol. 39, pp. 493-706), 1915.

[7] The Family Among the Australian Aborigines (London: University of London Press), 1913.

observation and statements made to him directly by the natives in their own language without the intervention of an interpreter." It was during these two years of intimate personal contact with the Trobrianders that Malinowski collected "the materials for those classic works of anthropological description and interpretation upon which his reputation largely rests: Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922), Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926), The Sexual Life of Savages in Northwestern Melanesia (1929), and Coral Gardens and Their Magic (1935)."[8]

The work in the South Pacific did not, however, comprise all of his field-investigation, for, as Murdock notes, "he spent from one to several months each among the Hopi or Arizona in 1926, the Bemba and Chagga of East Africa in 1934, and the modern Zapotec of Mexico in 1940 and 1941."[9] He also made a flying trip to Africa in 1935 to visit students in the field in Tanganyika, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, and Swaziland. He lived in Poland, Germany, Australia, England, the United States, and in the Canary Islands for a short time, thus "giving him an exceptionally wide first-hand acquaintance with different systems of living and a broadly comparative outlook toward cultural phenomena."[10]

Teaching: Malinowski's role as a teacher really began when, in

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[8] Murdock, G. P., "Bronislaw Malinowski," obituary in American Anthropologist, Vol. 45, No. 3, Part I, 1943, p. 441.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., p. 442.

1924, he was appointed to a Readership in Social Anthropology at the University of London. In 1927, he was nominated to "the first Chair in Anthropology" as a professor. It was during this period that "he trained and stimulated a generation of younger anthropologists": Mair, Richards, Firth, Ashley Montagu, Schapera, Fortune, Hogbin, et al. In 1926, for a short time, he taught at the University of California; in 1933, he again returned to the United States, this time to give the Messenger Lectures at Cornell. From 1939 until his death in May, 1942, he was at Yale University, first as Bishop Museum Visiting Professor of Anthropology and later as President of the Polish Institute for Arts and Sciences. At the time of his death, he was under appointment as Professor of Cultural Anthropology at Yale.[11]

Bibliography: Malinowski may be complemented both for the quality and the quantity of his publications. An examination of the bibliography compiled by Underwood will show the vast extent of his contributions to anthropological knowledge.[12] Besides his classic work on the Trobriands, commented on above, a few of many outstanding contributions may be noted: "Culture," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences; "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages," supplement in Ogden and Richards' The Meaning of Meaning; "The Scientific Approach to the Study of Man," article in Science and Man, edited by R. N. Anshen; and

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[11] Ibid., p. 422.

[12] A nearly complete bibliography compiled by Frances Wenrich Underwood may be found in the American Anthropologist, Vol. 45, No. 3, Part I, 1943, pp. 445-451.

his famous foreword to Hogbin's Law and Order in Polynesia. "With but few exceptions, Malinowski's writings concern social-psychological problems, such as sex, myth, custom and tradition, marriage, kinship, religion and magic, and law." Malinowski was never very interested in the "material" elements of culture; this, in part, can be explained by his training under Wundt, Seligman, Westermarck, and Frazer.

A typical cosmopolitan, Malinowski spoke English, French, German, Italian, Polish, Russian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Afrikan, as well as Motuan and Trobriand. He furthermore published in English, Polish, German, French, and Spanish--primarily in English. Although a cosmopolitan, Malinowski identified himself with English anthropology and, as Richards brings out, "London was . . . the centre of his intellectual life and interests."

Thus, not only through teaching, but also through extensive publications, Malinowski gathered a whole score of students about him. Through them, and through personal influence, his theories and methodologies have impregnated anthropology. As Murdock sums up: "In the degree of influence he has exerted upon anthropological theory, Malinowski stands beside Morgan, Tylor, and Boas."

In conclusion, let us reiterate the five significant formative influences in Malinowski's life:

(1) the influence of his cosmopolitan and aristocratic background;

(2) the influence of his scientific training in physics and mathematics;

(3) the early influence of the associationistic-sensationistic

psychology of Wundt;

(4) the influence of comparative economics; and

(5) the later influence of the Gestalt school and the behavioristic-functional trend in psychology, as well as the related pragmatic trend in philosophy. (This factor, although of the greatest significance, is almost altogether overlooked in other criticisms.)

Throughout the rest of this thesis, repeated reference will be made to these formative influences, for Malinowski's work can be fully understood only in the light of these factors. The fifth point will be treated in some detail, because it is of crucial importance in Malinowski's intellectual development. Furthermore, his outstanding contributions stem from this fifth influence.

CHAPTER III

THEORIES AND METHODOLOGIES BASIC TO MALINOWSKI'S VIEWPOINTS

> Whether or not the science of man is going to become a real science depends on three questions: can observation in the field be empirical and precise; is there any chance of discovering laws and general rules in anthropology; is the practical application of anthropological principles possible?[1]

Malinowski and Science: Common and basic to all of Malinowski's methodologies and theories is the belief that anthropology must be "the scientific approach to the study of man." Murdock states that if any label must be used to characterize the objectives and emphasis of Malinowski's work, it should be "scientific" and not "functional," for "Malinowski always fought hard and sometimes even ruthlessly for the development of a well integrated science of human behavior."[2] In pursuing the goal of scientific legitimacy, Malinowski not only improved the calibre of his own field work, but also developed scientific methods of investigation unique to anthropology.

Before discussing Malinowski's contributions to a science of

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[1] Malinowski, "Introduction" to Fijian Frontier by L. Thompson (Honolulu: American Council-Institute of Pacific Relations), 1940, p. xvii.

[2] Murdock, G. P., "Bronislaw Malinowski," obituary in American Anthropologist, Vol. 45, No. 3, Part I, 1943, p. 445.

anthropology, let us first question: "What is science to Malinowski?" In the first place, Malinowski does not consider mere fact gathering as science, but conceives of science as being an organized system of relationships. As G. H. Mead brings out in the following quotation:

> Science always tries to state an organized system of relations, but it never states the character of the object in itself apart from its relations. . . . You cannot deal with a body just by itself and find out what it is and so build up a system; you have to state it in terms of its relation to some system there. Now it is these necessary relations between bodies with which science is occupied.[3]

It was such a conceptual basis that led Malinowski to reject the "atomic" or "piecemeal" work of Westermarck, Tylor, and others, and to formulate the so-called "functional" approach. In Malinowski's own words:

> We can only plead for the speedy and complete disappearance from the records of field-work of the piecemeal items of information, of customs, beliefs, and rules of conduct floating in air, or rather leading a flat existence on paper with the third-dimension, that of life, completely lacking.[4]

The systematic nature of science is furthermore clearly brought out by Malinowski in the following paragraph:

> After all there is no value in isolated facts for science, however striking and novel they might seem in them-

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[3]Mead, G. H., The Philosophy of the Act (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 1938, p. 80.

[4]Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company), 1926, p. 126.

selves. Genuine scientific research differs from mere curio-hunting in that the latter runs after the quaint, singular and freakish--the craving for the sensational and the mania of collecting providing its twofold stimulus. Science on the other hand has to analyze and classify facts in order to place them in an organic whole, to incorporate them in one of the systems in which it tries to group the various aspects of reality.[5]

And elsewhere he states:

> It is the search for this common measure which modern anthropology begins to recognize more and more as its main aim. Intuitive schools may still rhapsodize about "specific tribal geniuses," about the "incommensurability of human cultures," and provide each culture with its own colorful descriptive label. Real scientific work is confirmed to the thorough, consistent, and clear consideration of what all cultures have in common with each other, or why they differ, because of environment, contacts, and level of evolutionary differentiation.[6]

Thus, as a science, anthropology must show both intra and inter tribal or cultural relationships. While the data is being collected by the field anthropologist, he must show the interrelations between the individual and "the organized bodies of activities carried out by each social group in fulfilment of a primary biological need" (which is social structure, cf., Radcliffe-Brown) and the relationships between individuals, the "imponderabilia of actual life" (which is social relations, cf., Radcliffe-Brown), and finally a sociological

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[5] Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: George Routledge and Sons), 1922, p. 509.

[6] Malinowski, "Introduction" to Fijian Frontier by L. Thompson (Honolulu: American Council-Institute of Pacific Relations), 1940, p. xviii.

comparison of the social structure and social relations of one society with that of another--for the establishment of "generalizations," "laws" if you will, about cultural behavior. The primary aim of science, and anthropology, is the establishment of predictive values, as the following quotation by Malinowski brings out:

> Science--to give an unpretentious yet clear definition or reminder--is the translation of experience into general laws which have predictive value. We have to inquire, then, whether it is possible to establish general rules and principles concerning cultural process and product. Such rules, to be scientific, must be inferred from observation and be subject to experimental test. They must be generalizations of universal validity. It is essential to have statements of principle which remain true whether applied to primitive or to highly developed cultures, to an arctic or a tropical island-tribe in the Pacific.[7]

Malinowski thus believes that anthropology can become scientific only when/if it accepts (which it has to a great extent) the "functional" or interrelational approach. This assumes, of course, that anthropology must improve its methods and theories for collecting data; a problem of which Malinowski was well aware, and which will be discussed at length below under the following headings: Structural, Functional Participatory, and Pragmatic Approach.

Normative-Descriptive Dualism: The most interesting part of Malinowski's outline for a scientific anthropology is contained in the following quotation: "Is the practical application of anthropological

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[7]Malinowski, "The Scientific Approach to the Study of Man," in Science and Man, edited by R. N. Anshen (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company), 1942, p. 208.

principles possible?" And, "This change of front in anthropological research is mainly due to the fact that, like every other science, anthropology has had either to show its practical utility or become disqualified as an idle mental game."[8] Unlike a great number of anthropologists, Malinowski does not see the value of "science qua science," an attitude that assumes "pure" observation, and the devil take care of application. But instead, Malinowski realizes that there is an unbroken continuity between the collection and organization of data with preconceived methods and techniques and the application of such data, still under the influence of the normative methods and techniques. In other words, Malinowski would not agree in full with Murdock when he says:

> The reader will now be prepared to understand why the articles in this volume are characterized by a striking absence of normative or melioristic views. These relate to policy, with which pure science has no concern. The scientist, as an individual, may, of course, favor any social policy which seems to him desirable, whether it be that of a Mussolini, a Stalin, a Hoover, or a Roosevelt, but he cannot import such views into his scientific writing and remain true to science. The authors of the articles in this volume hold personal opinions on social and political questions ranging from reactionary, through conservative and liberal, to radical. Since they are here speaking as scientists, however, a fundamental consistency, representing the common ground of science, runs through their various contributions.[9]

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[8] Malinowski, B., "Introduction" to Hogbin's Law and Order in Polynesia (London: Christophers), 1934, p. xviii.

[9] Murdock, G. P., "Editorial Preface" to Studies in the Science of Society (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1937, p. xix. The underscoring in the quotations throughout this thesis is the author's.

It would follow from reading the above quotation that science had no relation whatsoever to any social-political question and that "pure" science was something apart from and irrelevant to human activity. This is the logical conclusion of such an absurdity which has arisen as a relatively late abstraction from the physical sciences; that is, the idea of a non-social world. Suffice to say it is a meaningless concept, because nothing has meaning aside from the existence of the interpreter. The interpreter is a necessary precondition to meaning.

The above implied dualism between normative and descriptive data is basic to modern anthropological theory and, as a matter of fact, to the whole modern "climate of opinion." However, to modern pragmatic philosophers and modern experimental psychologists such a dualism is untenable.

The "pure fact" school in anthropology, and in all other branches of inquiry, hinges its position, unwittingly or implicitly, on two pre-scientific theoretical traditions: "Empiricism" in philosophy, and "Introspectionism" and "Sensationism" in psychology. That is, the proponents of the above related theoretical positions, as well as the "pure fact" scientists, believe that the "senses" have the capacity to receive raw data; for example, you see a tree, just as it is--a tree. Furthermore, the empiricists assume that a "fact" is innate--already given. All that is required is for the human "mind" to grasp this given "fact"--a kind of miraculous revelation occurs. They do not recognize the interaction which takes place between the total organism,

including the senses and the environment. These "empiricists" believe that the "mind" is essentially receptive or, as Locke states, a blank tablet upon which experience writes. Sensations are the basis of simple, primitive ideas; a complex idea is simply the combination of simple ideas. The "Empiricists" would agree en toto with Herskovits when he says:

> Unlike many recent anthropological monographs, the present work is purely descriptive. It is to be regarded as unfortunate that we have not held to an earlier tradition that dictated the separation in publication of ethnographic materials from ethnological controversies, leaving the former to be drawn on by all, irrespective of theoretical position, to document the problems in the study of culture that transcend materials from a single folk.[10]

Or with Strong when he says:

> Good ethnology is purely descriptive. Only when the results are used for generalizing or historical purposes are sociology or anthropology involved. The cardinal sin against ethnology is to curtail in any way or obscure its concrete facts. "Historical reconstructions," "elucidations of meaning," or "functional interpretations" should be made separately. The facts themselves are sacred. As such they may be employed as desired by the administrators, sociologist, anthropologist, psychologist, and others.[11]

And Lowie, who illustrates explicitly in the following statement the confusion in the normative-descriptive dualism:

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[10] Herskovits, M. J., Dahomey (New York: J. J. Augustin, Publisher), 1938, pp. viii-ix.

[11] Strong, "Anthropological Theory and Archaeological Fact," Essays in Anthropology (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1936, pp. 364-365.

> One of the important subjects for ethnographic study is artistic form. The ethnologist notes in a purely descriptive way the decorative patterns employed by various tribes, the fact that curvilinear motives are prominent among the Maori of New Zealand while the rawhide bags of Plains Indians are covered with angular paintings.[12]

Modern experimental psychology, pragmatic philosophy, as well as the whole history of man, offer instrumental (experimental operations which yield predictive consequences) evidence to attack the above "Empirical" position. In the first place, the "Mind" is not something given to begin with--a static entity--but is an evolutionary product subject to change and modification. As a matter of fact, modern experimental psychologists do not talk about the "Mind," but rather about the highly complex nervous system of man, which is a relatively late evolutionary resultant. This evolutionary attitude allows for a naturalistic theory of knowledge. Such a theory sets forth the basic fact that it is only through the interaction of the organism with the environment that ideas arise, and that we really "know." In other words, a "pure" fact or "pure" science is a phenomenon unknown to man; for man, the fact is always contained within a cultural context which determines its significance. It is in the interactive process that man "knows," and his actions indicate what he knows. Habits of action, or tendencies to act, are thus the only locus of rational, logical thinking--of ideas, if you please. This mundane, naturalistic explanation of thought meets with furious resistance on the part of tradi-

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[12] Lowie, R. H., Culture and Ethnology (New York: Peter Smith), 1929, p. 21.

tional philosophers and psychologists, but this is essentially the thesis of modern experimental science. Its general acceptance is only a matter of time.

In the second place, modern experimental animal psychologists and the pragmatists have also illustrated that a "fact" is not something already given or innate. The pragmatists emphasize that the "fact"-"theory" distinction is purely a functional, logical distinction. For example, X comes to a fork in the road; he does not know whether to take Road A or Road B; thus, a problematic situation confronts X; X, after some reflection, looks for a signpost; upon finding the signpost, the signpost becomes a "fact" for X in this particular situation, but only by virtue of its "pointing" function (it points to, or is a sign of, a solution of his problem). The signpost was not a given, innate "fact" of this situation; it became a "fact" only because of its functional role in the entire situation.

"Functionalism" in Anthropology: The functional school of psychology, which arose at the end of the 19th century, was the first to strongly emphasize the process of the adaptation of the organism to the environment--an interactive process. This school, predicated on the findings of the new biological sciences, had wide repercussions in all fields of investigation, particularly philosophy, economics, and (I believe) anthropology. Malinowski, in emphasizing the adaptive process, is obviously a product of this trend--an offspring of the functional school of psychology.

Out of such naturalistic psychological foundations, the theory of

instrumentalism arose, a theory to which Malinowski, in part and insofar as he understands it, subscribes. That is, through the development of tools, techniques, concepts or "instrumentalities," man has widened his range of interaction with the environment, as well as his control over the environment. As a matter of fact, the number of stimuli have been increased by technological developments. This can best be illustrated by comparing marginal[13] and western societies.

Science--in Marginal and Western Societies: In comparing the level of scientific achievement of marginal and western groups, we must first dispel the notion that differences exist because of biological capacities. There is no scientific evidence to show a biological difference between the nervous systems of the marginal and western man, or that race is causally related to culture. Therefore, we must seek for differences in the cultural matrix.

The basic reason for the difference of the position of science in marginal and western groups can be attributed to "the state of the

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[13]In this thesis, I shall use the terms "marginal peoples," "marginal groups," or "marginal societies," rather than the terms "primitive peoples," "savage peoples," etc. By "marginal peoples" is meant all peoples who have not yet acquired modern western technology to any significant degree. That is, "marginal peoples" are marginal to modern technological societies. This, I believe, to be the real distinction between the so-called "savage man" and the so-called "civilized man." This same distinction is implicit, although usually unrecognized, in all comparative anthropological works which deal with the subject of man. The term used in this sense does not have "geographical" implications.

"Marginal peoples" is a more satisfactory terminology than "primitive peoples," "savage peoples," etc., precisely because it does imply technological differences rather than psychological differences. And, of course, the former is the actual locus of the differences.

arts" or the "cultural threshold." As Dewey brings out: "The progress of inquiry (science) is identical with advance in the invention and construction of physical instrumentalities for producing, registering, and measuring change."[14] That is, with the proliferation of instrumentalities, with the development of more accurate means of testing hypothesis,[15] man has gained greater control over his environment. With the development of tools,[16] "junk piles," man is faced with a greater number of problematic situations. As Charles Peirce would state, technological development is a factor causing more doubt and leading to reflection as a means of establishing "belief." The pragmatic behavioristic psychologist would also add that tools are a basic factor contributing to the increased capacity of the organism to receive stimuli, hence increasing the interaction between the organism and the environment.

For example, when marginal man is faced with a problem (and he is not faced with problems as often as western man), what means does he have for solving the problem? Because he does not have the tools and techniques for a scientific solution of the problem, he resorts to magic. This "Quest for Certainty" is clearly illustrated by Dewey in

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[14]Dewey, J., The Quest for Certainty (New York: Minton, Balch and Company), 1929, p. 84.

[15]"An hypothesis is a statement based on evidence, and not certain, because some of the relevant evidence is lacking." Knowledge and Society (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co.), 1938, p. 67.

[16]As tools, we include not only mechanical contrivances which operationally widen fields of inquiry, but also ideas and reflection.

the following paragraph:

> As a drowning man is said to grasp at a straw, so men who lacked the instruments and skills developed in later days, snatched at whatever, by any stretch of imagination, could be regarded as a source of help in time of trouble. The attention, interest and care which now go to acquiring skill in the use of appliances and to the invention of means for better service of ends, were devoted to noting omens, making irrelevant prognostications, performing ritualistic ceremonies and manipulating objects possessed of magical power over natural events. In such an atmosphere primitive religion was born and fostered. Rather this atmosphere was the religious disposition.[17]

And by G. H. Mead:

> Before science men tried to control the world by magic. The ends of magic and the ends of science are not essentially different; it is the means that are different. The magician and the medicine men were undertaking to control the environment in the interests of certain social ends, just as definitely as science does, but they did not succeed in any such degree.[18]

This does not mean that all problems in a marginal community are solved by magic (or that magic is unknown in a western community), or even most of them, for man cannot live by magic. However, it does imply that there is more magic in a marginal community than in a western society, because of the level of the instrumental development. What means, then, does marginal man use to solve problems, to control nature?

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[17] Dewey, op. cit., p. 10.

[18] Mead, G. H., The Philosophy of the Act (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 1938, p. 475.

Common Sense: As noted above, man cannot live by magic alone, for life in any society is one of constant interaction with the environment, and through this interaction problems arise which must be solved with at least common-sense techniques. Common sense is well defined by Evans-Prichards in the following quotation:

> These are patterns of thought that attribute to phenomena only what men observe in them or what can logically be inferred from observation. So long as a notion does not assert something which has not been observed, it is not classed as mystical even though it is mistaken on account of incomplete observation. It still differs from mystical notions in which supra-sensible forces are always posited.[19]

The way in which common sense, rather than magic or science, is used to solve problems in a marginal community is shown in the following quotation which concerns the relation of magic to practical (common sense) work among the Trobriand Islanders. The quotation also shows how effective adjustment to nature is on a common-sense, and not a magical or scientific level.

> The gift of fertility bestowed by the mythical founders and wielders of magic on the richest districts of that region is without exception conceived in a two-fold manner, magical and natural. The natives realise that on sandy, brackish and stony soil neither yams nor taro, and still less taytu, could ever grow. . . . At the same time they attribute the supreme fertility of some districts, the prosperity which dwells there permanently and the beautiful expanse of successful gardens, to the superiority of one magical system over another. . . . The two ways, the way of magic and the way of garden work, are inseparable. They are

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[19] Evans-Pritchard, E. E., Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1937, p. 12.

> never confused, nor is one of them ever allowed to supersede the other. The natives will never try to clean the soil by magic, to erect a fence or yam support by a rite. They know quite well that they have to do it by hand and in the sweat of their brow. . . . To the natives, therefore, the aims of magic are different from the aims of work. They know quite well what effects they try to produce by competent and industrious labour. They equally know that certain evils, such as pests, blights, bush-pigs, drought or rain, cannot be overcome by human work however hard and consistent. They see also that, at times and in a mysterious way, gardens thrive in spite of all anticipations to the contrary, or else that, in a fairly good season favoured by good work, the gardens do not give the results they should. Any unaccountable good luck over and above what is due the natives attribute to magic; exactly as they attribute unexpected and undeserved bad luck to black magic or to some deficiency in the carrying out of their own magic.[20]

The Azande, as Evans-Prichard clearly brings out, also distinguish between natural and mystical causation:

> Now a granary is the summerhouse of a Zande homestead and people sit beneath it in the heat of the day and chat. . . . Consequently it may happen that there are people sitting beneath the granary when it collapses and they are injured, for it is a heavy structure. . . . Now why should these particular people have been sitting under this particular granary at the particular moment when it collapsed? . . . We say that the granary collapsed because its supports were eaten away by termites. That is the cause that explains the collapse of the granary. We also say that people were sitting under it at the time because it was in the heat of the day and they thought that it would be a comfortable place to talk and work. This is the cause of the people being under the granary at the time it collapsed. To our minds the only relationship between these two independently caused facts is their coincidence in time and space. We have no explanation of why the two chains of causation intersected at a certain time and in a certain place, for there is no interdependence between them.

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[20] Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: American Book Company), 1935, Vol. I, pp. 75-77.

> Zande philosophy can supply the missing link. The Zande knows that the supports were undermined by termites and that people were sitting beneath the granary in order to escape the heat and glare of the sun. But he knows besides why these two events occurred at a precisely similar moment in time and space. It was due to the action of witchcraft. . . . Witchcraft explains the coincidence of these two happenings.
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> Witchcraft explains why events are harmful to man and not how they happen. A Zande perceives how they happen just as we do. He does not see a witch push over a granary, but termites gnawing away its supports. He does not see a physical flame igniting thatch, but an ordinary lighted bundle of straws. His perception of how events occur is as clear as our own.[21]

The separation on an operational level between ritual (magical) and technical (common-sense) activity is further illustrated in Firth's study of the Tikopians:

> The ritual of net-making is hardly to be described as part of the technique of production. It is not intended to assist the manufacture of the net itself, but to help the net to fulfill its proper function afterwards. It may be described as a rite of deferred production, not a rite of immediate production. . . . As far as its effects on the efficiency of the process of production are concerned, the ritual does not challenge the autonomy of the technical processes for the work as a whole. But the ritual has certain positive effects. . . . Granted the present technique and knowledge of resources, the ritual system is a positive factor in the situation of production, contributing directly to the organization and indirectly affecting the output. . . . The ritual beliefs and practices may have some negative influence upon technical advance. By insisting upon the truth of certain false propositions, and by treating failure as an event of a non-technical order, to be corrected by further ritual rather than by experiment, beliefs and practices such as those described may immobilize some

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[21] Op. cit., pp. 69-72.

of the forces of invention and hamper more efficient adaptation.[22]

In the light of the above quotations (and by a mass of other anthropological data), it can be shown that marginal people face practical problems, demanding active adaptation, with common-sense evaluations. And, when they do not have the techniques for even common-sense interpretations, they rely upon "mystical notions." By "mystical notions" we mean "patterns of thought that attribute to phenomena supra-sensible qualities which, or part of which, are not derived from observation or cannot be logically inferred from it, and which they do not possess."[23] By "mystical" we do not mean "supernatural" as commonly used, for as long as there is no body of "natural" knowledge (and marginal peoples have no such body of knowledge) defined by instrumental investigation, then there can be no "supernatural." It is more accurate to speak of the ordinary and the extraordinary events.[24]

Common sense is the most common form of evaluation in all societies--marginal and western alike. But always common-sense beliefs are empirical (observational), and because they are, evaluations based upon common sense are both individualistic and sensationistic. Furthermore, common sense is typified by greater emotional intensity than scientific inquiry, but by less emotional intensity than "mystical"

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[22]Firth, R., Primitive Polynesian Economy (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1939, pp. 179-186.

[23]Ibid., p. 12.

[24]Ibid., pp. 80-83.

notions.

In contradiction to Evans-Prichard's statement that the Azande's, and by implication marginal peoples, "perception [observation] of how events occur is as clear as our own,"[25] we note that observation, like scientific behavior, is not a constant in all societies. That would imply the psychic unity of mankind (cf. Bastian); and likewise, observation does not differ from society to society because of innate differences in mentality (cf. Lévy-Bruhl). Common-sense observation, like science, is a changing factor because of tools, as Dewey clearly brings out in the following quotation:

> Common sense in respect to both its content of ideas and beliefs, and its methods of procedure, is anything but a constant. Both its content and its method alter from time to time not merely in detail but in general pattern. Every invention of a new tool and utensil, every improvement in technique, makes some difference in what is used and enjoyed and in the inquiries that arise with reference to use and enjoyment, with respect to both significance and meaning.[26]

To further illustrate the enormous variance in the contents and methods of common sense, as well as science, from one mode of life to another, I would like to refer to an argument with a fellow anthropologist in which the following challenge was made: "How do you know the world is flat?" The argument up to that point had centered about whether I was more scientific, as an individual in a western society,

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[25] Supra, p. 29.

[26] Dewey, J., Logic--The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt and Company), 1938, p. 64.

than an average native in a marginal society. In the first place, to put this argument on such an individualistic level is ridiculous and irrelevant, for no one person epitomizes a way-of-life and knowledge. Rather, we should have compared the body of knowledge of one society with that of another. However, the challenge was made in order to solicit the statement on my part that I did not have on the tip of my tongue the proof of the earth's sphericity. And the statement was made either overlooking or underemphasizing the influence of instrumental development upon western "climate of opinion." For although I cannot give the theoretical and operational explanations of the earth's sphericity, I have available a body of scientific knowledge (for science is the most social of all knowledge), and I have available scientific instruments whereby such a statement could be answered. The marginal man, in contrast, has no scientific means for testing such a problem (it would probably not be a problem), so it is not illogical for them to assume by common-sense observation that the world is flat.

Also, tools have not only increased scientific means for solving such a problem, but they have widened our common-sense range of experience. For example, I have seen, and so have hundreds of thousands of other individuals, the photograph by Capt. A. W. Stevens taken from an elevation of 72,395 feet, the highest point ever reached by man, which shows the actual curvature of the earth.[27]

And finally, common-sense notions when taken out of context and

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[27]Copyright Supplement of the National Geographic Magazine, May, 1936.

handed down from generation to generation become traditional (mystical) notions. The scientific process, on the contrary, is self-corrective--it discards irrelevant material.

More Aspects of Science: It follows from the above discussion that marginal peoples have very few scientific explanations. However, some anthropological data has been forwarded to indicate "scientific" experiment and attitude. Peter Freuchen in Artic Adventure notes one such extremely interesting approximation to scientific methodology:

> During the fall the natives turned pagan again. They had been Christian for more than a year and it had done them no good--the dogs had come down with distemper just the same. The Eskimos had even gone so far as to hang tiny crosses about the dogs' necks, but it had not helped. Then a young woman remembered that once as a child she had cured a dog by binding pagan amulets around its neck. She was a cautious, clever girl, so now she fastened both a cross and a round piece of wood to several dogs' necks, and the animals recovered. Then, by a scientific system of trial and elimination, they set about to determine which had been responsible for the cure. Half the remaining sick animals were treated with crosses, the rest with wooden amulets. The dogs wearing the pagan wood recovered. Whereupon the natives returned to the ways of their forefathers, and doubtless remained satisfied until another problem arose.[28]

In order to bring out clearly other aspects of science, let us analyze the above illustration of a "scientific system."

a. Control: The above "experiment" is not scientific, for one very important reason: there is no "control" group. That is, the

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[28] See pp. 422-423. Furthermore, a more careful research on this particular incident would probably show that it was stimulated by white contact--a borrowed technique out of "context." Actually the "experiment" could not have and did not have scientific "meaning."

young woman did not observe the dogs which had neither amulets nor crosses to see if they died. Control is always a part of scientific technique. This experiment is, incidentally, logical in an Aristotelian sense, but not in a modern scientific sense.

b. Multiple Causality: The magical disposition of the young woman (a product of a lack of tools and a pre-scientific "climate of opinion") led her to never question the possibility of natural causation. For in this "experiment" the choice was between two objects with a single function--magical protection. Science, however, demands that all relevant alternatives be considered as causal. But, in order to frame a problem, marginal man must see causal relationships; he cannot do so if he does not have the instrumentalities. He is aware that the dog is sick, that there are disturbing factors about which there is doubt, and he finds a solution (the certainty) in supersensible reference, and not through scientific investigation. As long as the "state of the arts" was insufficient for solving problems scientifically (microscopes, glass test tubes, naturalism, etc.), solutions were on a common-sense or magical level. Furthermore, the "scientific system of trial and elimination" used by the young woman was really just common-sense trial and error technique.

c. Reflection: Science, too, demands reflection; that is, symbolic activity based upon past experience which selects (admits or rejects) possible alternative solutions with reference to future activity. In reflection, "future action" is conditioned by reference to the "known" results, active consequences, of methods and techniques

utilized in the past. Scientific reflection does not grow out of patterns innately a part of the "Mind," but grows out of a logical analysis arising as a part of scientific inquiry.

d. Adequate Tools: Part of the job of modern anthropology is to discard the pseudo-scientific attitude that it is a "pure" science, and dig into the problem of improving its theoretical and methodological tools. The anthropologists today are not doing this job, as Gorer brings out in the following quotation:

> . . . the fact that further knowledge has invalidated the earlier hypotheses of social evolution is not a proper excuse for not trying to form new hypotheses which will take into account the newer sources of knowledge; and in so far as they fail to do this anthropologists are inadequately fulfilling their functions.[29]

Malinowski, many years earlier, in reaction to the atomic trend in anthropology of "pure" fact gathering, stated:

> What still remains to be done is to develop both a theoretical background and a method suitable for comparative analysis and field work, which will allow us to account for certain phenomena. . . .[30]

And, even more emphatically:

> I am still deeply convinced that anthropological theory, especially in reference to methods of field-work, has to be

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[29] Gorer, G., Himalayan Village (London: Michael Joseph), 1939, pp. 435-436.

[30] Malinowski, B., "Introduction" to Hogbin's Law and Order in Polynesia (London: Christophers), 1934, p. xxxii.

> reformed and reformed rapidly. One of the most urgent needs for us is to develop a set of theoretical principles referring to the mechanisms of primitive law, economics and education; theories which would focus the interest and attention of the field worker on the actual working of the social and cultural institutions of his natives.[31]

The argument that theories are pernicious to valid field-work is repeatedly attacked by Malinowski. He first notes that "the field worker relies entirely upon inspiration from theory," and "foreshadowed problems are the main endowment of a scientific thinker, and these problems are first revealed to the observer by his theoretical studies."[32] Malinowski also shows how a lack of technical knowledge caused the anthropologist[33] to overlook, or to be unaware of, valuable data.

> My botanical ignorance has been a great handicap to me. Some knowledge of tropical cultivated plants would have been an immense help. I was not able to judge for myself where rational procedure ended and which were the supererogatory activities, whether magical or aesthetic. Thus the whole question of the training of vines, the method of planting taro, taytu and large yams, lacked one important cultural dimension. Above all, I was not quite able to see whether

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[31] Ibid., p. lix.

[32] Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, p. 9.

[33] In this thesis I am not using the two terms "ethnographer" and "ethnologist." Malinowski and his followers use "Ethnography for the empirical and descriptive results of the science of Man, and . . . ethnology for speculative and comparative theories" (Malinowski). This implies an empirical-theoretical dualism. It is interesting to note that the dualism implied by Malinowski's use of these two words is not consistent, for the most part, with the rest of his attitudes towards theory and method. In discarding these terms, I hope to avoid the dualism implicit in their use. For intensive sociological investigation, I shall use the term "field-anthropology."

> some aspects of the native technique and theory of planting, thinning out and weeding were definitely dictated by scientific principles empirically reached and correctly translated into practice.[34]

And, elsewhere:

> My ignorance of certain technological principles comes out clearly . . . a knowledge of technology is indispensable as a means of approach to economic and sociological activity . . . a thorough grasp of how natives construct a yam-house would have enabled me to judge why they construct it in that way, and to discuss with them, as between equals, the scientific foundations of their manual systems.[35]

As stated before (cf. Dewey), the progress of scientific inquiry depends directly upon improved physical instrumentalities--adequate tools. In recent years, field-anthropology has greatly benefited through the use of improved cameras and photographic techniques. For one of the most striking deficiencies of the "classic" monographs is the primitive character of the photographs. Malinowski's work, by his own admission, is included. In 1942, Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead published a photographic analysis of Balinese character which will remain a milestone in anthropological methodology.[36] This book is a collection of 700 candid-photographs carefully selected from 25,000 Leica negatives. Along with each photograph, or group of photo-

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[34]Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: American Book Company), 1935, Vol. I, p. 460.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Bateson, G., and Mead, M., Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis (Special Publications of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 2), 1942.

graphs, is a verbal analysis by Bateson. Psychologically related behavior, spatially and contextually separated but of the same emotional trend, is cross-referenced by placing a series of photographs on the same page. In the words of the authors:

> In this monograph we are attempting a new method of stating the intangible relationships among different types of cultural behavior by placing side by side mutually relevant photographs. . . . To present them [mutually related behavior] together in words, it is necessary either to resort to devices which are inevitably literary or to dissect the living scenes of each behavior so that only desicated items remain. [But] . . . by the use of photographs, the wholeness of each piece of behavior can be preserved.[37]

There are some errors and limitations in this book, principally because of the primary thesis--Balinese character. Without enough individual documentary support, the authors drew conclusions (through photographs) about Balinese psychology. But such conclusions can only be drawn, as Lois and Gardner Murphy bring out, "after achieving a good over-all understanding of the culture," and through studying individual life-histories, which would not require the enormous difficulties of taking 25,000 photographs.[38]

However, the important thing is not whether or not this book has used photography with complete satisfaction, but whether it is a step forward in the development of a "science of man." In bringing to

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[37] Ibid., p. xii.

[38] Murphy, Lois and Gardner, "Review" of Mead and Bateson's Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis, in the American Anthropologist, Vol. 45, No. 4, Part I, 1943, pp. 615-619.

attention the need for a more complete use of cameras and photographic techniques, in an attempt to develop research techniques, it marks, I believe, progress towards the documentary filming of a culture. The study further illustrates how science is improved through the development of new instrumentalities.

Modern field-anthropology enjoys the use of a number of other physical instrumentalities--tools which have enabled the anthropologist to make more varied and more thorough investigation.

The revolution in transportation, the so-called "age of discovery," made possible comparative studies in anthropology. Subsequently, anthropology has benefited from all improvements in transportation which enable the field worker to reach the fartherest outpost. For example, from Austin, Texas, contact can be made by airplane with any marginal group any place in the world in sixty-four hours. These improvements in transportation also make greater cultural homogeneity inevitable; consequently, the anthropologist is being forced to change his theories and methodologies to take into consideration the phenomenon of acculturation. This accounts for the recent intense interest in culture-contact evidenced by Melville Herskovits, Robert Redfield, Isaac Schapera, Ernest Beaglehole, and others.

Modern medical development has made possible field investigation under almost any condition. For example, malaria need no longer be feared by the field worker in the tropics.

The phonograph has been of great value to the field-anthropologist. Frances Densmore and Laura Bolton have used it very successfully in

recording "folk" music. It is a stock trade-tool of the linguist. The phonograph also provides a very accurate means of recording rituals, chants, and genealogies.

These are only a few of the tools which have increased the efficiency and skill of the anthropologist. The tool factor cannot be overemphasized, for new tools effect a revolution in anthropology, as in all other phases of culture.

e. Interdependency: The sciences are interdependent, constituting a "structural" or "genetic" whole.[39] Mathematics in one form or another is utilized by all fields of inquiry. Modern experimental psychology was made possible by developments in the biological sciences which in turn depended upon developments in physics and chemistry. The conceptual structure of Darwinism has had repercussions in all fields.

Anthropology typifies this interdependency, as it relies upon investigation in all of the physical, biological, and cultural sciences. For example, the so-called "Functionalist," when discussing the needs of the organism and the adjustments it has made, must keep up with the latest development in psychology and physiology, as well as chemistry. The human biologists, like Raymond Pearl, have provided social anthropology with the foundation for one of its most fundamental premises: that "culture is only casually and not causally related to race" (Wallis). The culture-area concept developed by Wissler is an extension, according to Radin, of the quantitative methods of physics

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[39] Mayer, J., Social Science Principles in the Light of Scientific Method (Durham: Duke University Press), 1941, p. 12.

and biology.[40] From geology and history, anthropology gained historical perspective. In the light of the above discussion, the argument about whether or not social anthropology (the social sciences) is scientific appears futile. For anthropology and all the social sciences have grown out of the physical and natural sciences. Most of the basic methodologies of the social sciences are those of the physical and natural sciences, though many new scientific tools have been developed in the social sciences--each problem to a certain extent demanding a unique approach.

f. Misconceptions: It is argued that the problems and the data of the social sciences are too complex, but, if and insofar as they are, it is due to insufficient and confused theoretical foundations and tools. This was the state of biology and related disciplines not so long ago. Many state that no controls are possible in the social sciences. The confusion here lies in that controls are thought of only in the specialized "laboratory" sense. The job of the social scientist is not to "ape" scientific laboratory methodology, but to develop instrumentalities which meet new problems and which meet scientific specifications as outlined in this chapter.

One of the most frequently encountered misconceptions is that the social sciences cannot develop "laws"--"natural" laws. But that in itself is a preconception about science, for science is not interested in stating immutable laws (ends), but relations. Science attempts to

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[40] Radin, P., Method and Theory of Ethnology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.), 1933.

show the relations between certain phenomena under specified conditions and at a specified time. The modern scientific formula is: "such a thing will occur if these conditions are fulfilled at this time." Part of the specified conditions is the tool factor; when tools change results change. In this sense, science is operational. As Bridgman brings out:

> Relativity in the general sense is the merest truism if the operational definition of concept is accepted, for experience is described in terms of concepts, and since our concepts are constructed of operations, all our knowledge must unescapably be related to the operations selected.[41]

In the final analysis, science is a practical way of solving problems. And, most significantly of all, science is self-corrective. That is, a given hypothesis is used as long as it works more efficiently than any alternative hypothesis, and in the use of the hypothesis further refinements and corrections are made. Thus the scientific process is continuous and progressive.

The Structural Approach: Malinowski's best known contribution to anthropological methodology is the famous so-called "functional method." This ambiguous method usually refers to a "systematic technique for studying the interrelationship of different aspects of a particular culture--a technique which forces a field-worker to see each fact in a variety of different settings, and hence stimulates him

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[41] Bridgman, P., The Logic of Modern Physics (New York: The Macmillan Company), 1927, p. 25.

to follow a number of alternative lines of research."[42] However, frequently the term is used to refer to Malinowski's behavioristic treatment of basic human needs and their "cultural responses." At other times, "functionalism" is used to denote what a culture trait "does." Hence, the term is used with at least three different meanings--a situation which causes considerable confusion.

For purposes of analysis and clarification, we will refer to that part of the so-called "functional method" which merely shows the interrelationship of culture traits as the structural method. This use of "structuralism" is not an arbitrary one, but is consistent with the general use of the term in other fields of inquiry. The term "functionalism" will be used to denote Malinowski's analysis of "human culture into those basic institutions that exist to fulfill such fundamental human needs as food, sex, procreation, shelter, or defence."[43] Thus, the functional approach is concerned with the interaction (integration--cf. Dewey) of the organism and its environment.[44] The use of "functionalism" with this meaning will be consistent with its use in psychology and philosophy. The term "function-role" will be used to

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[42] Richards, A. I., "Bronislaw Kaspar Malinowski," obituary in Man, Vol. XLIII, January-February, 1943, p. 3.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Linton, in Chpt. XXIII of The Study of Man, discusses the confusion and misunderstanding resulting from the various uses of the term "function." After noting four interrelated qualities of every element of culture--form, meaning, use, and function--he defines function as "the contribution which it [any particular element of culture] makes toward the satisfaction of a particular need or needs." This is consistent with the above use of the term. See pp. 411-412.

designate specifically what a trait "does." It must be stressed that the above divisions are only for purposes of analysis, as in reality all three are interdependent.

Malinowski's use of a structural approach in field-anthropology can, in part, be traced to his early scientific training. For every scientist knows that an element can only be understood with reference to the complex or system of which it is a part. We can understand the behavior of individuals only by understanding the cultural forces and controls that play upon him. In order to understand how an economic system works in a society, its relationship to religion, material technology, the family and other social institutions must be studied. As Evans-Prichard states:

> One type of human behavior is related to other types, and it is therefore desirable in describing one type to refer to all the others in so far as it is directly dependent on them or they on it.[45]

A scientific study of culture, or any scientific inquiry, demands an interrelational analysis. Such an interrelated treatment of human society was made possible by the appearance of Darwinism and the new biological sciences. This was discussed at length above.[46]

Gestalt psychology was a powerful movement on the continent (particularly in Germany) and in England during the early part of the 20th

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[45] Evans-Prichard, E. E., Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande (Oxford: The Clarendon Press), 1937, pp. 2-3.

[46] Supra, pp. 22-23.

century. The heart of Gestaltism is its concept of wholeness: ". . . the whole is not a mere summation of parts, but a unitary structure, in which the change of any part changes the whole, and conversely."[47] Many psychologists use the terms "Gestaltism" and "structuralism" synonymously. Malinowski personally acknowledges the influence of Gestaltism upon him, and undoubtedly this influence was a potent factor in the formation of Malinowski's structural approach. It would be no great exaggeration to say that his structural approach is applied Gestalt psychology.

Structuralism in modern anthropology, as used by Malinowski and others, also arose as a reaction against the comparative, non-scientific and "piecemeal" techniques of Westermarck, Spencer, and others. It must be remembered that Gestaltism, too, was a reaction against "associationism" or "atomism." It can probably be safely stated that the "atomic" approach was the result of the influence of Newtonian physics upon other fields of investigation at the time. The following quotation from Lowie's The History of Ethnological Thought characterizes the deficiencies in the "atomic" approach:

> His [Westermarck's] use of aboriginal data, however, is unsatisfactory. Indeed, his own account of the procedure when preparing one of his later books is not apt to arouse confidence: "I made use of the same method as I had employed in my book on marriage. I made my excerpts on slips of paper, which I numbered according to subject-matter, so that afterwards I should be able so much the more easily to

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[47] Boring, E. G., A History of Experimental Psychology (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co.), 1929, p. 578.

> group together all data bearing upon the same question: homicide, theft, love of truth and falsehood, adultery, cannibalism, and so on . . ." (Memories of My Life). This approach is doubly suspect: first of all, the classification does not grow naturally out of the material but is imposed on it; secondly, the collector is likely to concentrate only on what seems to fall under his rubrics, omitting correlated phenomena of the utmost significance.[48]

Dewey further illustrates the abuse of the comparative technique when "facts are torn loose from their context in social and natural environment and heaped miscellaneously together":

> What would we think of a biologist who appealed successively to some external characteristic of say snake, butterfly, elephant, oyster and robin in support of a statement? And yet the peoples mentioned [in Spencer's works] present widely remote cultural resources, varied environment and distinctive institutions. What is the scientific value of a proposition thus arrived at?[49]

Wallis, in pointing out that "reality" is derived from showing relationships, notes the following:

> "Should a naturalist who had never studied the elephant except by means of the microscope think himself sufficiently acquainted with the animal?" (Poincaré) As well hope to understand the elephant by piecing together the information obtained from sections under the microscope as to attempt to understand culture by piecing together information about isolated individuals.[50]

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[48] Lowie, R. H., The History of Ethnological Theory (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc.), 1937, p. 97.

[49] Dewey, John, "Interpretation of Savage Mind," in W. I. Thomas' Source Book for Social Origins (Boston: The Gorham Press), 1909, p. 174.

[50] Wallis, W., Culture and Progress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.), 1930, p. 217.

For the above reasons, the results obtained from studying human culture in an "atomic" fashion were obviously unsatisfactory. And there were other reasons. First of all, an uncritical use of material --comparative judgment as to the source of the material--was frequently lacking. Secondly, the collection and organization of the data was based upon inadequate and unscientific preconceptions such as unilinear social evolutionism and "primitive mentality." Thirdly, the studies were superficial rather than intensive--much of the data was derived from the journals of explorers and travelers who had through necessity but casual contact with the natives. Finally, and most important of all, the studies lacked structural and functional perspective.

Before discussing the Kula, an example of the application of the structural approach, let us note briefly some field techniques which are, according to Malinowski, foundations for a structural and functional analysis. "The principles of method can be grouped under three main headings":[51]

(1) ". . . first of all, naturally, the student must possess real scientific aims, and know the values and criteria of modern (scientific) ethnography."[52] For example, to anticipate merely collecting isolated facts about marriage is not sufficient scientific aim; science demands an interrelational analysis. Furthermore, the student field-

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[51] Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, p. 6.

[52] Ibid.

worker should be provided with relevant instrumental field-techniques. The work of the early missionaries--Ellis, Dobrizhoffer, Turner, Gill, and Livingston--and of the early travelers--Marco Polo, Pinkerton, Bougainville, and Cook--is of limited value because they possessed no "real scientific aims" or field-tools. As Malinowski says, with some qualification, ". . . the scientific field-work is far above even the best amateur productions."[53]

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[53]One interesting exception is the scientific field-anthropology of the Swiss missionary Henri A. Junod. Though frequently overlooked, Junod's The Life of a South African Tribe is one of the best accounts of a marginal group ever published. Written in 1913, Junod's work predicates, and even goes beyond, present field-techniques. First of all, he systematically introduces all the informants, "faithful collaborators," and discusses their position in the tribe, their limitations (for example, the degree to which they were Christianized), and so on. Secondly, he notes that his work has two primary aims: scientific and practical. Although a missionary with typical preconceptions, he is aware of his prejudices and has "enough respect for science to avoid mixing the two subjects." Besides scientifically stating the techniques by which he collected the data, Junod made an intensive sociological study. This is clearly brought out in the following quotation: "After having briefly explained in a preliminary chapter what is the Tonga tribe, I will consider an individual and follow him in his career from birth to death; the story of the evolution of a man and of a woman will constitute the first part of the book. Then I shall pass on to the first social organism formed by these individuals and study the life of the family and of the village, which is but an enlarged family. The village will make up the clan and the tribe. The national life will form my third part, where I will deal especially with the Chief, the Court, the Army" (pp. 9-10).

By making an intensive study of one tribe, and by showing "organistic" (structuralistic) relationships, Junod achieved results previously unknown. Furthermore, Junod anticipated the role of Administrative Anthropology in his belief that native studies could bring practical help to native commissioners and missionaries. In his own words: "Let those who are prejudiced against the black race study more carefully its customs, its mind, such as it reveals itself in the old rites of the Bantu tribe. They will see that these natives are much more earnest than they thought and that in them beats a true human heart" (p. 11).

(2) "Secondly, he ought to put himself in good conditions of work; that is, in the main, to live without other white men, right among the natives."[54] This introduces the problem of residence, which will be discussed at length below under the heading: The Participatory Approach. However, we will note here that a thorough structural analysis, as outlined by Malinowski, demands face-to-face relations with the group being studied.

(3) "Finally, he has to apply a number of special methods of collecting, manipulating and fixing his evidence."[55] The structural method is the result of a number of special operations.

Malinowski notes three avenues, principally structural, that lead to the final goal of grasping "the native's point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world." They are:

(a) The first avenue: "The organization of the tribe, and the anatomy of its culture must be recorded in firm, clear outline." To do this the method of "concrete, statistical documentation" must be used.[56] A number of steps, however, necessarily precede the actual statistical documentation of a culture. In the first place, marginal groups have no explicitly formulated (written) code of laws, of tribal tradition, or of social structure. They have no specialists--historians, archivists, sociologists--whose purpose is to document

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[54] Op. cit., p. 6.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid., p. 24.

institutional behavior. Consequently the data must be gathered "from the most elusive of all materials; the human being," and from observing human action. For example, "it would be in vain to put to a native such a sweeping question as, "How do you treat and punish a criminal?" But instead the field-anthropologist must hypothetically formulate a specific case, or best of all, wait for a real incident. The following paragraph brings out this point:

> A real case . . . will start the natives on a wave of discussion, evoke expressions of indignation, show them taking sides--all of which talk will probably contain a wealth of definite views, of moral censures, as well as reveal the social mechanism set in motion by the crime committed.[57]

Then if the recorder has scientific aims of real importance, and if he is trained and able to recognize definitive social mechanisms, he can push relevant questions. As Malinowski says:

> From there, it will be easy to lead them on to speak of other similar cases, to remember other actual occurrences or to discuss them in all their implications and aspects. From this material, which ought to cover the widest possible range of facts, the inference is obtained by simple induction.[58]

This will provide the field-anthropologist with a "mental chart" of cultural relationships.

With this "mental chart," Malinowski (the field-worker) writes

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[57]Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, p. 12.

[58]Ibid.

down a short preliminary sketch of results. In doing this, "rifts and gaps" appear in the description. The job is then to collect more relevant data and fill in the gaps. This is a structural process which Malinowski calls "cross-fertilization." Malinowski in this connection advocates the use of "synoptic charts" (viz., a genealogy table) to bring authenticated data into their natural groupings.

The following summary by Malinowski briefs the above discussion of the first avenue of a structural analysis:

> To summarise the first cardinal point of method, I may say each phenomenon ought to be studied through the broadest range possible of its concrete manifestations; each studied by an exhaustive survey of detailed examples. If possible, the results ought to be embodied into some sort of synoptic chart, both to be used as an instrument of study, and to be presented as an ethnological document. With the help of such documents and such study of actualities the clear outline of the framework of the natives' culture in the widest sense of the word, and the constitution of their society, can be presented. This method could be called the method of statistic documentation by concrete evidence?[59]

(b) The second avenue: "Within this frame, the imponderabilia of actual life and the type of behavior have to be filled in."[60] Malinowski's use of the phrase "the imponderabilia of actual life" is illustrated by the following quotation:

> Here belong such things as the routine of a man's working day, the details of his care of the body, of the manner of taking food and preparing it; the tone of conversation and social life around the village fires, the existence of

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[59] Ibid., p. 17.

[60] Ibid., p. 24.

> strong friendships or hostilities, and of passing sympathies and dislikes between people; the subtle yet unmistakable manner in which personal vanities and ambitions are reflected in the behavior of the individual and in the emotional reactions of those who surround him.[61]

By "type of behavior" Malinowski means the "tone" or degree of vitality of an act. The field-worker must find out whether acts of tribal life flourish with full vigor or are survivals kept alive for tradition's sake. Malinowski further states:

> There is no doubt, from all points of sociological or psychological analysis, and in any question of theory, the manner and type of behaviour observed in the performance of an act is of the highest importance.[62]

Besides noting the normal and the typical "types of behavior," the field-anthropologist must record the deviations. By doing this, the field-worker "will be able to indicate the two extremes within which the normal moves."[63]

(c) The third avenue: "A collection of ethnographic statements, characteristic narratives, typical utterances, items of folk-lore and magical formulae has to be given as a corpus inscriptionum, as documents of native mentality."[64]

In the previous avenues of approach, the field-anthropologist

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[61] Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, pp. 18-19.

[62] Ibid., p. 20.

[63] Ibid., p. 21.

[64] Ibid., p. 24.

presented the framework of the social institutions that prescribe and guide the behavior of individuals, and the data of daily life which make up the individual's adjustment to his total environment. In the third avenue of approach, the field-worker records what the natives feel and think as members of a community. Malinowski calls this the "Weltanschauung" of life--the "spirit--the natives' views and opinions and utterances." Malinowski in his work is largely preoccupied with an interpretation of this "Weltanschauung."

This "spirit" of native life is of course a reflection, for the most part, of the social and cultural environment in which they move. Consequently, to record the feelings and opinions of natives, the field-worker must be thoroughly familiar with native life. This demands not only residence with the natives, but a knowledge of their language. According to Malinowski, the mentality of a people can be best recorded by writing exclusively in the language of the people being studied. The body of data thus presented is called the corpus inscriptionum, or in the case of the Trobrianders, the corpus inscriptionum Kiriwiniensium. This "corpora" Malinowski believes

> . . . can be utilized, not only by myself, but by all those who, through their better penetration and ability of interpreting them, may find points which escape my attention.[65]

In Part Five of Coral Gardens and Their Magic, Malinowski presents "The Language of Gardens" or the "Corpus Inscriptionum Agricul-

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[65] Ibid., p. 24.

turae Quiriviniensis."[66]

The Kula: The primary purpose of Malinowski's best work, The Argonauts of the Western Pacific, was a systematic analysis of the Kula "institution." Because the analysis was principally structural, it will be apropos to examine the Kula at length here, always keeping in mind the methods and techniques outlined above and used by Malinowski in recording this "institution." However, Malinowski's description of the Kula also includes a great deal of functional analysis. Consequently, Malinowski's definition of "institution," which includes all of the numerous manifestations of the Kula complex, is both structural and functional.[67]

For purposes of a clear analysis and to avoid ambiguity, it will be necessary to distinguish between that part of the Kula complex which is structural and that part which is functional. The term "institution" will be used to refer to structurally related culture complexes of the Kula. And following Ralph Linton, the term "activity" will be employed to designate functionally related complexes.[68]

The essential characteristics of the Kula are noted in the following quotation:

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[66] See pp. 77-210.

[67] The term "institution," as used by Malinowski, specifies a complex of interrelated features or "aspects," viz., social groupings (structural), which must come into being to carry out basic needs--sex, food, and shelter (functional).

[68] Linton, R., The Study of Man (D. Appleton-Century Co.), 1936, p. 397.

> The Kula is a form of exchange, of extensive, inter-tribal character; it is carried on by communities inhabiting a wide ring of islands, which form a closed circuit. This circuit can be seen on Map V, where it is represented by the lines joining a number of islands to the North and East of the East end of New Guinea. Along this route, articles of two kinds, and these two kinds only, are constantly travelling in opposite directions. In the direction of the hands of the clock, moves constantly one of these kinds--long necklaces of red shell, called "soulava." In the opposite direction moves the other kind--bracelets of white shell called "mwali." Each of these articles, as it travels in its own direction of the closed circuit, meets on its way articles of the other class, and is constantly being exchanged for them. Every movement of the Kula articles, every detail of the transactions is fixed and regulated by a set of traditional rules and conventions, and some acts of the Kula are accompanied by an elaborate magical ritual and public ceremonies.[69]

The main act of the Kula, therefore, is the ceremonial exchange of the two cultural items--the "soulava" and the "mwali." The Kula might be considered as a form of trade, if by "trading" we mean any exchange of goods. The Kula, however, is not merely a form of economic transaction. It is a big and complex institution which has relationships to all of the Trobrianders' ways-of-doing, believing, and thinking.

For example, the building of the sea-going canoe, the "masawa," which is used in the Kula expeditions, is inextricably a part of the whole institution. When the date of the Kula expedition is fixed, and canoes need to be built, the whole of village life is affected. The building of the canoes follows two main stages. The first stage

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[69] Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, p. 81.

is primarily technical. The canoe-builder with a few helpers selects and cuts down the tree, hollows out the basic dug-out, and prepares planks, boards, and poles. This may take from two to six months, and is accompanied by only a few magical rites. The second stage, however, which lasts only a week or two, is one of intense communal labor, and is accompanied by a great deal of community Kula magic. The second stage begins (after the headman has gathered a large number of natives from neighboring villages) with a rite in which the ceremonial prow-boards are inserted into the ends of the canoe. This rite is immediately followed by another in which all the men present push the body of the canoe into the water and wash away the evil influences.

After that, in a body the natives lash the canoe together, construct outrigging, make sails, caulk seams, and paint the canoe. The whole second stage, including the accompanying elaborate ceremonies and rites, may take only two or three days. Along with the building of the canoe, a number of taboos must be kept: no one should walk over a canoe log or stand on it, etc.

When the canoe is completed, it is publicly displayed with great festivity. Following this, there is a ceremonial launching and a trial run. And, finally, a communal feast.

Thus, we see that the ritual exchange of the arm-shells and the necklaces, the main act of the Kula, is necessarily preceded by the building of the ceremonial canoes for the expedition. Furthermore, we see that the actual building of the canoes, as well as all other Kula behavior, is prescribed by myth, magic, and tradition. And that

the whole of community life is affected during the canoe building, launching, and feasts.

The Kula is also associated with other daily patterns-of-behavior. Sexual taboos must be kept before the sailing of a Kula expedition and during its absence. Taboos resulting from mortuary ceremonies are placed on Kula goods, daming up the Kula valuables, and thus preventing the normal distribution of the items.

The actual participation in the Kula exchange is done by only a few men from every village, but the ramifications of the ceremony affect, of course, every individual in the community. Every man who is in the Kula has a lifelong partner from whom he regularly receives one of the two ceremonial items, and to whom he gives the opposite in exchange. The number of partners a man has will vary with his rank and importance--a commoner may have only a few, but a headman will have hundreds. Between partners there are a number of mutual duties and obligations (traditional sociological rules) that govern their reciprocal relationships. The partner is expected to be friendly, to provide food and shelter if necessary for his partner, and to ally himself with his partner in times of danger. The Kula ceremony thus involves a whole system of individual relationships.

Besides the sociological patterns which accompany preparation for the Kula, and the ritual patterns which govern individual behavior, there are a number of secondary institutions associated with the Kula. Along with the ceremonial exchange of the arm-shells and the necklaces, the natives carry on regular trade by bartering. Malinowski calls

this "secondary trade." Within the Kula area there is industrial specialization, as well as natural resources unique to a particular locality. Consequently, during the Kula the natives take the opportunity to exchange wooden dishes from Bwoytaul for lime pots from Yalaka and Kadukwaykela, and in the old days, axe blades from Tilataula. And the Dobuans will fish in the Trobriands; the Sinaketans will dive for spondylus in Sanaroa Lagoon.[70]

The Kula is thus "a vast and complex social mechanism." The ceremonial act of exchanging the "soulava" and the "mwali" is structurally related to canoe-building, mythology, magic, taboos, economic activity, and individual patterns of behavior. A field-anthropologist could not study any phase of Trobriand culture which was not in some way related to the Kula. And the Kula could not be thoroughly understood without making a systematic investigation of the entire Kiriwinian social structure and relations. Therefore, to describe the Kula as Malinowski has done is an extremely difficult task. The field-anthropologist cannot simply ask the natives what the Kula is. The natives have no picture of the <u>total outline</u> of the Kula; their knowledge is limited to subjective personal experience. As Malinowski says: ". . . the integral picture does not exist in his mind; he is in it, and cannot see the whole from the outside."[71] But the field-worker by developing a skeletal outline of the institution, and by filling it in

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[70]The description of the Kula ceremony showing its structural ties was abstracted from <u>Argonauts</u>, pp. 81-194.

[71]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 83.

with the "imponderabilia of actual life" gathered through intimate contact, can construct (to use Malinowski's own term) a picture of the complex institution.

Reciprocity: Rising logically from Malinowski's emphasis upon structuralism is his treatment of reciprocity. Reciprocity is broadly defined by Malinowski as

> . . . a definite system of division of functions and a rigid system of mutual obligations, into which a sense of duty and the recognition of the need of co-operation enter side by side with a realization of self-interest, privileges and benefits.[72]

In Crime and Custom in Savage Society, and in the famous "Foreword" to Hogbin's Law and Order in Polynesia, Malinowski dwells at length upon reciprocity. In these two works, reciprocity is presented as the basis of social structure. For example, the whole social structure of Trobriand society is founded upon the principle of "legal status." That is, "the claims of chief over commoners, husband over wife, parent over child, and vice versa, are not exercised arbitrarily and one-sidedly, but according to definite rules, and arranged into well-balanced chains of reciprocal services."[73]

The sociological status of an individual in the tribe, whether he be the highest hereditary chief or a mere commoner, is dictated by a

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[72] Malinowski, B., Crime and Custom in Savage Society (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd.), 1926, p. 20.

[73] Ibid., p. 46.

system of reciprocal mutual obligations. For example, to declare war or to organize an expedition, the chief "must issue formal summons, publicly announce his will, deliberate with the notables, receive the tribute . . .," and so on. And there are the reciprocal duties of rank and power, the "Noblesse Oblige." Enormous tribute is claimed by the chiefs, but in turn the chiefs are expected to render the commoners great service.

Marriage is conceived by Malinowski to be a system of mutual obligations--a "symmetrical institution." Reciprocity of obligations and mutuality of give and take is the core of marriage. This is not only true for relations between husband and wife, but also between spouses and in-laws and spouses and the community. Marriage, furthermore, cannot be disassociated from the economic obligations of the partners. Tribal economic patterns are dependent upon the reciprocal services of husband and wife, as well as reciprocal relations between commoners and headmen and separate communities. The relationship between sexual, marriage, and economic services is noted in the following paragraph;

> Nor could we deal with the question of sexual reciprocities independently from the exchange of economic services, from the value which one partner has for the other in conferring tribal status, and from the importance which the biological issue of marriage, that is, children, have to husband or wife respectively.[74]

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[74]Malinowski, B., "Foreword" in Hogbin's Law and Order in Polynesia (London: Christophers), 1934, p. 1.

Law in marginal societies, according to Malinowski, is based upon reciprocal behavior. In his analysis of "primitive" law, Malinowski attacks the concept that all native law is negative law, and that all native law is criminal law. He points out that: "Law dwells not in a special system of decrees which forsee and define possible forms of non-fulfillment and provide appropriate barriers and remedies. Law (instead) is the specific result of the configuration of obligations."[75] Among the Trobrianders, Malinowski notes a body of "civil law":

> "Civil law," the positive law governing all the phases of tribal life, consists then of any body of binding obligations, regarded as a right by one part and acknowledged as a duty by the other, kept in force by a specific mechanism of reciprocity and publicity inherent in the structure of their society.[76]

Law is consequently a positive form of denoting patterns of behavior; patterns which are consistent with social tradition and which demand reciprocal attention. Law should be "social control" and present a socially meaningful system of relationships. An interesting positive attitude towards marriage and divorce laws in western society is recorded in the following quotation:

> . . . no penalties against adultery will safeguard the institution of monogamy as firmly as the positive making of marriage into an attractive union. It can be made into an attractive union not so much by eugenic devices, still less by laws, but rather by giving scope to those influences which make for the free exercise of erotic passion within

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[75] Op. cit., p. 59.

[76] Op. cit., p. 58.

> the union and by casting overboard the useless lumber of canonical law with its prejudice against divorce.[77]

Thus, according to Malinowski, the principle of mutuality and the systematic dovetailing of reciprocities is the basis of legal validity in all human societies.[78]

Reciprocity, as noted by Malinowski, is after all a truism. Group living necessarily assumes a certain give and take--a certain amount of cooperation. A detailed criticism showing the relationship between structuralism, reciprocity, and mores nihilism will be presented in "Preconceptions."

A final word about structuralism: Malinowski is guilty of consistently confusing functionalism and structuralism. In the Foreword to Fortune's Sorcerers of Dobu, Malinowski clearly notes the existence of a Functional School in structural terms:

> The present book may be regarded by the Functional Method as one of its triumphs in the field. Dr. Fortune's account presents the two qualities which good functional field-work claims as its own. On the one hand it is a precise sociological analysis of the tribal organization of the Dobuans. On the other hand, far from giving us merely the scaffolding of social structure, the book brings us right in touch with the living individual, it gives us the feeling of communal life, it allows us to re-live the fears, the passions, the deep traditional beliefs and superstitions of the natives.[79]

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[77] Malinowski, B., "Foreword" in Hogbin's Law and Order in Polynesia (London: Christophers), 1934, pp. lxvi-lxvii.

[78] Ibid., p. lxx.

[79] Fortune, R. F., Sorcerers of Dobu (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1932, "Foreword" by Malinowski, p. xviii.

A perfect structural statement! And:

> All in all, the Sorcerers of Dobu is a pioneering piece of functional work, new in its way of approach, in its style of presentation, and in the construction of its sociological framework. . . . The tendency towards organic presentation, the broad full sweep over the totality of native culture, the placing of details within their proper context--all these qualities no one will contest.[80]

Again, this is an explicit statement of the structural approach, and is clearly different from the functional approach--an analysis of which follows.

The Functional Approach: The functional approach, like the structural approach, is basic to all of Malinowski's methodology. The functional approach, as has been noted briefly above, is concerned with the interaction between the organism and the environment. Before systematically analyzing Malinowski's use of functionalism, let us inquire into the relationship of functionalism in anthropology, as used by Malinowski, to the uses of functionalism in other fields of inquiry. This is important because, I believe, that the concept of functionalism as used by Malinowski was stimulated by fundamental developments in psychology and philosophy. Support for this analysis will not be found in anthropological texts; not because it is untrue, but because the orthodox anthropologist is artificially departmentalized when it comes to philosophical and psychological questions. In other words, although anthropology is in many ways the least provincial

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[80] Ibid., p. xxiv.

of the sciences because of its generalized nature, it has purposively overlooked for the most part methodological developments in psychology and philosophy.[81]

What were the developments in philosophy and psychology which stimulated the functional method in anthropology? In the first place, I do not believe that Malinowski's functional beliefs stem, as Lowie suggests Radcliffe-Brown's do,[82] from Durkheim, but from the American school of functional psychology.

The American school of functional psychology arose around John Dewey, G. H. Mead, A. W. Moore, and James R. Angell at the University of Chicago at the turn of the century. In 1896, John Dewey with a paper on "The Reflex Arc Concept" first formulated clearly the position of functional psychology. In this momentous article, Dewey leveled his guns on (1) the dichotomy of mind and body, (2) elementarism or atomism, and (3) the isolation of stimulus from response.[83]

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[81] Overlooking the relationship of anthropology to philosophy and psychology is a logical action on the part of investigators who believe they are doing "purely" descriptive work, and who do not want to be bothered by pernicious preconceptions. And it leads, as will be shown, to "relativism." I do not mean to imply that all anthropologists subscribe to this viewpoint, but that it is a part of the general anthropological "climate of opinion." Furthermore, it is outside the scope of this paper to categorize each and every important anthropologist with respect to this issue. But it is possible to discuss the viewpoints of Malinowski, which are symptomatic of a whole school, in this relation.

[82] Lowie, R. H., The History of Ethnological Theory (New York: Farrar and Rinehart), 1937, p. 221.

[83] Boring, E. G., The History of Experimental Psychology (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co.), 1929, pp. 539-541.

Dewey insisted that psychology be concerned with "totalities"; that "The response is to the sensations, the sensations is for the response; neither has meaning alone." In this respect, Boring says: "Dewey was a Gestalt-Psychologe twenty years too soon." Dewey also demands that psychology be concerned with "coordinations"; that is, "an organization of means with reference of a comprehensive end," or simply--adaptation. He furthermore adds, following logically, that unity of all lies through the biological function of the act. As Boring says: "Functional psychology is the study of the psychophysical organism in use."[84] Most important of all, this led to a "practical psychology" (out of which pragmatism arose), as the following quotation clearly brings out:

> Darwin's theory of survival and of adaptation is the greatest practical theory of living that has ever been promulgated. A psychology that is biological in the Darwinian sense is inevitably practical. Dewey's later life illustrates this point [his pragmatic doctrines and work in education].[85]

This whole thesis has been elaborated in volumes by the later pragmatists and behaviorists. Gestalt psychology, behaviorism, and pragmatism all had their inception, in part, in this early school of "functional psychology." Although the direct influence of "functional psychology" was perhaps limited, its stepchildren have revolutionized cultural investigation.

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[84] Ibid., pp. 540-541.

[85] Ibid., p. 541.

Malinowski makes repeated reference to the leaders of the "schools" mentioned above--John Dewey, G. H. Mead, Clark Hull, and others--which would substantiate the contention that he was influenced by the American school of functional psychology, and later on by the behaviorists and the pragmatists. The whole thesis of Sex and Repression in Savage Society is suggested by Dewey in Human Nature and Conduct, from which Malinowski took his frontispiece. In Coral Gardens and Their Magic, reference is made to Dewey's pragmatic treatment of language in Experience and Nature. Malinowski notes as complementary to his treatment of language that of G. H. Mead, who "expounds a general theory of language from a moderate behaviouristic point of view."[86] Mead's whole treatment of language is, incidentally, the most intensive and suggestive of the works in this field, and far exceeds in attainment that of Malinowski. More will be said of this later.

The proof of Malinowski's relationship to the above traditions is found in his behavioristic and pragmatic methodological attempts. This will be made clearer when we have analyzed in detail Malinowski's functional approach, and compared it with that of Dewey's, who predicated by decades Malinowski's work.

Finally, it would be foolish to say that Malinowski, a genuine cosmopolitan, was not familiar with the basic works of the functional psychologists in America--especially since one of Malinowski's fundamental interests was psychology.

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[86] Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: American Book Company), 1935, Vol. II, p. 60.

Throughout all of Malinowski's writings is repeated reference to the need of a change in anthropological methodology which will emphasize the interaction of various aspects of institutions (structuralism), and the integration of the organism and its environment (functionalism). In Argonauts of the Western Pacific, we find the following statement:

> The influence on one another of the various aspects of an institution, the study of the social and psychological mechanisms on which the institution is based, are a type of theoretical studies which has been practised up till now in a tentative way only, but I venture to foretell will come into their own sooner or later.[87]

In the Foreword to Hogbin's work, he is even more specific:

> The functional theory of anthropology regards culture as an instrumental reality. The most important thing about culture is that it allows man to satisfy his primary requirements, that is, his need of food, security, protection from the weather, from surrounding dangers, as well as his need of procreation. Through culture he is able to use his environment, to master space, to forestall illness, with an infinitely greater efficiency than he could as a mere animal.[88]

And:

> The most important thing for the student, in my opinion, is never to forget the living, palpitating flesh and blood organism of man which remains somewhere at the heart of every institution.[89]

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[87] Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, p. 516.

[88] Malinowski, B., "Foreword" in Hogbin's Law and Order in Polynesia (London: Christophers), 1934, p. xxxi.

[89] Ibid.

Malinowski's most explicit statement of the functional approach is found as one of the essays in Science and Man entitled "The Scientific Approach to the Study of Man."[90] This article, one of the last written by Malinowski, shows clearly the influence of behavioristic and pragmatic psychology. In order to present clearly Malinowski's functional analysis of culture, we shall examine in detail this article.

Biological determinism, according to Malinowski, appears in every culture. That man is first of all an animal is clearly noted in the following excerpt:

> As regards the drives, man is obviously an animal; hence his organic needs will always give rise to a permanent biological determinism in all behavior. Men have to eat, sleep, reproduce, and protect their bodies from excessive temperature, as well as from physical destruction. There is a minimum of elementary conditions which have to be fulfilled so that the individual organism survives and the group retains its numbers. Even a light but progressive deterioration of the healthy organic state would inevitably lead to cultural extinction.[91]

Every culture has a set of "vital sequences" by which the biological determinants are expressed. By "vital sequences" Malinowski means that for social continuity: ". . . the central activity or biological act . . . must be performed regularly and permanently in every

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[90]Malinowski, B., "The Scientific Approach to the Study of Man," in Science and Man, edited by R. N. Anshen (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company), 1942, pp. 207-242.

[91]Ibid., p. 212.

culture."[92] The "vital sequences" are of course an integral part of every culture and receive tremendous modification, but can always be recognized by their essentially biological and physiological character. For example, in every culture there is the "vital sequence" of sex; first there is the sex drive, then the "act" of conjugation, and finally satisfaction or detumescence.[93] Other "vital sequences" which are a biological reality in every culture are noted in the following diagram reproduced from Malinowski's essay:

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[92] Ibid., p. 215.

[93] Compare this with Dewey's statement in Logic, p. 27: "Hunger, for example, is a manifestation of a state of imbalance between organic and environmental factors in that integration which is life. . . . A state of tension is set up which is an actual state (not mere feeling) of organic uneasiness and restlessness. This state of tension (which defines need) passes into search for material that will restore the condition of balance. . . . The matter ingested initiates activities throughout the rest of the animal that lead to a restoration of balance, which, as the outcome of the state of previous tension, is fulfilment."

PERMANENT VITAL SEQUENCES INCORPORATED IN ALL CULTURES[94]

A. Impulse	B. Act	C. Satisfaction
drive to breathe gasping for air	intake of oxygen	elimination of CO_2 in tissues
hunger	ingestion of food	satiation
thirst	absorption of liquid	quenching
sex appetite	conjugation	detumescence
fatigue	rest	restoration of muscular and nervous energy
restlessness	activity	satisfaction of fatigue
somnolence	sleep	awakening with restored energy
bladder pressure	micturition	removal of tension
colon pressure	defecation	abdominal relaxation
fright	escape from danger	relaxation
pain	avoidance by effective act	return to normal state

"Vital sequences" arise from "drives."[95] "Drives" are individual, and are defined by Malinowski as follows: ". . . basic needs . . . which have to be satisfied so as to keep the organisms of a community

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[94] Op. cit., p. 216.

[95] The term "drive" as used here is not compatible with the term "instinct" which was used frequently in Malinowski's earlier works. A criticism of the loose manner in which Malinowski used the term "instinct" will be found later in "Preconceptions." However, it will be necessary here to briefly differentiate the terms "drive" and "instinct." Culturalists are at present disinclined to use the term "instinct," but have instead developed conative terms like "drive" and "wish." That is, the term "instinct" as used orthodoxly by Watson, McDougall, and others implied that a particular fundamental impulse would arouse a particular act. The term "drive," on the contrary," sees these fundamental impulses as raw materials which are subsequently fashioned by social forces and conduct. There is consequently a change in emphasis from the "biologic" to the "cultural," and Dewey, Cooley, Mead, et al., attempt to work out the means by which the biologic being becomes a socialized "self."

in a normal state of healthy metabolism."[96] Although culture in a myriad of manners refashions the physiological drives, still the satisfaction of the drive must be adequate. The nonsatisfaction of these biological needs "would imply the gradual biological deterioration of the group, which, if cumulative, would lead to extinction."[97]

"Drives" are, however, different from "basic needs" as used by Malinowski, for "basic needs" refer "to the collective exercise of individual drives, integrated with reference to the community as a whole."[98] Whereas psychologists are primarily interested in the mechanisms of personality, that is, the techniques whereby individuals satisfy the "drives," the attention in all cultural analysis, according to Malinowski, should not be on individual "drives" and their satisfaction, but on basic community needs.[99] Biological motives never occur in pure and isolated individual form, but as a part of a cultural matrix. That is, an analysis of an individual's "vital sequence," "drive-activity-satisfaction," would be abstracted from reality, for in all actual research "we are faced always with culturally organized satisfactions of integral basic needs." In other

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[96] Op. cit., p. 216.

[97] Ibid., pp. 216-217.

[98] Ibid., p. 217. The "basic needs" include all the individual drives in a community which must be satisfied to keep the organisms of the community in a healthy state.

[99] Malinowski does not note it, but this is a step from individual "subjectivism" or "intuitionism" to cultural "objectivism."

words, the manner in which an individual "acts" as stimulated by "drives" is determined by the total environmental setting which includes such social organizations as the family, clan, tribe, and state --the entire cultural configuration. In brief, human action is a product of "cultural responses" to "basic needs."

The "basic needs" and their "cultural responses" are concretely outlined by Malinowski in the following figure:

BASIC NEEDS AND CULTURAL RESPONSES[100]

A. Basic Needs: 1. metabolism; 2. reproduction; 3. bodily comforts; 4. safety; 5. movement; 6. growth; 7. health.

B. Cultural Responses: 1. commissariat; 2. kinship; 3. shelter; 4. protection; 5. activities; 6. training; 7. hygiene.

Culture, Malinowski notes, always "determines the situation, the place, and the time for the physiological act."[101] For example, bladder pressure is an individual "drive" and must necessarily be followed by the act of micturition. This in turn leads to biological satisfaction by removing the tension. But the "drive" does not demand a particular form of expression; the form of "doing" is a product of cultural forces. In the United States, micturition is considered as "nasty" or "bad" by virtue of Christian mores which abhor the biologic. The attitude towards micturition among many marginal peoples is quite

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[100] Op. cit., p. 217.

[101] Ibid., p. 220.

different. Among them, micturition is treated emotionlessly as a necessary biological act. Or as Malinowski notes:

> Human beings breathe in closed rooms or caves; they have to combine breathing (a physiological drive) with rules of politeness or taboo, since human breath is, in some cultures, regarded as sacred and in others as dangerous.[102]

This introduces the "instrumental phase of human behavior." That is, the "vital sequence" begins with "$Drive_1$" which demands satisfactory physiological ends, and is supported by "$Drive_2$" which represents the culturally determined means for obtaining satisfaction.[103] Furthermore, "$Drive_2$" determines other cultural ends. "$Drive_2$" is illustrated in the following paragraph:

> Drive(1) is the instrumental motive, the impulse to take the round-about way which man follows when he produces or purchases his food, prepares it, and places it on his table. In this he acts to a certain extent like the learning animal in a maze, who has to discover and to use the devices which supply it with food. . . . Drive(2) represents the culturally determined appetite. Man very often does not eat by hunger, hardly ever by hunger alone. He eats at the right time, the right place, and in the right company. . . . One man's meat is another man's poison; my cannibal friends in New Guinea would have developed a healthy appetite if confronted with missionary steak, but run away in disgust from my tinned Camembert cheese, sauerkraut, or frankfurters, which latter they regarded as gigantic worms.[104]

Instrumental performance is controlled by the culturally defined

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[102] Ibid., p. 218.

[103] Ibid., p. 219.

[104] Ibid.

situation, and is always an integral part of an organized system of activities.[105] For example, the "instrumentalities" of food production would include the techniques of fishing, hunting, gathering or planting, storing, preparing, and consuming, as well as all the moral prescriptions which codify the activities, and also the values which the techniques have. All preparatory activity must include the following four factors: (1) artifacts, (2) normed behavior (mores), (3) organized cooperation (social organization), (4) symbolic communication by means of language or other signs.[106] In this manner, culture is regarded as a system of means--techniques whereby biological needs are satisfied.

The existence of all culture, according to Malinowski, is dependent upon four systems of organized responses or "instrumental imperatives":[107] (1) economics, (2) social control, (3) education, and (4) political organization.[108] That is, every culture must have implements of production and consumption, systems of sanctioned behavior,

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[105] Ibid., p. 220.

[106] Ibid.

[107] The pragmatic use of the term "instrumental" and my use of the term "instrumental" as previously noted in this thesis differ markedly from the way Malinowski uses the term. Malinowski does not distinguish between "technologies" (scientific techniques) and "ceremonial patterns" (magical sanctions). Magic and religion he considers as fundamental instrumentalities, in that they supply spiritual satisfaction. This analysis is a result of "mores relativism," which does not recognize a means of evaluation. This will be discussed in great detail below under "Preconceptions."

[108] Op. cit., p. 222.

techniques for passing on and renewing knowledge, skills and tribal tradition, and authority, endowed with the power of forcefully executing sanctioned controls.

For culture to flourish, the instrumental responses must be adequate and working. Confirmation for this is supplied by historical evidence:

> A serious break-down in the economic, political, or legal order which usually also implies deterioration in the systems of knowledge and ethics, leads human groups to disorganization and to the sinking of the cultural level. The break-down of many simpler cultures under the impact of Western civilization and the extinction of many racial groups supply one example. . . . [The] period of the Dark Ages is another case in point.[109]

Malinowski and most culturalists study "functionalism" on the "instrumental" level. That is, they study the variety of means which have developed through culture to satisfy the cultural imperatives--economics, social control, education, and political organization. When Malinowski asks the question: "What does a trait do; what is its function?" he answers it with the focus of interest being cultural integration. In other words, Malinowski is interested in the "status quo" function of cultural items. This, as will be shown, is an unscientific and static approach.

Malinowski's analysis of the function of magic is a case in point. The function of magic is briefly, according to Malinowski (and correctly interpreted), that of sanctioning and controlling human action.

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[109] Ibid., p. 223.

The chief, for example, has the best sorcerers who put to death by black magic any who offend him. Control in garden work is maintained by the garden-magicians with their magical powers. All of the technical activity among the Trobrianders is in some way connected with magic. The building of the "masawa," sea-going Kula canoe, is inextricably tied up with prescriptive rites.[110] Magic is the great integrating force:

> . . . magic puts order and sequence into the various activities, and that it and its associated ceremonial are instrumental in securing the co-operation of the community and the organization of communal labour. As has been said before, it inspires the builders with great confidence in the efficiency of their work, a mental state essential in any enterprise of complicated and difficult character. . . .
>
> Magic, far from being a useless appendage, or even a burden on the work, supplies the psychological influence, which keeps people confident about the success of their labour, and provides them with a sort of natural leader.[111]

This is interesting and important. But what is the function of magic in relation to change? Malinowski does not answer this question. He is not concerned with process or dynamic function.

Thus, though Malinowski insists upon a functional interpretation of culture, his work is characterized by either a structural analysis (as pointed out) or a static-functional interpretation. The contradiction is evident in the following quotation:

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[110] Supra, pp. 55-56.

[111] Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, p. 116.

> . . . I personally believe that law ought to be defined by function and not by form, that is, we ought to see what are the arrangements, the sociological realities, the cultural mechanisms which act for the enforcement of law. . . . The main field of primitive jurisprudence lies, therefore, in the analysis of every relationship: husband to wife, parent to child, chief to subject, clansman to clansman, tribesman to tribesman; in the correlation of such relationships over a wider scale and in their at times very complicated constellations of reciprocity and mutuality within an institution; finally in the relation of one institution to another.[112]

The Participatory Approach: The demands of the structural approach--a skeletal outline of "institutions," filling in the "imponderabilia of actual life," and capturing the "Weltanschauung"; the difficulty of relating activities to the fulfillment of primary biological needs in the functional approach; and the problem of "meaning" in a pragmatic analysis, all require intensive sociological investigation. And intensive field-work[113] can be carried out only when the anthropologist resides with his subjects: "I have several times insisted on the fact that satisfactory field-work can only be done by one who lives right among natives."[114]

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[112] Malinowski, B., "Foreword" in Hogbin's Law and Order in Polynesia (London: Christophers), 1934, p. lxiv.

[113] By "field-work" Malinowski means: ". . . the study of living communities and their material culture, whether at a low level of development or within our own civilizations." Furthermore, "Such study must be guided by the general theory of culture (functionalism), while observation has to be stated in terms of general principle. As in all sciences, so also here we shall have to inquire whether the final test of applicability through planned social engineering is possible" (Science and Man, pp. 208-209).

[114] Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: American Book Company), 1935, Vol. I, p. 453.

Malinowski, like all modern social scientists, bitterly attacks the "spectator knowledge" of armchair scholars. For example, armchair anthropology gives a rigid and fictitious picture of native life. The spectator anthropologists, like Westermarck and Spencer (who are a rapidly diminishing breed), fail to record the abuses of the prescribed social patterns and controls. Furthermore, the deviations from normed behavior actually denote "belief."[115] In Crime and Custom in Savage Society, Malinowski notes how a fictitious picture of native law is derived by armchair techniques:

> It is not difficult to see also, why [armchair] anthropology fixed upon one side of the question, why it presented the rigid but fictitious doctrine of native law as the whole truth. For this doctrine represents the intellectual, overt, fully conventionalized aspect of the native attitude, the one set into clear statements, into definite legal formulae. When the native is asked what he would do in such and such a case, he answers what he should do; he lays down the pattern of best possible conduct. When he acts as informant of a field-anthropologist, it costs him nothing to retell the Ideal of the Law. His sentiments, his propensities, his bias, his self-indulgences as well as tolerance of others' lapses, he reserves for his behaviour in real life. And even then, though he acts thus, he would be unwilling to admit often even to himself, that he ever acts below the standard of law. The other side, the natural, impulsive code of conduct, the evasions, the compromises and non-legal usages are revealed only to the field-workers, who observe native life directly, registers facts, lives at such close quarters with his "material" as to understand not only their language and their statements, but also the hidden motives of behaviour, and the hardly ever formulated spontaneous line of conduct.[116]

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[115] This will be discussed under the "Pragmatic Approach."

[116] See pp. 120-121.

J. H. Driberg has written an amusing tirade against armchair anthropologists:

> The arm-chair anthropologist cannot even interpret rightly the material which he laboriously collates from the researches of others. He has no criterion whereby to test their veracity [an important statement which will be commented upon later], or in disputed points the clue to visualize the probable conduct of primitive peoples in a given situation. He just does not know how an institution works, because he has never seen it working. It is like learning to fly by a correspondence course, and about as dangerous. Even the cinema might help him to a fuller realization of actuality, but he is rarely to be found there, which is a pity. The sooner the species becomes extinct, the better for science, and the day is surely not far distant.[117]

Thus, in order for the field-anthropologist to scientifically describe a culture, he must live among the group, speaking their language, participating in community activities, identifying himself with the group's ideals and values. He must see problems from the natives' standpoint. This must be the case if the goal of the field-anthropologist is to present a relativistic description of native life. And this is Malinowski's primary aim.

> There is, however, one point of view deeper yet and more important than the love of tasting of the variety of human modes of life, and this is the desire to turn such knowledge into (Socratic) wisdom. Though it may be given to us for a moment to enter into the soul of a savage and through his eyes to look at the outer world and feel ourselves what it must feel to him to be himself--yet our final goal is to enrich and deepen our own world's vision, to understand our own nature and to make it finer, intellectually

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[117] Driberg, J. H., At Home With the Savage (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1932, p. 26.

> and artistically. In grasping the essential outlook of others, with the reverence and real understanding, due even to savages, we cannot but help widening our own. . . . Nothing can teach us a better lesson in this matter of ultimate importance than the habit of mind which allows us to treat the beliefs and values of another man from his point of view. . . . The Science of Man, in its most refined and deepest version, should lead us to such knowledge and to tolerance and generosity, based on the understanding of other men's point of view.[118]

The field techniques whereby the anthropologist records everything from fishing and gardening tools to the way natives "feel" about erotic life has been discussed above under the structural approach.

But a completely relativistic portrayal of a culture is only a "goal" for a number of reasons. To be more emphatic, it is a pseudo-goal. The mere presence of a field-worker at native activities, his participation in native life, changes to some extent the behavior of the natives. Herskovits was keenly aware of this problem: "But because of the distortion that occurs when a stranger invades rites of this sort [birth, marriage, or death rites] from motives that, whatever their scientific nature, can to native eyes only appear as indefensible curiosity."[119]

Moreover, the field-anthropologist can only to a slight degree give up his own social-psychological heritage in order to identify

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[118] Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, pp. 517-518.

[119] Herskovits, M. J., Dahomey (New York: J. J. Augustin, Publisher), 1938, p. vii.

himself with a strange group. Theoretical and methodological preconceptions, as has been brought out time and again, will always color the collection and organization of the data. But Richards is one of the very few who will admit this:

> The types of observation hitherto made in primitive societies have naturally been determined by the theoretical views of the investigators. It is impossible to write a "purely descriptive account" of any human culture, however simple. The facts recorded are themselves the result of selection, conscious or unconscious, in accordance with the observer's interests or theoretical outlook, even if he refrains from putting any special interpretation on these facts. The wide field of observation which the anthropologist claims to cover in his effort to describe tribal life makes such selection even more arbitrary.[120]

What a refreshing statement!

The above stand does not imply an "atomistic" position--that all description is relative to the peculiar techniques of the observer and thereby not comparable. For a scientific attitude can be maintained if the field-anthropologist states clearly what his theoretical and methodological tools are and how they have influenced the collection and organization of field-data.

> Before proceeding to the account of the Kula, it will be well to give a description of the methods used in the collecting of the ethnographic material. The results of scientific research in any branch of learning ought to be presented in a manner absolutely candid and above board. No one would dream of making an experimental contribution to

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[120] Richards, A. I., "The Development of Field-Work Methods in Social Anthropology," in The Study of Society, edited by F. C. Bartlett, et al. (New York: The Macmillan Co.), 1939, p. 274.

> physical or chemical science, without giving a detailed account of all the arrangements of the experiments; an exact description of the apparatus used; of the manner in which the observations were conducted; of their number; of the length of time devoted to them; and of the degree of approximation with which each measurement was made.[121]

The data collected by the field-anthropologist can then be interpreted with reference to his theories and methodologies, and the skill with which he has applied these.

New approaches are being tried in field-anthropology in order to eliminate the personal friction of a strange observer. One such approach is that recently used by Leo Simmons in presenting Sun Chief.[122]

A Hopi Indian, Don Talayesva, who can read, write, and speak English, is currently keeping a diary under Simmons' tutorage. Every significant incident in Don's daily life is recorded. The diary is furthermore checked for individual interpretation against the cultural situation--the Hopi life-scene--as constructed by the anthropologists. The Indian's life-history is also reconstructed both through personal memory and historical data. The historical and field-data act as a check on the introspective nature of the individual's description and interpretation. Material collected in this manner provides a wealth of knowledge about social-psychological behavior. Simmons could provide, for example, a "situational analysis" of most

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[121] Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, p. 2.

[122] Simmons, L. W., Sun Chief: The Autobiography of a Hopi Indian (New Haven: The Yale University Press), 1942.

of Don's actions. From the autobiographic sketch could be drawn the motivation and "tone" of each act. The autobiographic approach is certainly an excellent manner for investigating personality problems--to find out how an individual feels, thinks, behaves; the approach will become more valuable as the studies become more numerous. For in that way, we will have pictures of both men and women and their varied roles in a society.[123]

This autobiographic approach is, of course, similar to the case studies employed by the psychologists and the sociologists in western society, but has the additional difficulty of investigation in an alien situation. Similar difficulties in social work are encountered when studies are made in "Little Italy," "Russian Town," or in some other culture transplanted from the Old World.

Another method which has been frequently used to eliminate the residence problem and evaluation by a stranger is to train natives to gather the material. Considerable intercultural friction is in this manner avoided. But even native investigators encounter trouble, for when the informants become friendly with the white man they often lose status in their own society, thus making it impossible to obtain many sources of knowledge. Furthermore, a completely relativistic study is still impossible, the data collected being evaluated on the basis of the theories and methods used by the informant. Franz Boas and Truman

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[123]Some other important marginal autobiographies are: Underhill's The Autobiography of a Papago Woman; Radin's Crashing Thunder; Michelson's The Autobiography of a Fox Indian; Parsons' A Pueblo Indian Journal; Opler's Dirty Boy; et al.

Michelson used trained native investigators with considerable success in collecting texts.

Malinowski is certainly correct in insisting that anthropologists carry on laboratory work; that is, work in residence with marginal peoples. However, he has created a pseudo-problem in demanding complete relativity--a position which conflicts with his basic scientific suppositions.

The relativistic position which demands that the field-anthropologist interpret a marginal culture through the eyes of the natives is inconsistent with a scientific philosophy. Science is a technique for evaluating data; a technique for making choices. When the field-worker lives with a marginal group, he collects and organized the data according to his methods and theories, and not with a "pure" mind. The "empirical" observer is a mythological character. The evaluations are there whether he admits them or not; the important thing is that he be forced to admit them.

At present, the emphasis in anthropology is on removing from field-investigation all theories and methods which will in any way hinder a relativistic description of culture. Many believe that prolonged residence will give the necessary relativistic objectivity. These "negativists" have created a goal which does not exist in the existential world. Fact and theory are one. Until anthropology assumes a positive attitude, that of improving implicit preconceptions, the efforts of many will be so much "busy-work."

The Pragmatic Approach: Throughout all of Malinowski's writings

and particularly in his later work is a nascent pragmatic philosophy. For example, his insistence upon the participatory approach was formulated in the belief that only by observing the actions of individuals in daily activity could one really understand their thinking. The primary objective of the functional approach was a portrayal, not of rigidly codified custom, but of actual behavior: ". . . the manner in which a custom is carried out."

In 1922, in Argonauts of the Western Pacific we find the following pragmatic statement:

> There is no doubt, from all points of sociological or psychological analysis, and in any question of theory, the manner and type of behavior observed in the performance of the act is of the highest importance, . . . If in making a daily round of the village, certain small incidents, characteristic forms of taking food, of conversing, of doing work are found occurring over and over again, they should be noted down at once.[124]

In 1926, in Crime and Custom in Savage Society:

> The only correct proceeding is to describe the legal state of affairs in terms of concrete fact. Thus, the ownership of a Trobriand fishing canoe is defined by the manner in which the object is made, used and regarded by the group of men who produced it and enjoy its possession.[125]

In 1929, in The Sexual Life of Savages:

> As we proceed now to the study of more intimate behaviour, the elasticity of the rule becomes greater, and it grows more imperative to give a dynamic description of how

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[124] See p. 20.

[125] See p. 19.

a rule or an institution works, rather than how, in native theory, law and morality is supposed or desired to work.[126]

Thus, Malinowski in his study of culture obtained the meaning of a cultural item with relationship to its function-role in the society. This is more evidence to support the viewpoint that all anthropology is evaluative!

A Pragmatic Theory of Language: The manner in which Malinowski carried on a pragmatic analysis can be best illustrated by examining his theory of language--a theory which incidentally lends great support to the pragmatic theory of language as outlined by G. H. Mead, John Dewey, and others.

Part Four of Coral Gardens and Their Magic entitled "An Ethnographic Theory of Language and Some Practical Corollaries" and "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages" found as Supplement I in Ogden and Richards' The Meaning of Meaning are of great interest to this thesis as they show an attempt by Malinowski to remove the language difficulties, both practical and theoretical, encountered in anthropological investigation.[127] Here, as elsewhere, is evident awareness on the part of Malinowski of the need for improvement of theoretical instrumentalities in the collection of ethnographic data.

In complete agreement with Boas' creed that "a command of the language is an indispensable means of obtaining accurate and thorough

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[126] See pp. 281-282.

[127] Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: The American Book Company), 1935, Vol. II, pp. 3-74.

knowledge, because much information can be gained by listening to conversations of the natives and by taking part in their daily life, which, to the observer who has no command of the language, will remain entirely inaccessible,"[128] Malinowski believes that in order for the field-anthropologist to present the natives' meaning and use of words, which is essential in all thorough comparative field-anthropology, the field-worker must know the natives' language. The importance that Malinowski places on knowing the natives' language is evident in the following quotation:

> For language is the ethnographer's most important tool. It is through his knowledge of the vernacular and through his practical handling of native grammar and vocabulary that the ethnographer can ask clear questions and receive relevant answers.[129]

By knowing the natives' language, Malinowski has attempted to give, not what he thinks a term, for example, "valu" (village) means in English or finding in English a word with a similar meaning, but an interpretation of the word "valu" by the cultural context with meaning derived from the field-analysis. By deriving the meaning from the cultural matrix, Malinowski means that "every language has words which are not translatable, because they fit into its culture and into that only; into the physical setting, the institutions, the material

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[128] Boas, F., Handbook of American Indian Languages, BAE, Bulletin 40, Part I, 1911, p. 60.

[129] Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: American Book Company), 1935, Vol. II, p. 4.

apparatus and the manners and values of a people."[130] It is only through knowing the way-of-life, the world of ideas of a people thoroughly, i.e., through intensive field investigation, that a valid analysis of the meaning of a word can be given. Mere equation of terms done "by affixing an English label" is not a valid procedure. But by understanding the culture from which the word was derived, and through circumlocution based upon the knowledge of the natives' use of the word, grammatical distinctions, and contextual annotations, approximate terms can be found.

Because the classical philologist cannot give a "full description of language as an aspect and ingredient of culture" especially in historical studies, Malinowski emphatically states that the traditional methodology used by the Indo-European grammarians is practically worthless to anthropology. Too many of the orthodox philologists were overwhelmed by the ethical aspect of language; "how you ought to speak, what you ought to avoid, and what ought to be your ideal." This idea is brought out by Jespersen in discussing the ceremonial rigidity of Latin and its influence upon studies of language in the Middle Ages and later.

> Latin was not even taught and learnt solely with the purpose of opening the doors to the old classical or to the more recent religious literature in that language, but chiefly, and in the first instance, because Latin was a practical and highly important means of communication between educated people. One had to learn not only to read

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[130] Ibid., p. 12.

> Latin, but also to write Latin, if one wanted to maintain no matter how humble a position in the republic of learning or in the hierarchy of the Church. Consequently grammar was not (even primarily) the science of how words were inflected and how forms were used by the old Romans, but chiefly and essentially the art of inflecting words and of using the forms yourself, if you wanted to write correct Latin. This you must say, and these faults you must avoid--such were the lessons imparted in the schools. Grammar was not a set of facts observed but of rules to be observed, and of paradigms, i.e., of patterns, to be followed. . . . In other words, grammar was prescriptive rather than descriptive.[131]

Besides objecting to the normative way of viewing language, Malinowski attacks the historical romanticism concerning the formation of, for example, "Romance languages out of Latin" and the "firm belief that a language becomes really beautiful and instructive--ethically, logically and aesthetically valuable--when it is dead."

Three reasons are given why the classical Indo-European philologists' over-all methodology is fruitless for the anthropologist; although Malinowski realizes the debt anthropology owes classical scholars like Rask, Grimm, and Bopp. The task of the anthropologist is neither normative, reconstructive, nor historical. (Here is a methodological error which Malinowski notes in later works, and it will be discussed in that connection.)[132] Malinowski's anti-historical attitude towards linguistic studies is clearly shown in the following quotation:

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[131] Jespersen, J. O. H., Language (New York: Henry Holt and Company), 1922, p. 24.

[132] Below, pp. 117-118.

> It will be quite clear now that the point of view of the Philologist, who deals only with remnants of dead languages, must differ from that of the Ethnographer, who, deprived of the ossified, fixed data of inscriptions, has to rely on the living reality of spoken languages in flux. The former has to reconstruct the general situation--i.e., the culture of a past people--from the extant statements; the latter can study directly the conditions and situations characteristic of a culture and interpret the statements through them. Now I claim that the Ethnographer's perspective is the one relevant and real for the formation of fundamental linguistic conceptions and for the study of the life of languages, whereas the Philologist's point of view is fictitious and irrelevant. . . . To define Meaning, to explain the essential grammatical and lexical characters of language on the material furnished by the study of dead languages, is nothing short of preposterous in the light of our argument.[133]

Malinowski sees language as a product of reality, of action and activity, as we shall see later, and consequently believes that language is intelligible only when it is placed within the "context of situation"; i.e., the total cultural scene. Hence historical studies of dead languages, made by the utilization of written documents, are valueless for they are "torn out of any context of situation," and "a word without linguistic context is a mere figment and stands for nothing by itself."[134]

An interesting theoretical consideration is introduced when Malinowski brings out that it is sometimes necessary in ethnographic description to go beyond the verbal and conceptual outfit of the native;

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[133] Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company), 1923, with Supplementary Essay by Malinowski entitled "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages," pp. 467-468.

[134] Ibid., pp. 465-467.

to employ terms that do not have their native counterpart. In doing this the term is not given an English meaning, but is defined in relationship to native phenomenon. As he brings out in the following paragraph:

> In speaking about "agriculture" and "gardening," about "labour" or the "organisation of garden work," about "leadership" and "economic dependence," I was using abstract scientific terms which have no counterpart whatever in native speech, and yet have their meaning defined by facts belonging to Trobriand culture. The ethnographer has constantly to go beyond the native outlook and introduce certain categories which are not native. At the same time, in building up his concepts the ethnographer must never go beyond native facts.[135]

In the Trobriand language, for example, Malinowski notes "gaps in abstract concepts and gluts in concrete words." A "prominent characteristic of the Trobriand language is the paucity of terms which stand for general concepts and the multiplicity of words which describe particular subdivisions."[136] This is easily understood with reference to the different "cultural threshold" of the Trobrianders, and not to a "poverty of language" caused by a "pre-logical mentality." Malinowski believes that terminology is determined by the actual needs of the natives in their life activities, and if you do not find, for example, a general term for "people who do not garden," it is because to the Trobrianders all people garden.

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[135] Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: American Book Company), 1935, Vol. II, p. 19.

[136] Ibid., p. 66.

In the collection of linguistic data, as well as with general field data, a number of pitfalls must be avoided. In order to describe a living-and-acting community realistically, the field-anthropologist must carefully distinguish between traditional or volunteered statements in answer to direct questions.[137] Also, homonyms, or words with a multiplicity of meanings, must be carefully differentiated. For example, carelessness in the lumping of the meanings of the word "mana" (magical force) has caused a great deal of theoretical confusion in anthropological literature. In this connection, Malinowski denotes a possible generalization of linguistic behavior; i.e., "the more important the term (in the society), the more pronounced is the tendency to use it over a wide range of meanings." The word will function with all sorts of subsidiary meanings because of its important pragmatic or practical role in the society.[138]

But probably the most important point noted is that language does not simply mirror reality. The "one word--one idea--one piece of reality" methodology employed by some anthropologists in kinship studies is extremely superficial and dangerous. In doing this one may group together two people denoted by the same term and miss important "behavior patterns," recognized by the natives, which clearly distinguish the two. As Malinowski explicitly states, "a purely formal terminological approach to any aspect of human culture must be futile."[139]

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[137] Ibid., p. 5.

[138] Ibid., p. 68.

[139] Ibid., pp. 65 and vii-viii.

An analysis of Malinowski's treatment of language shows relationship to at least two "schools" of theory: the so-called "Functional" school of which he was the leading proponent, and the so-called "Pragmatic" school in philosophy of James-Peirce-Mead-Dewey. Here the term "school" is used figuratively.

Relationship to the "Functionalists" is apparent in everything Malinowski has written, and the varied theoretical foundations of "functionalism" have obviously influenced his treatment of language. The concept that every element in a culture is structurally related to the total cultural context, and that the "meaning" of the element is derived from its function-role in the culture context, is used by Malinowski to treat language, as well as social organization, economics, and the arts and crafts. The task of the ethno-linguist is "to give a full description of language as an aspect and ingredient of culture."[140] The following quotation, including incidentally an unnecessary dig at Boas, is characteristic of Malinowski's position:

> Language therefore must be linked up with all the other aspects of human culture. Language is not something which can be studied independently of cultural reality. To divide anthropology, as one of the leaders of our science has done recently, into three disciplines, one of which is concerned with the human frame, the other with culture, and the third with language--shows that the relation between language and culture has not been sufficiently appreciated by modern anthropology in general.[141]

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[140] Ibid., pp. viii-ix.

[141] Ibid., pp. vii-viii.

Far more interesting and significant theoretically than the relationship of language to "Functionalism" is Malinowski's "pragmatic" treatment of language. The term "pragmatic" as used here by Malinowski means "that words in their primary and essential sense do, act, produce and achieve." To my knowledge Malinowski's first thorough "pragmatic" treatment of language is found in the Supplement of The Meaning of Meaning. Here Malinowski stated egotistically that he had arrived at the concept of language "as a mode of action" through separate field inquiry, realizing independently as did "Messrs. Ogden and Richards, Dr. Head, Dr. Gardiner" the basic psychological considerations of language and treating it as an "indispensable element of concerted human action."[142] Despite Malinowski's boast, we suspect that he was already under the influence of the pragmatic and functional schools at the time that he wrote the Supplement. A more systematic treatment of this same thesis is found, of course, in Part Four of Coral Gardens.

Malinowski, first of all, considers language as an active mode of human behavior rather than as a reflective or cognitive mode. Words, for example, should be studied for their dynamic rather than for their intellectual functions. Language is a tool, and like all tools when in use, involves action. Language is primarily an instrument of action.

However, language has been conventionally portrayed as a process

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[142] Op. cit., p. 455.

running parallel to and exactly corresponding with the mental process. This relation between verbal statements and mental attitudes, i.e., between words and ideas, has been, in fact, the primary consideration of the orthodox philologists. Malinowski brings out this idea in the following paragraph:

> Language is usually, though . . . incorrectly, regarded as "The expression of thought by means of Speech Sounds." The obvious idea, therefore, is that linguistic structure is the result of rules of human thought, that "every grammatical category is--or ought to be--the expression of some logical category."[143]

The orthodox philologist when discussing the relationship between language and thought is of the "empirical" opinion that thought, the "Mind," existed prior to communication. The implication is that language is merely a symbolic technique by means of which thought is communicated. The psychological presuppositions of this position are no longer tenable. Malinowski, in agreement with modern experimental psychology, states that "language is little influenced by thought, but thought, on the contrary, having to borrow from action its tool--that is, language--[and] is largely influenced thereby."[144] Malinowski conceives language as a necessary prerequisite to thought. The "Mind" does not exist as an entity before the development of communication. Because of his pragmatic analysis, Malinowski recognized the formative role of language when other linguists did not. In his survey of

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[143] Ibid., p. 495.

[144] Ibid., p. 498.

Trobriand gardening, Malinowski clearly brings out the "pragmatic" nature of language:

> These people have to determine the area to be put under cultivation, to fix the boundary in short to make everything ready for the cutting of the boundary belt. The older men, with experience and a good knowledge of the ground, identify the fields, place the boundaries by means of landmarks and trace the lines of stone. All this is done by means of a combination of speech and bodily activity. Movements, words and gestures are used to solve this practical problem. The natives search for objects such as trees, coral outcrops, or stone heaps, discuss their proper names, point out, disagree. Finally they come to a decision which is the outcome of verbal discourse, of going about, pointing and using implements; for, as they come to an agreement, they leave signs, blaze marks on trees, and cut down saplings. . . . Speech is here equivalent to gesture and to motion. It does not function as an expression of thought or communication of ideas but as a part of concerted activity. If we jotted down the words spoken there and treated them as a text divorced from its context of action and situation, the words would obviously remain meaningless and futile. In order to reconstruct the meaning of sounds it is necessary to describe the bodily behaviour of the men, to know the purpose of their concerted action, as well as their sociology. Speech here is primarily used for the achievement of a practical result.[145]

A "pragmatic" understanding of the character of language is valid, according to Malinowski, not only for analyzing the more mundane activities of everyday life, but in understanding too, for example, a typical Trobriand magical formula. For to the native, the formula is not merely a bit of traditional folklore, but a verbal act whereby powerful forces will be loosened--forces which will control and modify the activities of the group. It is a momentous and sacred act, as

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[145] Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: The American Book Company), 1935, Vol. II, pp. 7-8.

surely a part of real action or activity as gardening or paddling a canoe.[146] The "meaning" of the formula cannot be derived from the mere verbal prescriptions, but only from the active "behavior patterns" that the formula stimulates; thus the necessity of studying the "context of the action." Moreover, to fully interpret the "meaning" of the interrelated elements, the field-anthropologist must study the "context of the situation," as noted above.[147]

The analysis of the "magical word" is one of Malinowski's most thorough contributions, and further illustrates the so-called "pragmatic" character of magical utterances. It also defines the relationship between magic and language (words). For example, "when the magician mumbles over some herbs in his hut--is it just an empty monologue?" For it is neither a piece of conversation, a prayer, nor a statement.[148] What then is the "pragmatic" function of "magical words"?

Here again we can only determine the "meaning" of words and their "pragmatic" function by reference to the "context of the situation" and the "context of action." The Trobrianders, as we see by the following quotation, firmly believe that words have power over things:

> In studying the infantile formation of meaning and the savage of illiterate meaning, we found this very magical attitude towards words. The word gives power, allows one to

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[146] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[147] Above, p. 90.

[148] Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: The American Book Company), 1935, Vol. II, p. 214.

> exercise an influence over an object or an action. The meaning of a word arises out of familiarity, out of ability to use, out of the faculty of direct clamouring as with the infant, or practically directing as with primitive man. A word is used always in direct active conjunction with the reality it means. The word acts on the thing and the thing releases the word in the human mind. This indeed is nothing more or less than the essence of the theory which underlies the use of verbal magic. And this theory we find based on real psychological experiences in primitive forms of speech.[149]

The Trobriander, and other marginal groups, believe that words will stimulate action.[150] Utterance of the word "spider" in a magical formula will sympathetically induce a web-like development of particular vines. Listing of ancestral spirits produces effects on fertility. In Trobriand gardening, an accredited magician by means of magical spells produces (it is believed) generation in plants. The natives attribute scientific efficacy to magical utterances; this constitutes a pseudo-science. (It is interesting to note that Malinowski also makes this mistake when discussing garden-magic.) Although a magical belief, this belief has powerful social and cultural force. The

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[149] Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, with Essay by Malinowski, p. 490.

[150] It is a universal phenomenon for people to identify the symbol with the referent; that is, to identify the thing to which the symbol or sign refers. Small children (and marginal peoples) identify the sign as being an intrinsic part of the referent. Thus, for example, the child believes that through vocalization he can control the environment. It isn't until much later that the child realizes that mere symbols will not control the environment (Piaget). Because man believes that symbols must have a referent, he is under the compulsion to create "supra-empirical" referents; that is, if he cannot find referents in the existential world. Through this identification process, it is believed that words control the environment--thus marginal man chants and we pray. This is a naturalistic explanation of magic (George Gentry--lecture notes).

function then of these utterances is to produce "effective change." Here language, or words in action, have a "mystical power which transcends the mere utilitarian convenience of such words in communication from man to man."[151]

Malinowski further brings out that law in our society is not mere instrumental control (in the Deweyian sense), but control based upon sacred incantations and sacraments; upon mystical and religious ideals of the community and state. To mouth a law is to state a belief in the absolute sanctity of its control, or of the action (the results) it stimulates. A greater part of modern legal terminology is sympathetic magic.[152] With little overt recognition, Malinowski illustrates the basic dichotomy that is intrinsic in modern western legal systems. On one side is a mass of technological or instrumental controls (laws) sponsored by the level of technological achievement--the "needs" of the community (for example, child labor laws), and on the other side is the mass of magical prescriptions that permit or inhibit the adjustment of the social and instrumental forces ("property laws" are an obvious example).[153]

Furthermore, Malinowski recognized, as did Ogden and Richards, the instrumental-magical dichotomy in language. "The various structural peculiarities of a modern, civilized language carry . . . an

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[151] Op. cit., p. 214.

[152] Ibid., pp. 234-235.

[153] A definition of instrumental will be found above, p. 22.

enormous dead-weight of archaic use, of magical superstition and of mystical vagueness."[154] Then there is that part of linguistic structure which is a product of man's practical "needs," or which are basic to linguistic structure and function (grammar, vocabulary, sound)--a product of man's adjustment to his total environment through the use of tools. For example, the words with meanings developed in the laboratory during experimental operations or during reflective thinking are instrumental rather than magical. So are many of the terms employed by the primitive in gardening, in making baskets, or in fishing.

But in his analysis of the function of "magical words" and magic, Malinowski completely overlooks the dichotomy which he so vividly illustrates in his field sketches. The essence of the error is that he believes (and defends) magic and magical words are a basic instrumentality. Malinowski states that "the sacredness of words and their socially sanctioned inviolability are absolutely necessary to the existence of social order," and that "if promises and contracts were not regarded as something more than flatus vocis, social order would cease to exist in a complex civilization as well as in a primitive tribe."[155] With relationship to the function of magic, Malinowski states its so-called "instrumental" character explicitly:

> The garden magician, according to native ideas, thus controls both the work of man and the forces of Nature. He

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[154] Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, 1923, with Essay by Malinowski, pp. 497-498.

[155] Op. cit., p. 234.

> also acts directly as supervisor of gardening, sees to it that people do not skimp their work, or lag behind with it. Thus magic is a systematizing, regulating, and controlling influence in garden work. The magician in carrying out the rites, sets the pace, compels people to apply themselves to certain tasks, and to accomplish them properly and in time. Incidentally magic also imposes on the tribe a good deal of extra work, of apparently unnecessary, hampering taboos and regulations. . . . In the long run, however, there is no doubt that by its influence in ordering, systematizing and regulating work, magic is economically invaluable for the natives.[156]

The basic error in Malinowski's analysis of magic and magical words is that he attributes conflicting function-roles to the same phenomenon. As we have already noted above, Malinowski believes in the "instrumental" efficacy of magic and magical words. On the other hand, Malinowski repeatedly refers to the ceremonial nature of magic and magical words; that is, the function of magic and magical words is one of "power control" and mysticism. Power control can be defined here as the assertion of Absolute Authority over the actions of an individual and/or individuals by means of moral or physical coercion. In the case of magic among the Trobrianders, it is moral Authoritarianism or dogma, in that control is based upon the sanctity of tradition and custom accompanied by the fear of physical coercion through intervention of deistic powers. The inertia of ceremonial patterns is vividly illustrated in the following paragraph:

> In the Trobriands, the general injunction for always building canoes under the guidance of magic is obeyed with-

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[156]Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (New York: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, pp. 59-60.

> out the slightest deviation, for the tradition here weighs very heavily. Up to the present, not one single "masawa" canoe has been constructed without magic, indeed without the full observance of all the rites and ceremonial. The forces that kept the natives to their traditional course of behaviour are, in the first place, the specific social inertia which obtains in all human societies and is the basis of all conservative tendencies, and then the strong conviction that if the traditional course were not taken, evil results would ensue. In the case of canoes, the Trobrianders would be so firmly persuaded that a canoe built without magic would be unseaworthy, slow in sailing, and unlucky in the Kula, that no one would dream of omitting the magic rites.[157]

Why does Malinowski make such an obviously discrepant analysis? In the first place, Malinowski notes the function-role of magical words in a relativistic and static perspective. That is, if the end in view is maintaining status-quo social control, then magical words are "absolutely necessary." But if a dynamic and scientific attitude is taken towards magical words, then they can only be evaluated as inhibitive to social (instrumental) change. That Malinowski himself does not realize the static nature of his interpretation only adds to the confusion. Furthermore, this analysis is structural rather than functional, because Malinowski interprets structurally related cultural elements (cultural complexes) as having a single function, viz., garden magic, when in reality these traits have differing functions.

For example, the garden magician is both a technologist and a magician. In his supervision of gardening activity he would not rely upon magic for the choice of the garden plot, but upon scientific knowledge of soil condition, drainage, etc. His magical function is

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[157] Ibid., p. 115.

exerted when he chants ancestral names to produce fertility. The garden magician believes that magical words have power over the action and behavior of things, so from his point of view, or from a relativistic position, these magical words are "pragmatic"; that is, they "do" and "achieve." From a native's standpoint, and apparently Malinowski's, the incantations are effective agents of change. But the efficacy, the "achievements" of these magical words cannot be scientifically demonstrated. And until it can be experimentally shown that magical words or incantations produce real material change or that it actually gives the natives effective control over nature, then we can only agree with the premise that magic and magical words are power controls. Contrast these ceremonial words with words that we know are really effective tools--words that are truly pragmatic. For example, the word "takaywa" means "to clear the scrub"; the meaning of this word is derived from the actions of clearing the garden plots, and consequently is an "instrumental" term having results which can be demonstrably recognized. "Takaywa" has pragmatic consequences, whereas incantations do not.[158]

The important point to recognize here is that the garden magician performs two very different function-roles; that of a scientist and that of a magician. While Malinowski describes clearly the two different functions of the garden magician, in the end he combines both functions under the single function of garden magic. Magic, however,

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[158]The quotation on pp. 95-96 above illustrates the instrumental nature of words.

as Malinowski recognizes, has but one basic function and that is of sanctioning, permitting or inhibiting, social change. Magic and magical words sanction by means of power control--moral or physical coercion. Magic does sanction the gardening activities, but this is not instrumental! That is, its control is not based upon scientific and experimental knowledge of what is the most effective use of labor, soil, and plants, but rather upon the authority of custom and tradition. Magic sanctions human behavior in a ceremonial manner and not, as Malinowski says, in an instrumental manner. Magic (sanctioning) is never instrumental! It cannot be demonstrated that magic is instrumentally or scientifically valuable. Thus, it cannot contribute to the social continuum.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that Malinowski's specific treatment of magic and magical words lacks systematic logical development, and that it is a static-structural rather than a dynamic-functional analysis.

Because of Malinowski's romantic idealization of "pure" native cultures, he committed another ethnographic error. That is, he did not take into account the phenomenon of acculturation--cultural process. The effect of this oversight with relationship to language can best be illustrated with reference to the more thorough field-work of Malinowski's student, Raymond Firth. Firth recognized that an acculturating situation was an excellent laboratory for studying linguistic change, lexical accretion, etc. For example, many words in Tikopian closely approximate European names, such as "kapu" (cap), "suka"

(sugar), "bokis" (box). However, many times European objects are simply described by Tikopian phraseology; for example, a smokestack is a "pou afi" or "firepost," socks are "a fao o a vae" or "enclosures for the feet." Then there were words for European objects in Tikopian for which Firth could not account; for example, "tilo" (photograph) or "natana" (iron). These words are not recognizable approximations of European terms and have no ulterior meaning in Tikopian.

Can any general principles be laid down to account for the terminology in use by natives for describing European objects, thereby furthering our understanding of linguistic change? Perhaps, but the past romantic attempts to describe "pure" native cultures only ignored the phenomenon of culture contact. This led to the omission of much valuable data about cultural and linguistic transformation. Happily, a few modern anthropologists, as will be discussed later, are aware of the importance of acculturation studies, and are rapidly collecting data before western contact destroys the field-anthropologist's laboratory.

Malinowski in one of his last Introductions recognized his theoretical error, as the following quotation shows:

> The propensity to falsify observation in the very act of making it, by shutting the eyes to any encroachments of western civilization, was detrimental to earlier field work. Most of the really serious mistakes, for instance, which I myself committed in the field, between 1914 and 1918, were due to the fact that I wanted my Melanesians to be genuine Melanesians and not at all tainted with western knowledge, belief, or technology.[159]

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[159] Malinowski, B., "Foreword" to Thompson's Fijian Frontier (Honolulu--Institute of Pacific Relations), 1940, p. xvii.

The above quotation illustrates clearly how preconceived theoretical tools influence the collection of field data. For example, Malinowski's anti-historical attitude, which will be discussed at length later, led to a "synchronic" description of language. That is, he attempted to describe language without historical relationships, thereby overlooking much valuable linguistic data. But if a complete and systematic study of language is to be made, it should include both historical or "diachronic" data and "synchronic" or field data. This is especially important if "generalizations" about linguistic behavior are to be made, since one of the primary aims of anthropology is to establish "generalizations."

Malinowski's "synchronic" treatment of language can in part be explained as an extreme or polar reaction against the also extreme historical studies of the early Indo-European linguists. Despite this extremist position towards the utilization of historical data, Malinowski's "organic" and behavioristic-pragmatic treatment of language is far superior to that of the orthodox historical linguists, for a pragmatic treatment emphasizing the "context of the situation" and "the context of the action" rather than the historical relationships is of greater value for establishing "meaning." And, because of the varied "social settings" of marginal groups, the problem of "meaning" can best be attacked, as Malinowski has shown, in the field laboratory.

Malinowski in his study of marginal languages has made a distinctive contribution to a pragmatic theory of language. The contribution may be summed up in three points:

(1) Malinowski noted that "meaning" is contextual; that is, "meaning" is relative to the particular cultural situation--a word has no "meaning" out of that situation. "Meaning" is consequently dependent, for the most part, on the "cultural threshold." And for the anthropologist to obtain "meaning," he must pursue intensive sociological investigation.

(2) Malinowski clearly showed the connection between language and activity. "Meaning" arises through doing. Language is a form of social behavior. That is, words can be understood only in the stimulus-response situation.

(3) Malinowski illustrated that in marginal languages most of the symbols used have existential practical referents. That is, abstraction is not a very highly developed art in marginal communities.

Further anthropological investigation of the nature of language can most profitably follow the behavioristic-pragmatic analysis outlined by Malinowski, and developed more fully by G. H. Mead in Mind, Self, and Society and by John Dewey in Experience and Nature. Linguists in anthropology need to pay closer attention to theories of learning being developed in psychology and philosophy and to apply and check these by means of investigation of marginal cultures.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGICAL COMPARISONS

Franz Boas and the Historical Position: Anti-historicity is Malinowski's weakest position. And even today anthropology is still plagued by this anti-historical tradition (cf. Radcliffe-Brown and followers). As Robert Redfield says:

> . . . it may now be declared that Radcliffe-Brown's signal contribution is . . . a strictly nonhistorical, sharply scientific mothod in anthropology. . . . no one in America has offered a strictly nonhistorical scientific method, equipped with a self-consistent body of concepts and procedures for getting specific jobs done in relation to ultimate scientific objectives. Radcliffe-Brown has done just that.[1]

It has been shown that Malinowski's violent anti-historical prejudice arose as a reaction against the pre-scientific methods of the early historical anthropologists, who were primarily interested in tracing origins, defining stages of development, and outlining schemes of social evolution. As such, Malinowski's reaction and presentation of another method of approach--"Functionalism"--represented at the time a step forward toward a science of anthropology, but in taking an extremist position he committed grave methodological errors--errors from which anthropology is still suffering.

Malinowski's anti-historical stand is most clearly expressed in

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[1]Redfield, R., Introduction to Social Anthropology of North American Tribes (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 1937, pp. ix-xi.

Argonauts of the Western Pacific:

> It is hardly necessary perhaps to make it quite clear that all questions of origins, of development or history of the institutions have been rigorously ruled out of this work. The mixing up of speculative or hypothetical views with an account of facts is, in my opinion, an unpardonable sin against ethnographic method.[2]

About historical "survivals" Malinowski is even more explicit:

> To put it bluntly, I should say that the symbolic representative or ceremonial contents of marriage are of secondary importance to the anthropologist. To insist that enshrined in a ceremonial act there remain large chunks of history, condensed and pickled souvenirs of past ages, is simply a case of antiquarian obsession.[3]

Malinowski, as we have noted throughout this thesis, was intent upon the presentation of an "organic" study of society--a study which would show to the field-worker "the actual working of the social and cultural institutions of his natives rather than inspire him with a retrospective desire to build up from his data tempting but often imaginary visions of past stages and histories."[4]

Malinowski's anti-historical attitude can be summarized in the following two points:

(1) Intensive sociological analysis: The aim of anthropology,

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[2]Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, p. 100.

[3]Malinowski, B., "Foreword" in Hogbin's Law and Order in Polynesia (London: Christophers), 1934, p. xlviii.

[4]Ibid., p. lix.

according to Malinowski, is an intensive sociological analysis of a culture with all historical considerations ruled out. The proponents of this position claim that the contemporary cultural-situations form a scientific laboratory, whereas historical investigations cannot be scientific. The greater the time interval involved, the less scientific the historical material. In order to eliminate the historical problem, a culture must be studied at one time horizon. This methodology Radcliffe-Brown calls a "synchronic approach," as contrasted with the "diachronic approach" (historical method).

(2) Static interpretation: Anthropology should be concerned largely with the questions: How is social-equilibrium maintained? What are the integrative factors?--rather than with the questions: How and why is social-equilibrium disrupted? What are the dynamic factors of change? We have previously called the former the static-functional approach. Thus we see that in all of his work Malinowski is primarily concerned with magic, religion, kinship, family, law and order, etc.--the integrative factors which maintain social-equilibrium.

The role of anthropology in modern science as developed by Malinowski is in significant disagreement with the aims of anthropology as outlined by Franz Boas and as modified by Kroeber, Lowie, and other representatives of the historical tradition in anthropology.

What is the role of anthropology according to Boas?

> Subject matter: History of mankind. The science of anthropology deals with the history of human society. It differs from history in the narrower sense of the term in that its inquiries are not confined to the periods for which

> written records are available and to peoples who have developed the art of writing. Anthropological researches extend over the whole of humanity regardless of time and space. Historical inquiry reaches out hesitatingly beyond the domain of written records. Archaeological and later remains, and survivals of early times that persist in modern culture, are utilized to extend the span of time and to fill in details for which written records are not available. In these inquiries the fields of anthropology and history are in close contact.[5]

But the most explicit statement by Boas of temporal considerations is his "three great problems of anthropology":

1. The reconstruction of human history.
2. The determination of types of historical phenomena and their sequences.
3. The dynamics of change.[6]

Boas, like Malinowski, attacked the unilinear evolutionary position of the early historical anthropologists but with deeds, not invectives! In Primitive Art, The Mind of Primitive Man, and in many other publications, Boas attacked

> . . . the theory according to which geometrical designs had developed from realistic patterns by a process of gradual deterioration; the theory according to which all mythological themes and motifs had their origin in an attempt at explaining natural phenomena; the evolutionary theory according to which totemism was a stage through which all primitive peoples had passed; and, lastly, the theory according to

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[5] Boas, F. (editor), General Anthropology (Boston: Heath), 1938, p. 1.

[6] Ibid., p. 4. Then why, when Boas makes statements such as these, should there be any argument as to whether or not he represents the historical tradition in anthropology?

which secret societies, the world over, had developed out of the men's house and age classes.[7]

But unlike Malinowski, Boas did not go to the unscientific extreme of anti-historicity. He saw the errors of historical subjectivism, unilinear evolution, culture-area reconstructions, of the "quantitative methods," but Boas did not divorce history from anthropology.

Which one of the two positions--Malinowski's or Boas'--meets more fully the demands of scientific methodology?

In the first place, Malinowski committed a prime logical offense in his criticisms of historical method; that is, he universalized a particular. Malinowski was criticizing a particular historical methodology--historical reconstruction and the study of origins--but he identified this historical methodology with history as a whole and thus made a sweeping condemnation of history as such. However, we know that historical methodology includes a far greater "frame of reference" than that recognized by Malinowski. For purposes of analysis, we shall refer to historical methodology (including all historical avenues of approach) as the temporal process.

In the second place, Boas recognized, as Malinowski did not, that history cannot be either realistically or scientifically separated from anthropology. All human experience is historical--or as Dewey says, "experience is history." Reflective thinking always involves a

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[7]Radin, P., Method and Theory in Ethnology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company), 1933, p. 134.

reconstruction of past experience. All inventions are in part historical reconstructions.

To the study of man, as Dewey shows, history furnishes the necessary naturalistic setting:

> Aside from mathematics, all knowledge is historic; chemistry, geology, physiology, as well as anthropology and those human events to which, arrogantly, we usually restrict the title of history. Only as science is seen to be fulfilled and brought to itself in intelligent management of historical processes in their continuity can man be envisaged as within nature, and not as a supernatural extrapolation. Just because nature is what it is, history is capable of being more truly known--understood, intellectually realized--than are mathematical and physical objects.[8]

Veblen devoted his life to the attempt to make economics scientific. He was convinced that economics could become truly scientific only by replacing its traditional taxonomic, pre-evolutionary and static methodology with the evolutionary, genetic (historic) approach of the modern sciences.

> In speaking of this matter-of-fact character of the modern sciences it has been broadly characterized as "evolutionary"; and the evolutionary method and the evolutionary ideals have been placed in antithesis to the taxonomic methods and ideals of pre-evolutionary days. But the characteristic attitude, aims, and ideals which are so designated here are by no means peculiar to the group of sciences that are professedly occupied with a process of development, taking that term in its most widely accepted meaning. The latter-day inorganic sciences are in this respect like the organic. They occupy themselves with "dynamic" relations and sequences. The question which they ask is always: What

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[8]Dewey, J., Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company), 1925, pp. 163-164.

> takes place next, and why? . . . Even in so non-evolutionary a science as inorganic chemistry the inquiry consistently runs on a process, an active sequence, and the value of the resulting situation as a point of departure for the next step in an interminable cumulative sequence. . . . There is no ultimate term, and no definitive solution except in terms of further action. The theory worked out is always a theory of genetic succession of phenomena, and the relations determined and elaborated into a body of doctrine are always genetic relations.[9]

Darwinism introduced the concept of temporal process and change into all of the social sciences, except in the most backward fields, viz., orthodox economics. Unfortunately, this way of thinking has not been wholly domesticated even in the more progressive areas, viz., anthropology. Veblen, as we have noted, has brilliantly criticized the taxonomic character of orthodox economics. Economics has been mainly concerned with categorizing and dust-collecting. That is, economics has not been concerned with change or with dynamic cultural forces--it has not been concerned with how or why the economic system came to be as it is and how and why it is changing. The genetic approach was entirely overlooked. The orthodox economists created an artificial and static picture of society--the logical culmination of which is Pareto's "static state." They came to look upon their given society as immutable and inalterable--the concept of change was foreign and disturbing. But this static characteristic is not peculiar to economics. In Malinowski's repudiation of history, or of the temporal process, there is a repudiation, however unconsciously, of Darwinism--

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[9] Veblen, Thorstein, The Place of Science in Modern Civilization (New York: The Viking Press, Inc.), 1919, pp. 84-85.

of change, development, and growth. Of this anti-evolutionism in anthropology, Leslie A. White has penetratingly remarked: "It is a significant fact that in cultural anthropology alone among the sciences is a philosophy of anti-evolutionism respectable--a fact we would do well to ponder."[10]

In the third place, Malinowski's anti-historical attitude champions a still-life technique. (As a matter of fact, Radcliffe-Brown's "synchronic approach" might synonymously be called a still-life method.) For example, if a snapshot were taken of a powerful cargo ship plowing through the high seas at a given instant, then we would have an exact analogy to the "synchronic" descriptions in anthropology. We could not ascertain in either instance the dynamic forces at work in the given situation, how they came into being, and what will be their effects. But science demands to know how and why the ship moves and what are the consequences of its movement. In a scientific study of society, we likewise desire to know the cause and effect sequence in order to be able to predict and control.

The still-life technique has an additional drawback in that it captures and gives equal emphasis to transitory and irrelevant cultural items. To continue with our ship: if a snapshot were taken of the launching of a ship which included as its major feature (as is most often the case--see Sunday rotogravure section) the traditional champagne ceremony, our knowledge of the technique of launching would not

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[10] White, Leslie A., "Energy and the Evolution of Culture," American Anthropologist, Vol. 45, No. 3, Part I, 1943, p. 356.

be increased. We should merely have seen one more comfortable, well-fed, society woman--and what could be a more irrelevant aspect of a technological society? But to be consistent with his relativistic position, Malinowski would have to assign to the society woman, as he does to the garden-magician, an indispensable, integrative, and sanctioning role! As a matter of fact, we know that both the society woman and the magician are not only superfluous but so much "sand in the bearings."

In the fourth place, Malinowski's anti-historicity is only apparent, never real. His naivete and capacity for self-delusion are impressive. Despite his protestations and belief to the contrary, he was always engaged in a study of temporal process. Malinowski could not have stayed in a society over any period of time--however short--without being involved in a historical analysis. Wherever he speaks of human experience, he is speaking historically. Many of his analyses are historical even in the very narrow sense in which he defined the word. For example, in contrasting the use and importance of the "nagega" and the "masawa" canoes, Malinowski utilizes historical techniques:

> One point of great importance in the relation of these two forms of canoe is that one of them has, within the last two generations, been expanding at the expense of the other. According to reliable information, gathered at several points in the Trobriands and the Amphletts, the "nagega" type, that is the heavier, more seaworthy and better-sailing canoe, was driven out some time ago from the Amphletts and Trobriands. The "masawa," in many respects inferior, but less difficult to build, and swifter, has supplanted the bigger type. In olden days, that is, about two or three generations ago, the "nagega" was used exclusively in Iwa, Kitava, Kiriwina, Vakuta, and Sinaketa, while the Amphlettans and the natives

> of Kayleula would usually use the "nagega," though sometimes they would sail in "masawa" canoes. . . . Thus, one of the most important cultural items is spreading from South to North. . . . Thus in this district at any rate, and probably in the Trobriands and Amphletts as well, not only the use, but also the manufacture of the bigger canoe has been superseded by that of the smaller one, the "masawa," now found in all these parts.[11]

Thus we see that Malinowski's anti-historicity is mere verbalization. Perhaps his vocalizations convinced himself, but it is only necessary for the critic to point to Malinowski's actual activities to prove the vaporous nature of his anti-historical diatribes.

It is significant to note that Malinowski in later years, when coming under pragmatic and behavioristic influences, revised his viewpoints toward temporal process. Impetus to this change in mind was given by his belated recognition of the process of acculturation. Change became such an omnipresent phenomenon that Malinowski was forced to revise some of his basic preconceptions. The revision was so complete and so enthusiastic (an admirable personal characteristic) that Malinowski pioneered the field of acculturation studies in Africa.[12]

> . . . a good deal of information on contact and change is included in this volume [Coral Gardens and Their Magic]. I was often in my observations driven to note certain phenomena, very largely because my earliest training in exact science made it to me almost physically impossible to neglect the full reality which I had before my eyes. The empirical facts which the etnographer has before him in the

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[11] Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, p. 145.

[12] Methods of Study of Culture Contact in Africa, with an Introductory Essay by B. Malinowski (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1938.

> Trobriands nowadays are not natives unaffected by European influences but natives to a considerable extent transformed by these influences. The Trobriander as he was, even two or three generations ago, has become by now a thing of the past, to be reconstructed, not to be observed. And the scientific way to reach even a careful reconstruction is through the observation of what actually exists.
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> I was thus forced to observe the facts of contact and change, but I want emphatically to state that my attitude, both in theory and practice, on this point was false. The Anthropology in which I was brought up was still mainly interested in the "real savage" as representative of the stone age. . . . On the other hand, the process of the diffusion of culture, as it is going on now under our very eyes, is one of the most important historical events in the development of mankind. To neglect its study is definitely to fail in one of the most important tasks of Anthropology.
>
> I have developed this point of view in one or two articles . . . but I was not yet under its influence in doing my field-work. This perhaps is the most serious shortcoming of my whole anthropological research in Melanesia.[13]

And this is what the arch anti-historian has to say about history in 1938:

> But the phase of world history through which we are now passing imposes on the anthropologist, as has already been said, a new task. He has to study the processes of culture change in their own right. These are a historical phase of first-rate importance, theoretically as well as practically. . . . As an historian he has to recognize that he is chronicling one of the most dramatic and far-reaching crises in the evolution of mankind.[14]

The anti-historical tenets of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown would be unimportant from an intellectual standpoint (we have already shown that it is a pseudo-position) were it not for the fact that they

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[13] Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: American Book Company), 1935, Vol. I, pp. 480-481.

[14] Op. cit., pp. xi-xii.

have influenced a generation of younger anthropologists--Powdermaker, Firth, Mair, and others. The still-life technique has been positively mischievous in that it has confused the scientific aims of anthropology in positing that there could be and should be a non-historical approach. As Lowie says: "We cannot picture a timeless culture any more than a spaceless one."[15]

Murdock, although maintaining a separation between the "Functional" and "Historical" positions, realizes that they are really "complementary rather than antagonistic," and that the fullest development of anthropology will come with a realization of this interrelatedness.

> The two most powerful movements in twentieth century anthropological theory are the historical and the functional, the former stressing the uniqueness of individual cultures and their dependence upon their predecessors and neighbors, the latter emphasizing the cross-cultural similarities that result from independent adjustment to like biological, geographic, and social imperatives. These movements have gradually merged, until today they are widely recognized as complementary rather than antagonistic.[16]

While this viewpoint leaves much to be desired, it does represent an advance over the still-life technique. But as always, Boas was from the beginning most fully aware of the interrelatedness of anthropology and history. Thus, in this respect, Boas was more scientific

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[15]Lowie, R., "Cultural Anthropology, a Science?" American Journal of Sociology, November, 1936, p. 309.

[16]Murdock, G. P., "Review" of Redfield's The Folk Cultures of Yucatan, in the American Anthropologist, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1943, p. 135.

than Malinowski.

In the opinion of the author, the dynamic-functional methodology offers the most fruitful approach to a real science of anthropology.

Radcliffe-Brown: As Radin notes, the first revolt against the early historical anthropologists "is associated with the names of Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski in England, and with [Margaret] Mead in America,"[17] and with Thurnwald in Germany. Along with their students, they have formed the "school" of "Functionalism--Pure and Applied."[18] Malinowski's closest ties are with Radcliffe-Brown, and for that reason we shall compare them at length.

In most significant points Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown agree, but the emphasis in their work is somewhat different. Before we discuss their points of departure, let us examine the methodology on which they agree:

(1) Both agree that anthropology can be scientific, and that one of the basic problems facing this discipline is to refine the techniques used in investigation--to develop new tools for a "new anthropology.".

Radcliffe-Brown regards social anthropology as a branch of the natural sciences:

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[17] Radin, R., Method and Theory of Ethnology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.), 1933, p. 169.

[18] Lowie, R., The History of Ethnological Theory (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc.), 1937, pp. 230-249.

> I conceive of social anthropology as the theoretical natural science of human society, that is, the investigation of social phenomena by methods essentially similar to those used in the physical and biological sciences. I am quite willing to call the subject "comparative sociology" if any one so wishes.[19]

(2) Both fundamentally agree that the goal of anthropology is to establish "laws," or generalizations if you wish, about cultural behavior. Generalizations which will have universal validity.[20] Malinowski, however, remained an "ethnographic provincial"[21] despite his intentions, while Radcliffe-Brown, at one time or another, formulated many provoking generalizations. It has been suggested that Malinowski's interest in establishing generalizations was stimulated by Radcliffe-Brown.

(3) Both are suspicious of historical methodology. However, Radcliffe-Brown does not make such a sweeping condemnation of the temporal process as does Malinowski. But Radcliffe-Brown establishes a non-existent dualism between history and social anthropology.

> I see no reason at all why the two kinds of study--the historical and the functional--should not be carried on side by side in perfect harmony. . . . [But!] I do think that

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[19]Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., "The Present Position of Anthropological Studies," JRAI, Vol. LXX, 1931, p. 2.

[20]Malinowski, B., in Science and Man, 1942, p. 208; Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., ibid., pp. 2-6.

[21]Lowie, R., The History of Ethnological Theory (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc.), 1937, p. 241.

> there are many disadvantages in mixing the two subjects together and confusing them.[22]

Radcliffe-Brown recognized the fact that "social evolution," the temporal process, forms a legitimate "frame of reference" for the social anthropologists.

> . . . the process of human history to which I think the term social evolution may be appropriately applied might be defined as the process by which wide-range systems of social structure have grown out of, or replaced, narrow-range systems. . . . the social anthropologists should recognize and study . . . two features, (1) process of differentiation--many forms out of few, (2) complex forms develop out of, or replace, simpler forms. Used in the sense that organic evolution is used.[23]

It is this stand towards the use of the term "social evolution" that has led some to call Radcliffe-Brown a "neo-evolutionist."[24] This is, however, a superficial analysis for the outstanding characteristic of Radcliffe-Brown's methodology is its synchronic nature. As Radcliffe-Brown notes:

> In the study of social structure, the concrete reality with which we are concerned is the set of actually existing relations at a given moment of time, which link together certain human beings. It is on this that we can make direct observations.[25]

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[22]Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., "On the Concept of Function in Social Science," American Anthropologist, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1935, p. 401.

[23]Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., "The Present Position of Anthropological Studies," JRAI, Vol. LXX, 1931, pp. 11-12.

[24]Radin, P., Method and Theory of Ethnology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.), 1933, p. 170.

[25]Op. cit., p. 4.

Radcliffe-Brown is primarily interested in finding out as much as possible about the varieties and diversities of structural systems and building a "comparative morphology of societies" by obtaining a "clear-cut picture of movement arrested for a static moment"[26] --a functional-synchronic approach. However, like Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown was always speaking historically whether he recognized it or not.[27]

(4) Both emphasize the importance of the nebulous concept of "reciprocity":

> Social relations are only observed, and can only be described, by reference to the reciprocal behaviour of the persons related. The form of a social structure has therefore to be described by the patterns of behaviour to which individuals and groups conform in their dealings with one another.[28]

(5) Both recognize the importance of theory and together have contributed a great deal of literature on conceptual problems. Neither could be accused of attempting "purely" factual descriptions, as is the fad in anthropology. However, both, at times explicitly and at other times implicitly, postulate a dualism between fact and theory--an error which has already been discussed and which will be referred to again under "Preconceptions."

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[26] Voegelin, C. F., "On Being Unhistorical," American Anthropologist, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1936, pp. 345-347.

[27] Lowie, R., The History of Ethnological Theory (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc.), 1937, p. 226.

[28] Radcliffe-Brown, "The Present Position of Anthropological Studies," JRAI, Vol. LXX, 1931, p. 8.

Differences arise between Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown on the issue of the individual's rôle in society, and on the concept of "function" in anthropology. The differences in methodology can, of course, be explained by the general philosophical, psychological, and anthropological training that each received.

Malinowski, as we have shown, was first a Gestaltist and in his later life a pragmatic-behaviorist, while Radcliffe-Brown, by admission, stems directly out of Durkheim and the French sociological school.[29] As Lowie notes, the Durkheimian influence stimulated Radcliffe-Brown to develop a "'Social anthropology' or 'comparative sociology'--the study of group behavior--is independent of psychology and ignores as irrelevant the individual as an individual."[30] Malinowski, on the contrary, in his early work (consistent with his German philosophical and psychological training) was primarily interested in the "Weltanschauung." The feelings and opinions of the individual are prominent in Malinowski's work. This led each to approach a problem in somewhat of a different fashion. G. C. Homans in an excellent article entitled "Anxiety and Ritual: The Theories of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown"[31] discusses this difference:

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[29] Op. cit., p. 221.

[30] Lowie, R., The History of Ethnological Theory (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc.), 1937, p. 222.

[31] Homans, G. C., "Anxiety and Ritual: The Theories of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown," American Anthropologist, Vol. 43, No. 2, Part 1, 1941, pp. 164-172.

> Malinowski's theory of magic is well-known and has been widely accepted. He holds that any primitive people has a body of empirical knowledge, comparable to modern scientific knowledge, as to the behavior of nature and the means of controlling it to meet man's needs. This knowledge the primitives apply in a thoroughly practical manner to get the results they desire--a crop of tubers, a catch of fish, and so forth. But their techniques are seldom so powerful that the accomplishment of these results is a matter of certainty. When the tiller of the soil has done the best he can to see that his fields are properly planted and tended, a drought or a blight may overwhelm him. Under these circumstances the primitives feel a sentiment which we call anxiety and they perform magical rites which they say will insure good luck. These rites give them the confidence which allows them to attack their practical work with energy and determination.[32]

Malinowski explicitly distinguishes between "magic" and "religion" --"magic" is the practical act done to gain certainty; "religion," an explanation of acting in terms of custom and tradition. Radcliffe-Brown criticizes Malinowski's distinction between "magic" and "religion" on the basis of the term "practical." Actually, as we shall see, Radcliffe-Brown is criticizing Malinowski's individualistic interpretation; that is:

> The native performs one rite and says that it has a definite practical purpose. He performs another rite and says that it is performed as a matter of custom. If we call the first rite magic and the second religion, we are basing our distinction on a difference between the verbal statement a native makes about the rites.[33]

Radcliffe-Brown objects to this explanation because it assumes that

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[32] Ibid., p. 164. See also pp. 9-20, above.

[33] Ibid., p. 165.

the native understands and interprets a valid distinction between "magic" and "religion." It is a completely "individualistic" and "relativistic" explanation, as well as a misguided attempt at a pragmatic analysis. For, as Homans brings out, because the natives say that "magic" produces "practical results" is not sufficient proof that it does. It should instead be treated as a "rationalization."[34]

It follows, then, that Malinowski's distinction between "magic" and "religion" is not valid. Because he treated magic functionally he arrived at a sound conclusion as to its rôle in society--"power control"[35] and "quest for certainty." If he had also made a functional analysis of religion, rather than an individualistic (atomistic) one, he would have been forced to the conclusion that religion plays the same rôle as magic in culture; that is, it too is a "power control," a "quest for certainty." While Radcliffe-Brown's criticism is suggestive, he does not note this fundamental difficulty.

Malinowski believes that anxiety arises when the individual realizes that he does not have the techniques for security. "Malinowski is saying that the individual tends to feel anxiety on certain occasions."[36] Radcliffe-Brown does not explicitly reject Malinowski's explanation, but he does offer a supposed alternative interpretation. That is, Radcliffe-Brown says: ". . . that society expects the

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[34] Ibid., p. 166.

[35] For a definition of "power control," see page 101, above.

[36] Op. cit., p. 168.

individual to feel anxiety on certain occasions."[37] That customs are already established for meeting uncertainty, and if the proper rituals are performed then the individual will have security. Any anxiety present is latent. However, if the ritual is not properly performed, he does feel anxiety. As Homans clearly brings out, "Malinowski is looking at the individual, Radcliffe-Brown at society."[38]

In the discussion of "Primitive Law" the same disagreement arises between Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown:

> The tendency rspresented largely by the sociological school of Durkheim, and clearly expressed in Professor Radcliffe-Brown's approach to primitive law and other phenomena, the tendency to ignore completely the individual and to eliminate the biological element from the functional analysis of culture, must in my opinion be overcome. It is really the only point of theoretical dissension between Professor Radcliffe-Brown and myself, and the only respect in which the Durkheimian conception of primitive society has to be supplemented in order to be really serviceable in fieldwork, in theoretical studies, and in the practical application of sociology.[39]

Malinowski, as we have seen, is primarily interested in the way the individual "practically" adjusts to social controls, the deviations from prescribed behavior, and so forth. Radcliffe-Brown, consistent with the Durkheimian tradition, is concerned with the controls that law exerts on the individual. Radcliffe-Brown is interested in

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[37] Op. cit., p. 168.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Malinowski, B., Foreword to Hogbin's Law and Order in Polynesia (London: Christophers), 1934, p. xxxviii.

the structural systems and relations. But he does not ignore the individual.

> The "functionalist" point of view here presented does therefore imply that we have to investigate as thoroughly as possible all aspects of social life, considering them in relation to one another, and that an essential part of the task is the investigation of the individual and of the way in which he is moulded by or adjusted to the social life.[40]

As with a great deal of disputes in the world of science, this one is only apparent, not real. The viewpoints of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown are not mutually exclusive but supplementary. Emphasis seems to be the point of departure, of disagreement. As Homans says: ". . . two distinguished persons talking past one another rather than trying to find a common ground for discussion, presenting their theories as alternatives when in fact they are complementary."[41]

Radcliffe-Brown, unlike Malinowski, is very hostile to the use of the term "functionalism" to designate a "school" in anthropology.

> I have been described on more than one occasion as belonging to something called the "Functional School of Social Anthropology" and even as being its leader, or one of its leaders. This Functional School does not really exist; it is a myth invented by Professor Malinowski. He has explained how, to quote his own words, "the magnificent title of the Functional School of Anthropology has been bestowed

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[40] Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., "On the Concept of Function in Social Science," American Anthropologist, Vol. 37, No. 3, Part I, 1935, p. 400.

[41] Homans, G. C., "Anxiety and Ritual: The Theories of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown," American Anthropologist, Vol. 43, No. 2, Part I, 1941, p. 172.

> by myself, in a way on myself, and to a large extent out of my own sense of irresponsibility." Professor Malinowski's irresponsibility has had unfortunate results, since it has spread over anthropology a dense fog of discussion about "functionalism." . . . The statement that I am a "functionalist," or equally the statement that I am not, would seem to me to convey no definite meaning.[42]

Radcliffe-Brown does, however, use the term "function," and in a manner which is somewhat different from its use by Malinowski.

> As I have been accustomed to use the word, following Durkheim and others, I would define the social function of a socially standardized mode of activity, or mode of thought, as its relation to the social structure to the existence and continuity of which it makes some contribution. Analogously, in a living organism the physiological function of the beating of the heart, or the secretion of gastric juices, is its relation to the organic structure to the existence or continuity of which it makes its contribution. It is in this sense that I am interested in such things as the social function of the punishment of crime, or the social function of the totemic rites of Australian tribes, or of the funeral rites of the Andaman Islanders. But this is not what either Professor Malinowski or Professor Lowie mean by functional anthropology.[43]

And elsewhere:

> The concept of function as here defined thus involves the notion of a "structure" consisting of a "set of relations" amongst "unit entities," the "continuity" of the structure being maintained by a "life-process" made up of the "activities" of the constituent units.
>
> If, with these concepts in mind, we set out on a systematic investigation of the nature of human society and of social life, we find presented to us three sets of problems.

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[42]Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., "The Present Position of Anthropological Studies," JRAI, Vol. LXX, 1931, p. 1.

[43]Ibid., p. 10.

> First, the problems of social morphology--what kinds of social structures are there, what are their similarities and differences, how are they to be classified? Second, the problems of social physiology--how do social structures function? Third, the problems of development--how do new types of social structure come into existence?
>
> . . . By the definition here offered "function" is the contribution which a partial activity makes to the total activity of which it is a part. The function of a particular social usage is the contribution it makes to the total social life as the functioning of the total social system. Such a view implies that a social system (the total social structure of a society together with the totality of social usages, in which that structure appears and on which it depends for its continued existence) has a certain kind of unity, which we may speak of as a functional unity. We may define it as a condition in which all parts of the social system work together with a sufficient degree of harmony or internal consistency, i.e., without producing persistent conflicts which can neither be resolved nor regulated.[44]

The criticisms which we levied against Malinowski's early "structuralism" can be even more emphatically applied to Radcliffe-Brown's concept of "function." As a matter of fact, Radcliffe-Brown's entire methodology might be called "structuralistic." We have shown that Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown developed their viewpoints as a reaction against the "evolutionists" or the "quantitative method," to use Radin's phrase. Certainly the evolutionary position needed correction, but not annihilation! Although Radcliffe-Brown specifically denies that he is anti-historical[45] and although Lowie points out that some

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[44]Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., "On the Concept of Function in Social Science," American Anthropologist, Vol. 37, No. 3, Part I, 1935, pp. 396-397.

[45]Ibid., p. 401.

of his work is "conjectural history,"[46] his treatment of "function" is conceptually static. His interest is the status quo. As Bateson notes: "We have on the one hand Radcliffe-Brown, who tends to see all the elements of culture in their bearing upon the solidarity, the integration, of the group."[47]

Malinowski, on the other hand, tends to define "function" consistent with its general philosophical and psychological use; that is, to regard cultural elements "as working directly or indirectly for the satisfaction of human needs."[48] Culture has developed as an efficient means of adaptation. However, we have also seen that Malinowski uses the term "function" with structural meaning.

In conclusion we could say that Radcliffe-Brown's concept of "function" is consistently structural and that while Malinowski's early use of "function" was structural (Gestalt influence), his later treatment was truly "functional" in the pragmatic-behavioristic sense. Both stress a static analysis of culture.

Sigmund Freud:

> The doctrine of psycho-analysis has had within the last ten years a truly meteoric rise in popular favour. It has exercised a growing influence over contemporary literature,

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[46] Lowie, R. H., "Queries," American Anthropologist, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1933, pp. 293-294.

[47] Bateson, G., Naven (Cambridge: The University Press), 1936, p. 29.

[48] Malinowski, B., "Culture," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 4, 1931, p. 625.

> science, and art. It has in fact been for some time the popular craze of the day. By this many fools have been deeply impressed and many pedants shocked and put off. The present writer belongs evidently to the first category, for he was for a time unduly influenced by the theories of Freud and Rivers, Jung, and Jones. But pedantry will remain the master passion in the student, and subsequent reflection soon chilled the initial enthusiasms.[49]

Malinowski's Sex and Repression in Savage Society is for a number of reasons an extremely important contribution to anthropological methodology. First, it challenges basic psycho-analytical doctrines of family relationships in the "first application of psycho-analytic theory to the study of savage life."[50] Here, as before, Malinowski is sensitive to methodological and theoretical changes in related fields and their possible influence on anthropology. Secondly, the book shows how comparative anthropology can scientifically test for universal validity hypotheses developed by students in other fields of inquiry. And finally, the book is an example of a "functional" work as stimulated by the treatment of basic human drives (e.g., sex) and their cultural ramifications in contrast to the "structural" emphasis of Argonauts of the Western Pacific.

Sigmund Freud pictures the family complex as one of the most important psychological forces. As Malinowski states: "Psycho-analytic doctrine is essentially a theory of the influence of family

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[49] Malinowski, B., Sex and Repression in Savage Society (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd.), 1937, p. vii.

[50] Ibid., p. ix.

life on the human mind."[51] Consequently, "If family life is so fateful for human mentality, its character deserves more attention. For the fact is that the family is not the same in all human societies."[52] However, the psycho-analyst has not tested his theories comparatively, he has only assumed their universal validity.

Malinowski has thus taken it upon himself to investigate one of Freud's basic concepts, the Oedipus Complex. This was done by comparing the radically different western patriarchal family with the Melanesian (Trobriand) matrilineal family and the influence that each has upon the maturation of the child.

The Oedipus Complex, as recognized in our western patriarchal society, is evidenced by the strong emotional attachments that the boy early develops for his mother and the ambivalence and even hatred for the father. According to Malinowski, and in agreement with Freud, the institution of father-right (the authoritative, powerful, and bread-winning father) in western society represses and frustrates the development in the child of natural inclinations; for example, the normal development of the sexual drive on the part of the child. Furthermore, western institutions develop rivalry between father and child for the affection of the mother. The child is an obstacle to parental freedom and a reminder of age and decline. Ultimately, social friction in many forms develops between the child and the father.

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[51] Ibid., p. 2.

[52] Ibid., p. 3.

All of these clashes are absent in the Trobriand matrilineal society. There is no moral horror of sexuality between boy and mother. The father, instead of being a tyrannical parent, is a friend and helper of the child. "He is a stranger, having authority through his personal relations to the child, but not through his sociological position in the lineage."[53] In a comparable position to the father in western society is the maternal uncle in whom authority over the child is vested. Consequently, the "mother's brother represents the principle of discipline, authority, and executive power"--ambivalence and hatred is directed towards him.

In western society there is sexual repression between the mother and the child--the natural biological tie between mother and child is broken by institutional adjustments; for example, foster parents, wet-nurses, and so forth. Moreover, there is typically a "repulsion of the child from the mother by the father." In the Trobriand society the natural relationship between the child and the mother is allowed to run its course--biological "needs" are satisfied. However, between brother and sister there is a set of strong sexual barriers--taboos. Consequently, the Trobriand boy feels sexually towards his sister as the western boy feels towards his mother.

Thus, the Oedipus Complex appears in Trobriand society, but in a very different form from that postulated by Freud. Malinowski's attitude towards the Oedipus Complex is that of the social psychologist.

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[53] Ibid., p. 10.

The Oedipus Complex arises through biological drives but is conditioned by social and cultural forces. Consequently, if there is a different family structure, there will be a modification of the nuclear complex. As Malinowski says:

> To put it concretely, it appears necessary to draw in more systematically the correlation between biological and social influences; not to assume the universal existence of the Oedipus Complex, but in studying every type of civilization, to establish the special complex which pertains to it.[54]

Freud, however, in true metaphysical fashion, postulates the universality of the Oedipus Complex in terms of an innate crime which is continued in the racial memory by a system of inherited, collective tendencies.[55] Malinowski does not in any way minimize the importance of the biological and psychological or unconscious factors, but he does show quite conclusively that Freud and the psycho-analysts overlooked the sociological factors.

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[54] Ibid., p. 82.

[55] Ibid., p. 171.

CHAPTER V

PRECONCEPTIONS

The term "preconception" is used here in the Veblenian sense; that is, to denote a priori, prejudiced beliefs which are held in the face of scientific evidence to the contrary. We must note that all individuals hold preconceptions and that these are usually held unconsciously. Science, as the most social of all processes, raises these preconceptions from the unconscious to the conscious level. It is the duty of the anthropologist to continuously and critically examine his own preconceptions, as well as those of society in general, in the light of changing knowledge. The ability to exercise critical faculties and to discard deep-seated beliefs in the face of opposing evidence is an indication of intellectual progress. Such intellectual "house-cleaning" is a prerequisite to the existence of a body of rigorous scientific knowledge.

Malinowski, although open-minded and critical to an admirable degree, was no exception to the rule of human fallibility. Certain preconceptions which were basic to his whole way-of-thinking he held quite unconsciously; other preconceptions he recognized as preconceptions but nevertheless retained. In the first class of preconceptions are the following:

(1) A belief in the complete relativity of value--"mores relativism";

(2) A static approach to the study of society resulting in "mores

absolutism";

(3) A normative-descriptive dualism.

In a second class are such preconceptions as:

(1) Anti-historicity;

(2) A belief in instincts.

In this chapter, we are not concerned with all of the errors which Malinowski made, but only with those basic preconceptions which generally influenced his approach to a problem. We must also note that the above preconceptions are not separate entities but "logically" and conceptually interrelated.

Mores Relativism: The belief that value (choices between alternatives)[1] is completely relative finds expression in two related forms: (1) individual relativism, and (2) community or societal relativism. We can understand individual and community relativism only by showing their philosophical and psychological foundations. Both individual and community relativism are the modern versions of Cartesianism, which is still the dominating intellectual tradition of our day.[2] The psychological basis of mores relativism, as in the case of Cartesianism, is hedonism or introspectionism.

The Cartesian theory of knowledge is that the individual's conscience is the only test of validity. Descartes treated the mind as

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[1] Geiger, G. R., "Science and Values in a Changing World," Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. I, No. 1, 1941, p. 3.

[2] Lecture notes--G. V. Gentry, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas.

wholly individual.[3] We must remember that Cartesianism first arose as a protest against Scholasticism or Authoritarianism. At the time it was thought a great step forward in the liberation of the individual. The victory was Pyrrhic, however, since Cartesianism is no better a guide than Authoritarianism for fixing belief. Cartesianism fell into the same pitfall as Scholasticism, but perhaps the damage done by the fall was more serious for future generations (as Peirce has pointed out). Cartesianism, or introspectionism, founded as it is on pre-scientific philosophical and psychological beliefs, remains today the chief inhibition to intelligent problem-solving.

Descartes, in defying Authority, located the seat of "value" in the individual--whatever the individual liked was true or good for that individual. Individual likes and dislikes were based upon pleasure-pain experiences. This hedonistic psychology has been completely discredited by modern pragmatic experimental psychology, and yet Cartesianism is still extant and thriving. In escaping traditional absolutism, Descartes fell into the error of absolutizing the individual. As Dewey brings out: "Wholesale revolt against tradition led to the illusion of equally wholesale isolation of mind as something wholly individual."[4]

In absolutizing the individual, Descartes postulated the existence of Pure Reason. Each independent mind possessed a faculty which

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[3] Dewey, J., Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company), 1925, p. 224.

[4] Ibid.

was capable of intuiting or introspecting the substance of Pure Reason. This is a concept of the immediacy of knowledge. The individual mind was alleged to contain within itself a valid criterion of the truth and falsity of ideas. The old classical dualism between mind and body, or reason and passion, is perpetuated in Cartesianism. The mind is the superior realm; the body is the interior, mundane realm. Thinking is the higher activity; bodily behavior is the grosser. Here again we see the Greek spectator-theory-of-knowledge. This dualism posits in a priori mind and makes a naturalistic approach to the study of man impossible.

Because he absolutized the individual, Descartes stated further that it was possible for the individual to doubt everything--even his own existence! Let us critically examine Cartesianism.

In the first place, it is psychologically impossible to doubt everything. One simply cannot erase completely from one's mind the results of all past and present experience. Modern psychiatry records the tragic results of exceptional cases in which the individual begins to doubt almost everything--the result is a padded cell. This doctrine of the "blank mind" is normatively suspect for it leads to self-deception. The individual, under the delusion of being able to doubt everything, in reality retains unnoticed his preconceptions. In other words, this doctrine leads to uncritical thinking.

Furthermore, modern experimental psychology is emphatic on the point that there is no extra faculty of intuiting or introspecting. The individual mind does not contain within itself any valid criterion

of the truth or falsity of ideas. Charles Peirce, in a flash of brilliant humor, has stated that the only reason for believing in the existence of an intuitive faculty is the desire so to believe. This denial of an intuitive faculty does not suggest that the individual isn't a creative factor, but it does remove the test of ideas from the individual. The pragmatic behaviorists and all science, on the basis of overwhelming evidence, have repeatedly stated that the only test of an idea is an objective test.

The pragmatists also have challenged successfully the whole concept of the immediacy of knowledge. The pragmatists postulate that all knowledge is of the discursive or mediational type.

Cartesianism is clearly contrary to science. The outstanding characteristic of modern science is its insistence upon objective testing as the only valid criterion of truth and falsity. This is the very thing Cartesianism denies. Even objective Idealism has more in common with science than Cartesianism.

Of course, Cartesianism carried to its logical conclusion results in the Cretan fallacy. If I can doubt everything, I can doubt that I am. Logically, I must also doubt that I am doubting. Those who postulate complete relativism must recognize that this very postulation is open to the charge of relativism. Thus, nothing is ever known.

The biological sciences deny the existence of any dualism between "mind" and body. The "mind" is not something given to begin with. "Mind" is rather a relatively late evolutionary product. To the pragmatic experimental psychologists, "mind" emerges only in the organism-

environment interactional process. That is, "mind" is the result of past experience, or in the language of the neuro-physiologist, "mind" is the total resultant of all past experiences which have left imprints upon the nervous system. It is this body of knowledge which has made possible a naturalistic approach to the investigation of the problem of knowledge.

By the objective test of action, we can state that Descartes did not <u>really</u> believe what he was saying--he was merely verbalizing. Descartes did actually talk to other individuals and enter into activity with them; he did eat, drink, etc.; he did dodge balls, stones, etc. In other words, Descartes behaved as a social being and his own activities are a condemnation of his busy theorizing. If Descartes had really believed his own theory, he would not have ducked in the face of an oncoming blow, but we know that he did. We are forced to agree with Einstein that the only way to ascertain what a man <u>really</u> believes is to note that man's activities.

> If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist anything about the methods he uses, I would give you the following piece of advice: Don't listen to his words; examine his achievements.[5]

It is but one step further to extend the concept of individual relativism or hedonism to society in general. Whatever a particular society likes is good or right for that society. Thus, society is

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[5]Einstein, Albert, "On the Method of Theoretical Physics," the Herbert Spencer Lecture, delivered at Oxford University, June 10, 1933. (Quoted in Joseph Ratner's <u>John Dewey's Philosophy</u>, p. 46.)

absolutized. The Authority becomes the set of mores prevailing in a society.

The most explicit formulation of community relativism or "mores relativism" is found in the widely-read book Folkways[6] written by the famous Yale socio-anthropologist, William Graham Sumner. It is the thesis of this provocative book that the truth or falsity of ideas is found in the "mores." "Folkways" are ways of doing that have been developed by man in a pleasure-pain adjustment to basic human needs--hunger, love, vanity, fear, etc. "Mores," however, are "folkways" plus "the philosophical and ethical generalizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by them, and inherent in them, as they grow."[7]

> They are the ways of doing things which are current in a society to satisfy human needs and desires, together with the faiths, notions, codes, and standards of well living which inhere in those ways, having a genetic connection with them.[8]

Consistent with Cartesian relativism, Sumner postulates that the folkways for any society are always "right":

> The folkways are the "right" ways to satisfy all interests, because they are traditional, and exist in fact. They extend over the whole of life. . . . The "right" way is the way which the ancestors used and which has been handed down.

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[6] Sumner, W. G., Folkways (New York: Ginn and Company), 1906.

[7] Ibid., p. 30.

[8] Ibid., p. 59.

> The tradition is its own warrant. It is not held subject to folkways. It is not outside of them, of independent origin, and brought to them to test them. In the folkways, whatever is, is right.[9]

What is goodness or badness of the mores?

> It is most important to notice that, for the people of a time and place, their own mores are always good, or rather that for them there can be no question of the goodness or badness of their mores. The reason is because the standards of good and right are in the mores. . . . Everything in the mores of a time and place must be regarded as justified with regard to that time and place. "Good" mores are those which are well adapted to the situation. "Bad" mores are those which are not so adapted. . . . For the men of the time there are no "bad" mores. What is traditional and current is the standard of what ought to be. . . . Hence our judgments of the good or evil consequences of folkways are to be kept separate from our study of the historical phenomena of them, and of their strength and the reasons for it.[10]

Societal relativism as expressed by Sumner is Cartesianism generalized; that is, in addition to absolutizing the individual, Sumner has absolutized the societal mores. Of course, those who absolutized the "individual" were really doing the same thing--the "individuals" were expressing, as their own private decisions, the moral judgments of their time and place. Descartes' "original" God, for instance, strikingly resembles the 17th-century Catholic patriarch. At any given time or place, the final judge of "value" is what the "mores" prescribe. What is, is right!

Sumner's thesis has had a tremendous influence upon the social

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[9] Ibid., p. 28.

[10] Ibid., p. 58.

sciences--upon western climate of opinion in general. Sumnerianism, in one form or another, is encountered in every intellectual quarter. Moreover, "mores relativism," pure and perverted, is a bedrock part of modern anthropology.[11] For example, Calverton in his treatment of "cultural compulsives" (which is only another phrase for Cartesianism) shows how every individual is relativistically influenced by the social forces that surround him--political, economic, and otherwise--and how consequently one cannot make a choice which does not reflect his individual conditioning.[12] Therefore, objectivity in the social sciences is impossible. Mores nihilism enters the picture via the personal equation. The individual may see and collect the pure facts, but evaluation is absolutely relative to the "culture compulsives."

> What I am trying to stress, then, by the theory of cultural compulsives, is that all social thought is colored by such compulsives, reactionary as well as radical, and that those who think they can escape them are merely deceiving themselves by pursuing a path of thought that is socially fallacious. . . . The existence of cultural compulsives, then, makes objectivity in the social sciences impossible. Indeed, the actual claim to objectivity in the social sciences has been largely a defense-mechanism, an attempt unconsciously to cover up the presence of compulsive factors and convictions. No mind can be objective in its interpretation and evaluation of social phenomena. One can be objective only in the observation of detail or the collection of facts--but one cannot be objective in their interpretation.

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[11] Lowie, R. H., Primitive Society, p. 439; Wissler, C., An Introduction to Social Anthropology, p. 12; Herskovits, M., The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples, pp. 7-8 and 212; Goldenweiser, A., Anthropology--An Introduction to Primitive Culture, p. 524; et al.

[12] Calverton, V. F., The Making of Man--An Outline of Anthropology (New York: The Modern Library), 1931.

> Interpretation necessitates a mind-set, a purpose, an end. Such mind-sets, such purposes, such ends, are controlled by cultural compulsives.[13]

The above is a striking example of the Cretan fallacy--of the impasse which is reached when the relativistic position is accepted en toto. How can we seriously heed Calverton's thesis, which, by his own admission, is unscientific? Goldenweiser's position is even more indicative:

> Is Christianity, let us say, superior to Mohammedanism, Judaism, or Confucianism? Yes or no, according to who you are or what you believe in. Or, is modern art superior to that of the Greeks or that of the Chinese? Again we are in the same quandary. Or, is modern socio-political organization superior to that of the primitives, the Greeks, the Romans? How standards here can differ and how irreconcilable such differences may become, on occasion, is strikingly brought home by the basic cleft in modern opinion between those who advocate dictatorship, whether communist or fascist, and those others who cling to democracy with its recognized failings and compensating virtues.[14]

Among the more critical anthropologists--Lowie, Boas, et al.--one finds a modified form of relativism. That is, these anthropologists will evaluate physical instrumentalities, but will maintain a relativistic position towards morals, marriage, religion, economic systems, etc. This is the position taken by Boas in the following quotation:

> Observation proves that the inventions and knowledge of man have extended with ever increasing rapidity, and it is possible to speak of progress in technique. . . . It is much

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[13] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

[14] Goldenweiser, A., Anthropology (New York: C. F. Crofts and Company), 1937, p. 524.

more difficult to speak of progress in any other cultural activity, except in so far as those aspects of cultural life that contradict the advance of knowledge gradually disappear.[15]

And by Lowie:

> Tools are contrivances for definite practical purposes; if these are accomplished more expeditiously and efficiently by one set of tools, then that set is better. Hence it is a purely objective judgment that metal axes are superior to those of stone. So economic activity has for its object the sustenance of human existence, and when the possibilities for supporting life are enlarged, as by the domestication of an eatable and milkable species, we are justified in speaking of a progressive change. But in the sphere of social life there is no objective criterion for grading cultural phenomena. The foremost philosophers are not agreed as to the ultimate ideals to be sought through social existence. . . . In short, the appraisal of sociological features (marriage, suffrage, democracy, etc.) is wholly different from that of technological features of culture. The latter may be rated according to the closeness with which they accomplish known ends; the former have unknown ends or ends whose value is a matter of philosophic doubt, hence they can be graded only on subjective grounds and must scientifically be treated as incommensurable.[16]

Let us examine critically their position. In the first place, Lowie and Boas admit tacitly that a universal form of evaluation is possible with respect to some aspects of culture in terms of the accumulation of physical instrumentalities and the control which these give to man over his total environment. But, as the sociological features are wholly different and distinct from the instrumental aspects,

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[15] Boas, F., "Anthropology," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, p. 103.

[16] Lowie, R. H., Primitive Society (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation), 1920, pp. 438-439.

no evaluation is possible in this realm of human behavior.

In assuming this perverted relativistic position Lowie, for example, has postulated a dualism which does not in fact exist; that is, the "sociological" features are entirely different and apart from "tools." Are they? If so, then why does modern anthropology insist upon an "organic" analysis? Is there no relationship between the machine and the state, between a tractor and an agricultural program, between a gun and a fascist political organization? In accepting this dualism, one would be forced to the conclusion that the introduction of printing (a tool) had no influence or effect upon medieval social organization, that the introduction of the horse (a tool) had no influence upon Plains culture, and so on.

The problem of evaluation cannot be evaded by setting up a dualism between the physical instrumentalities and the "sociological" features. Such a position is untenable, as Lowie, Boas, et al. would readily admit. Malinowski alone has shown quite conclusively the interrelationships--structural and functional--between items of culture. Thus, three alternatives face the anthropologists and the future of this discipline will be determined by the channel taken:

(1) Anthropology will either continue to deny that the problem of evaluation exists, as Wissler does:

> However, we must not confuse this use of the term [culture] with certain qualities of individual behavior, as when we say a man is highly cultured, or again, with group values, as when we say one is civilized and the other barbarous, chiefly because we have set out to learn what we can about modes of human life, not to evaluate them. In any event, it

> seems wiser to come into a full understanding of modes of human life before one attempts to value them. . . . What we need to bear in mind, then, is that when the term culture is used in social science, it does not imply values or ratings, as higher or lower, ignorant and enlightened, etc., but stands for that which is expressed in the term "habits and customs of a tribe."[17]

(2) Or anthropology will fallaciously set up a dualism between "tools" and "institutions"--tacitly evaluating one while ignoring the other. This trend merely evades the basic issue.

(3) Or anthropology will acknowledge that "choices between alternatives" exist in every human action and that the major problem facing all disciplines is the refinement of evaluative techniques. In pursuing this course of action, anthropology will play a major rôle in intelligently adjusting man to a dynamic environment. Administrative or applied anthropology will be critical, not apologetic. This will be further discussed below.

How does Malinowski fit into this picture? His attitudes on this basic issue are confused. Malinowski's early work is characterized by absolute relativism. For example, he treated the "magic word" as an instrumentality by virtue of the fact that the native thought it produced efficacious results. Malinowski also distinguished between the function of "magic" and "religion" on the basis of the natives' statements. As a matter of fact, the primary aim of Malinowski's fieldwork was to portray relativistically the natives' vision of his world.

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[17] Wissler, C., An Introduction to Social Anthropology (New York: Henry Holt and Co.), 1929, p. 12.

> Nothing can teach us a better lesson in the matter of ultimate importance than the habit of mind which allows us to treat the beliefs and values of another man from his point of view.[18]

And:

> In each culture, the values are slightly different: people aspire after different aims, follow different impulses, yearn after a different form of happiness. In each culture, we find different institutions in which man pursues his life-interest, different customs by which he satisfied his aspirations, different codes of law and morality which reward his virtues or punish his deflections. To study the institutions, customs, and codes or to study their behavior and mentality without the subjective desire of feeling by which these people live, of realizing the substance of their happiness--is in my opinion, to miss the greatest reward which we can hope to obtain from the study of man.[19]

The early relativistic attempts of the anthropologists are laudable in one respect; that is, they have made us critical of our ways-of-doing and have been responsible for breaking down our western ethnocentrism. For example, Malinowski's Sexual Life of Savages and M. Mead's Coming of Age in Samoa have done a great deal to destroy the "ideals" of Christian sex mores. For, from the standpoint of the biological and socio-psychological development of the child, the Trobrianders and the Samoans have made a much better adjustment. In this particular instance, I would not hesitate to say that these marginal peoples have made a better biological-social adaptation. This is an

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[18] Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, p. 518.

[19] Ibid., p. 25.

example of how evaluative techniques may be used.

Malinowski's later work faces squarely the issue of evaluation. Although Malinowski does not state specifically the criterion or the criteria by which he would evaluate a culture item or complex, he is aware that cultural anthropology faces this "new" task.

> The science [anthropology] which claims to understand culture and to have the clue to racial problems must not remain silent on the drama of culture conflict and of racial clash. Anthropology must become an applied science. Every student of scientific history knows that science is born with its applications. The seven essays which follow are unanimous in their attempt to formulate criteria of practical guidance, to define indices of maladjustment, and to show the way in which sound knowledge can be translated into useful practice. . . . he [the anthropologist] ought to be aware that in the process there are involved human interests and values which must be brought to light and translated into rules of action.[20]

Malinowski further states that scientific evaluation is a task which the anthropologist must face if he is to secure a legitimate foothold in the scientific community. In other words, the anthropologist must make scientific value judgments not only in regard to what was and is, but in regard to what ought to be.

> Knowledge gives foresight, and foresight is indispensable to the statesman and to local administrator, to educationalist, welfare worker, and missionary alike. The discovery of long-run tendencies; the capacity of foreseeing and forecasting the future in the light of the full knowledge of all the factors involved; competent advice on specific

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[20] Malinowski, B., "Foreword" to Methods of Study of Culture Contact in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1938, pp. x-xi.

questions--these are the tasks of the contact ethnographer as a practical expert.[21]

This interest in the problem of evaluation is found in Malinowski's later work. The change in front was largely the result of two major influences:

(1) The belated recognition of the phenomenon of acculturation;

(2) The stimulus of the behavioristic and pragmatic psychologies.

Let us consider the first of these two major influences. The clash of western and marginal societies has had, as we have shown, a tremendous influence upon the conceptual development of anthropology. Malinowski and others who were engaged in a still-life description of marginal groups were rudely forced to change their methods to dynamic ones.

> All this [acculturation] imposes new tasks on the anthropologist. So far he has remained within the limited tribal horizon of an undeveloped culture. Now he is faced with the necessity of understanding questions of world economics and finance, of colonial policy, of overseas education, and of missionary aims, plans, and outlook. Since culture change means the entry of native societies into the arena of world politics and economics, the anthropologist, who wants to study the totality of his problem, cannot remain completely ignorant of that half which pertains to Western civilization. . . . Instead, however, of lamenting the inevitable [acculturation], we must face the new, more complex and more difficult task which history has set before us, the task that is of building new methods and new principles of research in order to reclaim the "anthropological no-man's-land."[22]

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[21] Ibid., p. xxxviii.

[22] Ibid., pp. x-xii.

The phenomenon of acculturation is not, however, a "new" one. Acculturation has been occurring since the origin of man. Today the process is only more apparent because of the advanced state of the arts. The phenomenon was "new" only in this respect: it was new to Malinowski.

The speeded-up process of acculturation in our modern era makes the problem of evaluation in anthropology more pressing than ever before. The development of technologies have brought all peoples and cultures into intimate contact; swift change is the consequence. Again, a number of choices between alternatives exist for the anthropologist:

First, the anthropologist may assume a "pure science" attitude--as Murdock says, social policy is of no concern to the scientific anthropologist.[23] Malinowski, on the contrary, believes that the body of knowledge obtained by the anthropologists in studying human relations can be practically and scientifically applied to solve the urgent problems arising from acculturation. Malinowski pragmatically insists that any hypothesis must be tested in practical application. It is the relevant consequences of practical activity that determine the scientific validity. In assuming a "pure science" position, the anthropologist is not only evading the difficulties of evaluation, but is tacitly condoning the anti-scientific programs or, as Veblen would say, the "vested interests."

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[23] See above, p. 19.

Secondly, the anthropologist may assume a relativistic position which ignores the evident acculturation process. The proponents of this position desire to preserve intact the marginal cultures against the encroachment of western society. This stand is evasive, unrealistic, and romantic, for, as Malinowski has pointed out, the process of acculturation is inevitable. If the anthropologist is to be scientific, he must face the facts of the case.

Thirdly, the anthropologist may act as an agent of exploitation. In refusing to scientifically evaluate, the anthropologist may hire his services out indiscriminately to vested interest. His function will be to obtain the maximum exploitation of marginal groups. Since the continued existence of capitalism is contingent upon the search for markets, the majority of anthropologists can hardly do other than play an exploitative rôle under capitalism. For example, the anthropologist, as an employee of the South African Diamond Cartel, will be engaged in the task of advising his employers as to how they can use native customs and beliefs to obtain the maximum output of native labor. This is only a refined employment of the opium technique used by the British in China. What the financial master is interested in is getting the most out of the natives for the least, and it is the job of the anthropologist to advise him how to do this as inexpensively as possible.

Finally, the anthropologist may scientifically evaluate in terms of basic human needs, fullest development of the individual, and

"keeping the machines running."[24] For example, the anthropologist may instrumentally distinguish between basic human needs--food, shelter, etc.--and wants--individual whims and fancies. A need (viz., nutritive diet) may be pointed out to a marginal people and they could then be provided with the widest possible alternative choices. The decision would be their's to make. The problem here is to develop in marginal groups an awareness of basic needs, and to make available the widest possible range of choices (a product of developed technologies) for answering the need. In a program like this, every scientific technique and resource would be utilized for a maximum human adjustment and technological efficiency. The anthropologist would then serve mankind as a whole, instead of powerful vested interests.

Let us now consider the second major influence. We have already pointed out that Malinowski in his later years was deeply impressed by pragmatic philosophy and psychology. At his death, Malinowski was on the way to rapidly becoming a thoroughgoing pragmatist, as his last articles so unmistakably illustrate. Now, the problem of evaluation is one of the central problems of pragmatism. The pragmatists assert that every act involves an evaluation (a choice between alternatives). Only by applying the scientific method of evaluation to all spheres of human activity can man gain increasing control over his environment and thus obtain that relative security which is the only security

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[24] Ayres, C. E., "The Theory of Economic Progress," MS. at the University of Texas (to be published in March, 1944, by the Univereity of North Carolina Press); Dewey, J., Logic: The theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt and Company), 1938.

possible in an ever-changing world. The strong emphasis upon change is characteristic; intelligent evaluation is vital to the best adaptation of the organism to its changing environment. According to the pragmatists, there are three essential steps in the process of evaluation:

(1) The existence of a problematic situation;

(2) the ensuing occurrence of inhibition which makes possible symbolic "trial and error";

(3) the reaching of a solution (decision or judgment) which results in existential activity. It is only by means of the relevant consequences of this activity that the validity of the decision can be tested.

Malinowski's formulation of the problem of evaluation illustrates clearly the impact of pragmatism upon his way-of-thinking. Malinowski recognizes (although in embryonic form) that these three steps exist. He emphasizes the first and third steps, particularly the third, while largely ignoring the second step.

In his stress upon the third factor, Malinowski shows his strong attraction toward the pragmatic way-of-thinking. However, it was not until the process of change became so obvious and so widespread in its repercussions that it could no longer be ignored that Malinowski began to realize (in a very incomplete manner) the significance of the pragmatic analysis of the ever-present problem of evaluation. At his death, Malinowski had made only preliminary incursions into the field of evaluation.

In anthropology, as in all other fields of inquiry, evaluation is the major problem. Because of its absolute relativistic position, anthropology has in the past side-stepped evaluation. It is for this reason that anthropology, as well as the other social sciences, must face the serious charge by the Thomist movement or the Hutchins' school[25] that the social sciences have singularly failed to solve the gravest problems of our day. The Hutchins' school points out that the absolute relativism of the social sciences makes value judgments impossible; that is, the social scientist, when confronted with the present problem of fascism vs. democracy, has no solution. The Germans like fascism, we like democracy--who is to say which is better?

To solve this impasse, the Hutchins' school sets up as a standard of evaluation medieval Authoritarianism. This school idealizes the supposed integration of medieval society. But as Pirenne[26] and other recent historians point out, this ideal is a myth, for medieval society was in reality characterized by rapid change and the breakdown of a whole social structure. Disintegration, not integration, was the rule in medieval society. Ralph Linton's suggestion that a return to an aristocracy or a rigid caste system might solve our social probleme

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[25] See John U. Nef, The United States and Civilization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 1942 (dedicated to R. M. Hutchins). Mortimer Adler is the most extreme example of this school. Cf. Adler's What Man Has Made of Man (New York: Longmans, Green and Co.), 1938.

[26] Pirenne, Henri, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd.), 1936.

is quite in keeping with the Hutchins' position.[27]

Is there no alternative to such a recourse to arbitrary power as the Hutchins' school advocates? Science offers an alternative, if the social scientists are fearless enough to undertake the task!

Mores Absolutism: Although Malinowski's later work is characterized by an awareness of cultural dynamics, his treatment of "function" is conceptually static and consequently absolutistic. That is, in attempting to describe a culture at a static moment for purposes of simplification, he established as the ultimate value the particular social equilibrium[28] (or perhaps disequilibrium) which happened to obtain at that given time. In so doing, he absolutized the prevailing mores of the community. Thus, we find him insisting that certain ceremonial patterns are efficient, valuable, and necessary for the maintenance of the status quo. Throughout his works, Malinowski emphasized the ceremonial force or power control which always tends to maintain the given social structure, or at best is only permissive to change! The dynamic force (tools, techniques, reflective thinking,

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[27] Linton, R., The Study of Man (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company), 1936, pp. 111-112, 131.

[28] The "synchronists" do not use the term "equilibrium" in the same sense as do the physical and biological scientists. By a "return to the state of equilibrium," the former mean that a prior state is duplicated again exactly; the latter mean that a prior state cannot be exactly duplicated, but that the new equilibrium is only similar to a preceding state. The former is backward-looking; the latter is forward-looking. This distinction is important, for it illustrates clearly the static, pre-Darwinian bias of the "synchronists."

ideas, etc.) was almost entirely ignored.[29] The idea of change was abhorrent. This static, absolutistic, methodology has until recently characterized the work of the "synchronist" anthropologists--Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, Powdermaker, et al.--with the result that this brand of anthropology became an apologia for the status quo. The question which these anthropologists have asked in the past is: "What keeps or will keep this society as it is now or as it was (social equilibrium)?" Of course, the answer is the ceremonial patterns. Thus, one trend in anthropology has had an absolute standard of value--the mores or ceremonial patterns which prevailed in a given society at a given time.

Furthermore, the structural anthropology carried out by Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski which posits that every element of culture has a necessary structural-role or even that ". . . it may have one . . .," and that this forms a structural unity with harmonious and internal consistency, absolutizes the status quo. When a social system is in equilibrium, when there is harmony, consistency, and conflicts are resolved then the culture is "euphoric"--a state of well being. When dynamic change, stress, and disorganization is present in the society, the culture is "disphoric." But this distinction has no meaning in rsality for cultures are always in a process of change. Radcliffe-

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[29] In Essays Presented to C. G. Seligman (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd.), 1934, we find a rare article by Malinowski in which he deals specifically with the "Stone Implements in Eastern New Guinea." In Malinowski's own words: "I am choosing here a subject which lies to a certain extent outside of my own sphere of interests" (p. 189).

Brown's "euphoric" culture is reminiscent of Plato's ideal state; in other words, it is the age-old "quest for certainty."

Normative-Descriptive Dualism: Malinowski fits into the group of anthropologists who hold that fact and theory are innately distinct but of equal importance. In Chapter III of this thesis, the fallacies of this position were pointed out. There is no innate dualism between fact and theory but only a logical, functional distinction.

Theory has been traditionally used as an end; facts were gathered and used if they fitted the theoretical structure. The reaction in modern anthropology to this deductive method is justified. However, the misuse of theory in the past does not validate its dismissal today. Theory should be used as a means for problem-solving, as a technique for evaluation. For there is theory and evaluation in anthropology whether or not it is recognized.

> . . . I am afraid that many of our anthropologists who are most distrustful of "theory" are like Molière's character who spoke prose without knowing it, for a complex theoretical viewpoint is usually implicit in some of the most apparently innocent "statements of fact."[30]

The job ahead is to dig out and critically examine implicit preconceptions. And in the future, to use with awareness theoretical tools. Kluckhohn points out that anthropology cannot be really scientific until it performs this task:

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[30]Kluckhohn, C., "The Place of Theory in Anthropological Studies," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1939, p. 330.

> Otherwise the house that anthropology builds is bound, I think, to fall in tumbling ruins which will not lend themselves to repair or rebuilding. For, howsoever substantial be the bricks by themselves, unless the trusses of the theoretical structure which supports them are sound, the bricks will fall to the ground in a confused mass. A scientific structure, like any other structure, will be stable in so far as not only the primary elements of construction (the building blocks) but also the structural plan which unites and binds together the primary elements and the foundation upon which the whole rests are rigorously tested and examined.[31]

Anti-historicity: We have discussed and criticized Malinowski's anti-historical position at length in Chapter IV. Kluckhohn's penetrating analysis could very well be repeated here. That is, like Molière's famous gentleman, Malinowski had been speaking historically all his life without knowing it. Although Malinowski was driven to admit the inadequacies of his anti-historical stand, he continued to cling to the functional-synchronic position. This reluctance on Malinowski's part to abandon an invalid premise can, of course, be explained by his vested interest in the "organic" studies of institutional life.

Instincts: Because Malinowski was interested in the interactional process between the organism and its environment, he was necessarily led to consider the genetic propulsions of the organism.

His early attempts to describe the genetic characteristics of man were crude and generalized. He utilized the psychological terminology of his day, which was limited and inadequate. Throughout his work we find Malinoweki using such vague phrases as "human impulses," "natural

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[31] Ibid., p. 344.

propensities," "fundamental tendency," "natural inclinations," "innate desire," "natural sentiments," "natural desires," and "instinctive cores," but never do we find a clear definition of any of these terms. However, as modern experimental psychology developed, such loose phraseology as "instinct," etc., was discarded for more specific and meaningful terminology, and Malinowski was able to clarify this genetic aspect of man. In his latest works, Malinowski uses almost exclusively the term "drive," which we have discussed on pages 70-71 of this thesis.

Despite his renunciation of "instinct," etc., and his acceptance of the experimental results of the new laboratory psychology, Malinowski still believed in the existence of certain fundamental instincts, such as the paternal or maternal instinct. There is no scientific basis for a belief in the latter (or the former). Modern genetics is inclined to treat the so-called "maternal instinct" as a cultural phenomenon. Malinowski's stubbornness in this respect can perhaps be explained on the basis that it was by means of fundamental "instincts" that he could explain certain universal phenomena, such as the family.

Thus, it is apparent that Malinowski held certain basic "preconceptions." A critical analysis of Malinowski's work, or a critical use of his data and results, should take into account these unscientific biases.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

A panoramic survey of Malinowski's work shows a very positive contribution to the study of man. For a number of reasons, Malinowski will remain one of the most outstanding figures in the growth of cultural anthropology:

> . . . his name deserves to be remembered as one who set up a new standard of field-work, trained a new school of field-workers, opened up new possibilities in the application of anthropological knowledge to colonial problems, and breathed a fresh spirit into the anthropology of his time.[1]

Malinowski's significance lies in the very thing for which he was criticized--mixing fact and theory in the presentation of his field data.[2] Malinowski constantly demanded that anthropology develop a body of rigorous scientific theory. Toward this goal, he made a great personal contribution. Malinowski was the first to vociferously insist upon an "organic" (incorrectly termed "functional") approach in anthropology. That is, to describe a culture by a succession of different books containing essentially the same facts but arranged around different focal points--six, in The Sexual Life of Savages; law, in Crime and Custom in Savage Society; gardening and economics, in Coral

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[1] Richards, A. I., "Bronislaw Kaspar Malinowski," obituary in Man, Vol. XLIII, January-February, 1943, p. 4.

[2] Fortune, R. F., Sorcerers of Dobu (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1932, "Foreword" by Malinowski, p. xxiv.

Gardens and Their Magic; the Kula, in Argonauts of the Western Pacific, and so on. Although a methodological problem is created by this procedure, in that undue emphasis is given to the institution described, it provides a very workable abstraction. And it still remains for field-anthropologists to develop a better technique for illustrating cultural interrelationships.

Throughout Malinowski's writings one finds evidence of a wide acquaintanceship with other disciplines--economics, philosophy, psychology, etc. For this reason, Malinowski continually introduced into the field of anthropology methodological techniques developed in other disciplines. His pragmatic treatment of language is an excellent example and may be, as Dewey brings out, his most significant contribution.

> I know of no statement about language that brings out with the same clearness and appreciation of the force of the fact that language is primarily a mode of action used for the sake of influencing the conduct of others in connection with the speaker. . . . Nothing more important for philosophers to hearken to has been written than Dr. Malinowski's conclusion. . . .[3]

In his treatment of "function," the interrelationships of the organism and its environment, Malinowski was again a leader in his field.

Malinowski was also one of the first to apply psychological theories and techniques to marginal societies; cf. Sex and Repression

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[3]Dewey, J., Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company), 1925, p. 206.

in Savage Society. He rendered psychology a great service by testing some of its basic premises in the marginal laboratory.

Malinowski was writing on economic questions, using his field-data to attack the classical concepts of "economic man" and "artificial scarcity," when most of the cultural anthropologists were engaged in "fact" hunting. He was one of the first to realize the importance that anthropological data had for the solution of practical problems in western society. Moreover, he insisted that unless problem-solving were to be the goal, anthropology would be so much "busy work."

Probably the most pleasing quality found in Malinowski's work is his ability to change his views and techniques when these were found to be inadequate or incorrect. A lack of dogmatism is apparent throughout his writings. His self-criticism in Coral Gardens and Their Magic is withering. Sometimes he became overenthusiastic, but he was usually willing to retreat gracefully when confronted by more adequate solutions to problems.

Malinowski may be strongly criticized for his vague use of the term "functionalism." As has been pointed out, the methodologies of "functionalism" were never clearly or consistently stated--at one time the term was used by Malinowski to mean a structural analysis of society, at another the term referred to the study of basic human needs and their cultural responses, and at still another time the term was used to denote the function-role of a culture trait. Eventually the loose usage of "functionalism" caused considerable confusion in anthropology--a confusion which still prevails. Malinowski recognized

the harm he had done in this respect and attempted to disown the functionalist school.

The purpose of this thesis was, in part, to attempt to clarify this issue--to place Malinowski's fundamental theories and techniques in proper perspective. In order to eliminate some confusion in terminology, the term "functional" was used with its usual philosophical and psychological meaning; that is, to denote the integration of the organism and its environment. The term "structural" was used to designate a study of cultural interrelations. The term "function-role" was used to describe what a trait "does." If it is still necessary to label as a whole Malinowski's methodology, the writer would use the term "organismic." Like all terminology the word "organic" has many different implicit meanings, but even then it is far superior to the term "functional" with its many varied uses in other fields of inquiry. Moreover, to equate terms in anthropology with their general use in the social sciences is to bring order out of chaos.

Malinowski, like the majority of the anthropologists, did not always face squarely the basic issue of evaluation. Consequently, there were many implicit and uncritical evaluations in his works. For example, his static analysis of society, which led to an evaluation in terms of the status quo. However, Malinowski's later works show that he was becoming more concerned with and critically aware of the problem of "value."

One irritating characteristic of Malinowski's writings is his frequent attacks upon pseudo-problems--the dangers of historicity,

armchair scholars, legal stagnation, and so forth. As Lowie remarks, Malinowski loved to batter down doors which were wide open. But all in all, Malinowski's positive contributions to a science of society greatly outweigh the negative. It behooves every student of the social sciences to be familiar with Malinowski's basic theories and methodologies, for his influence is still very much at work in all fields of cultural inquiry.

In conclusion, the writer would again like to return to the major problem facing the anthropologists--that of evaluation. John Dewey has flung a significant challenge at anthropology:

> Need for a theory of human relations in terms of a sociology which might perhaps instructively be named cultural anthropology is a further condition of the development of a theory of evaluation as an effective instrumentality, for human organisms live in a cultural environment.[4]

It remains to be seen whether anthropology accepts this challenge, or whether it leaves this all-important task to contenders. In the latter case, the result would be disastrous for anthropology; in the former, the future of anthropology would be unlimited. It is the hope of the writer that anthropology will bravely meet Dewey's challenge and thus cooperate in solving the gravest problem which today faces the social sciences.

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[4]Dewey, J., Theory of Valuation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 1939, p. 63.

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